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Abstract 
Fiscal federalism has been an important topic among public finance theorists 
in the last four decades. There is a series of arguments that decentralization of 
governments enhances growth by improving allocation efficiency. However, 
the empirical studies have shown mixed results for industrialized and 
developing countries and some of them have demonstrated that there might be 
a threshold level of economic development below which decentralization is 
not effective. Developing and transition countries have developed a variety of 
forms of fiscal decentralization as a possible strategy to achieve effective and 
efficient governmental structures. A generalized principle of decentralization 
due to the country specific circumstances does not exist. Therefore, decentra-
lization has taken place in different forms in various countries at different 
times, and even exactly the same extent of decentralization may have had 
different impacts under different conditions.  
The purpose of this study is to investigate the current state of the fiscal 
decentralization in Mongolia and to develop policy recommendations for the 
efficient and effective intergovernmental fiscal relations system for Mongolia. 
Within this perspective the analysis concentrates on the scope and structure of 
the public sector, the expenditure and revenue assignment as well as on the 
design of the intergovernmental transfer and sub-national borrowing. The 
study is based on data for twenty-one provinces and the capital city of 
Mongolia for the period from 2000 to 2009. 
As a former socialist country Mongolia has had a highly centralized 
governmental sector. The result of the analysis below revealed that the 
Mongolia has introduced a number of decentralization measures, which 
followed a top down approach and were slowly implemented without any 
integrated decentralization strategy in the last decade. As a result Mongolia 
became de-concentrated state with fiscal centralization. The revenue 
assignment is lacking a very important element, for instance significant 
revenue autonomy given to sub-national governments, which is vital for the 
efficient service delivery at the local level. According to the current assign-
ments of the expenditure and revenue responsibilities most of the provinces 
are unable to provide a certain national standard of public goods supply. 
Hence, intergovernmental transfers from the central jurisdiction to the sub-
national jurisdictions play an important role for the equalization of the vertical 
and horizontal imbalances in Mongolia. The critical problem associated with 
intergovernmental transfers is that there is not a stable, predictable and 
transparent system of transfer allocation. The amount of transfers to sub-
national governments is determined largely by political decisions on ad hoc 
basis and disregards local differences in needs and fiscal capacity. Thus a 
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fiscal equalization system based on the fiscal needs of the provinces should be 
implemented. The equalization transfers will at least partly offset the regional 
disparities in revenues and enable the sub-national governments to provide a 
national minimum standard of local public goods.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Fiscal federalism has been an important topic among public finance theorists 
in the last four decades. The interest in intergovernmental fiscal relations has 
been strengthened by recent developments in the European Union (EU), 
countries in transition, and developing economies. Numerous discussions on 
fiscal federalism have produced a number of arguments, both pro and contra, 
and some of them have become “conventional wisdom” in politics. There is a 
series of arguments that decentralization of governments enhances growth by 
improving allocation efficiency. However, there is no theory that verifies a 
strong relationship between decentralization and economic growth. The 
empirical studies show mixed results on industrialized and developing 
countries and some of them state that there is a threshold level of economic 
development below which decentralization is not effective. Nevertheless, one 
can find a clear trend toward decentralization in the developing world. 
Developing countries have built a variety of forms of fiscal decentralization 
as a possible strategy to achieve effective and efficient government. 
Transition countries are also developing new systems of intergovernmental 
finance. The issues that each decentralizing country faces are at the same time 
very different but also very similar. There is no generalized principle of 
decentralization because the countries have different political and economic 
structures, geography, demography, institutions, traditions and access to new 
technologies. Therefore, decentralization has taken many different forms in 
different countries at different times, and even exactly the same extent of 
decentralization may have different effects under different conditions (Bird 
and Vaillancourt, 1998).  
As mentioned above the empirical studies do not show strong and clear 
relations between fiscal decentralization and economic growth and only partly 
support the theoretical hypothesis that fiscal decentralization improves 
economic growth. Both theoretical and empirical analyses tend to have 
inconclusive and ambiguous results. Thereby it is difficult to draw a clear 
recommendation regarding the optimal degree of decentralization. Each 
country should define an own country-specific model of fiscal decentraliza-
tion, which will contribute to the welfare of the country by improving the 
provision of public goods. 
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Mongolia as a former communist-ruled country has a too centralized decision-
making and administration of public goods supply, both in terms of efficiency 
and political democracy. In the last decade Mongolia has introduced a number 
of decentralization measures, which followed a top down approach and were 
slowly implemented without any integrated decentralization strategy. Despite 
these efforts, Mongolia is still a centralized country, or as it has been defined 
by the World Bank (WB), is a de-concentrated state with some fiscal 
centralization. The process of fiscal decentralization was stopped by the 
introduction of the treasury single account system (TSA) and the Public 
Sector Finance and Management Law (PSFML). By this law the important 
social services such as education, health and culture were assigned to the 
central portfolio ministers, hence local governments fulfill only very basic 
municipal and administrative functions. According to the current legislature 
the province governor’s function is to be the local representatives of the 
central government, to run the municipal administration and to monitor the 
Soum (lower level of local government) activities and budgets. The current 
functional assignment creates dual subordination for the local governors, 
consequently the local governments’ lack of political, economic, administra-
tive and fiscal autonomy to manage their own affairs. 
Since 2003 the share of aggregated local government revenues in total 
revenues has been decreasing and accounted for 6.9 percent of general 
government total revenues, which was equivalent to 5.6 percent of total local 
government expenditures in 2007. The system of tax sharing is unclear and 
unstable, which generates uncertainty and reduces predictability for local 
budgeting. The intergovernmental transfer system is not transparent, without 
clear rules and tends to provide revenue disincentives to the local govern-
ments. One final problem associated with intergovernmental transfers is that 
there is not a stable, predictable and transparent system of transfer allocation. 
As a result, local governments do not only frequently lack revenues for their 
efficient and equitable supply of services, but also have trouble planning the 
future budgetary development for their constituencies. 
1.2 Research Content and Importance of the Study 
The definitions and implications of fiscal federalism are in the center of the 
policy debates in many countries around the world. The lack of generalized 
principles for decentralization and a formalized theory on the relationship 
between decentralization and growth, and the need to define the optimal 
structure of fiscal decentralization in Mongolia creates an opportunity to 
conduct research that should be interesting both from a theoretical and 
practical point of view. 
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This work is important for a number of reasons. First, it will contribute to the 
further development of the theory of public economics. Second, it will give 
practical guidance to policy-makers for sequencing reforms for fiscal 
decentralization in the country. Finally, it will provide government leaders 
more detailed and comprehensive information and recommendations on the 
process of fiscal decentralization in Mongolia.  
1.3 Research Goal and Expected Result 
1.3.1 Research Goal and Questions 
The purpose of this dissertation is to define the optimal structure for fiscal 
decentralization by making theoretical and empirical analysis and to develop 
an effective and efficient decentralization policy for the transition countries in 
general and for Mongolia in particular. For this purpose the following 
questions will be addressed: 
1. Which level of jurisdiction has to fulfill which public tasks and which 
jurisdiction has the legislative power? 
2. Which level of jurisdiction has the legislative power on tax law, which 
jurisdictional level gets the tax revenue, and which jurisdictional level 
has to administer the taxes? 
3. Which structure should have the intergovernmental transfer system 
have to achieve the desired degree of vertical and horizontal equaliza-
tion? 
4. Which jurisdictional level has the borrowing power and which institu-
tional design is appropriate for Mongolia? 
1.3.2 Expected Result of the Study 
On the basis of theoretical and empirical arguments to be found in the 
literature of fiscal federalism, a comprehensive review and assessment of 
recent decentralization efforts in Mongolia will be made, using both, 
economic and polit-economic perspectives . Then a model for a decentraliza-
tion strategy in Mongolia is developed, which takes the interest of the lower 
jurisdictional levels into consideration and secures a more stable budgetary 
situation even in a mid-term perspective. 
Finally, policy recommendations are formulated for the improvement of the 
tax sharing and expenditure autonomies for both, the national and local level 
of administration. Additionally further proposal are made to amend existing 
legislative acts and policy papers in the field of fiscal decentralization in 
Mongolia. 
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1.4 Literature on Fiscal Federalism 
Since Tiebout’ article “A pure theory of local expenditure” was published, the 
field of fiscal federalism has been substantially developed and many articles 
on fiscal decentralization have been contributed. In Oates’ (2005) terminolo-
gy, the “first generation theory” of fiscal federalism was well established in 
public finance. Tiebout (1956) argued that fiscal decentralization would result 
in the improvement of production efficiency by altering perfect mobility of 
citizens and overcome the free rider problem in public goods. Musgrave 
(1959) in his text book on “Public Finance” described the role of the 
government sector in terms of correcting the market failures. When private 
markets failed to supply such goods then government should introduce policy 
measures correcting such failures in the field of allocation, macroeconomic 
stabilization, and income redistribution. He also emphasized that allocation 
efficiency will be achieved when local tastes and preferences have been met. 
In addition Oates (1972) argued that the regions have different tastes and 
preferences for public goods so that local government will provide better 
services for their citizens because they have better information than central 
government about the preferences of the local citizens. Therefore, Oates’ 
decentralization theorem states that economic efficiency will be achieved 
through the decentralized provision of public goods. 
From the more recent discussion on public economics literature one can 
conclude that the central government should be responsible for national policy 
and provide efficient levels of national public goods. The sub-national 
governments’ role is the provision of efficient levels of regional and local 
public goods for their constituencies. With a proper assignment and the 
necessary fiscal tools at their disposal, regional and local agent can implement 
welfare maximizing policies (Oates, 2005). Hence, the analysis will be 
focused on the intergovernmental relations in order to address the problem 
and to meet the demand of the study.  
From a polit-economic view the public sector bureaucrats show a rent seeking 
behavior. Oates (2005) argues that new literature on fiscal federalism draws 
on two basic sources, that are a) public choice and political economy, which 
focus on political processes and behavior of political agents, and b) informa-
tion problems (asymmetric information). According to this view the 
assessment of fiscal decentralization will have some different perspectives. 
For instance in case of developing and transition countries, in a setting of 
asymmetric information and control, incentives for budget maximizing 
behavior of the political agents are very strong. The main principle of the 
public-choice approach is that public decision makers are utility maximizers 
with their own objective functions. Niskanen (1971) has constructed a model, 
which explained the budget maximizing behavior of the public agents. 
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Niskanen listed a certain number of variables in their utility functions such as 
salary, reputation, power and patronage. Brennan and Buchanan (1980) 
extended this view and stated that the public sector is a monopolistic agent. 
Therefore fiscal decentralization will be a mechanism to constraint the 
expansionary tendency of the government (“Leviathan”) through the 
competition between regional and local governments.  
Cremer, Estache and Seabright (1996) argue that central government fails to 
get information about the local tastes and preferences. Hence, fiscal decentra-
lization will have a positive impact because it allows regional and local 
government to provide an efficient supply of local public goods for their 
constituents. Qian and Weingast (1997) state that decentralization is the 
mechanism for controlling over intrusive and expansive tendencies of the 
public sector and supports effective operation of the private markets. So, from 
the public choice and political economy perspective, the fiscal decentraliza-
tion will constrain the budget expansion through competition and enhance 
controlling and accountability, which results in an efficient supply of regional 
and local public goods and support the private markets.  
However, local political agents are keen to expand their programs and 
expenditures beyond the mean and also try to increase local public goods by 
the expense of other jurisdictions. Rodden (2003) argues that it is a matter of 
fact, which form fiscal decentralization takes. If fiscal decentralization relies 
on own tax sources, smaller jurisdictions result and if transfers are financed 
by the central government an overall increase in the budget occurs. The public 
choice perspective does not examine the structure of fiscal institutions, which 
is an important component for fiscal decentralization and the effect of fiscal 
decentralization will certainly depend on the fiscal institutional structure.  
From the economic and political science perspective, the fiscal decentraliza-
tion has many benefits, however, decentralization is not a panacea, and it also 
does have costs. The decentralization can result in the loss of economies of 
scale and control over the scarce resources; inefficiency in service delivery 
and complexity in policy coordination may happen if decentralization is 
implemented in a wrong way (World Bank, 2007). 
Thus, centralization and decentralization are not alternatives. Hence, the 
countries should find the appropriate balance of centralization and decentrali-
zation in order to achieve an efficient and effective structure of the public 
sector. Countries differ in circumstances, thus for a successful implementation 
of decentralization each country should develop an own model, which 
considers its specific conditions. However, there is also a general principle 
that finance should follow the public tasks. The main failure in the former 
socialist countries as well as in Mongolia was that they decided on the 
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revenue autonomy before making the expenditure assignments to the single 
jurisdictional levels.  
1.5 Research Methodology 
The research methodology refers to the instruments and techniques which are 
used to acquire knowledge. Two different approaches for the discovery of 
universal laws of behavior do exist, which are inductive and deductive. The 
inductive approach involves deriving generalizations from specific observa-
tions in a large number of cases, while the deductive-empirical approach starts 
with a theory, which then generates hypothesis subjected to test of hard facts 
(Porta and Keating, 2008). Within this study the deductive-empirical 
approach is used.  
Academics need to understand the phenomenon in a general way before 
making investigation of the specific aspects, thus Simon (1978) hold the view 
that description (diagnosis) is the first step for research in social sciences. The 
next step is classification, which involves the organization of the described 
object into a scheme for interpretation. Then measurement is necessary, which 
is followed by testing and finally testing displays the limits of the theory. Yin 
(2003) argued that the case studies are particularly applicable when studying 
knowledge utilization. The field studies are characterized by the richness of 
the material and ability to recognize the details of practices. This study is a 
somewhat a mix of a case study and field study. The “how” and “why” 
questions are examined in the qualitative studies and the frequency of 
phenomenon is determined by using quantitative studies. Since the conduction 
of experiments is rarely possible in social sciences, datasets and statistical 
analysis are used to identify and isolate causes and effects, attaining 
appropriate explanations. 
The qualitative study included several unstructured interviews of the 
governors of the different jurisdictional levels, and large number of archival 
materials. The quantitative study was undertaken by using the different 
statistical tools such as proportion, percentage and regression analysis. 
1.6 The Organization of the Thesis 
The thesis consists of five chapters. The introductory chapter presents the 
research problem and the main goals as well as research questions, followed 
by the description of the research methodologies and related literature in 
fiscal federalism. Chapter 2 concisely presents the theoretical research on 
fiscal federalism, which starts with the rationale and pros and cons of fiscal 
federalism. It also discusses the theoretical aspects of taxation in federal 
systems as far as tax competition and tax exporting are taken into considera-
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tion. Then the theory of grants is discussed to solve the problem of the 
spillovers and the mismatch of the assigned expenditures and tax revenues is 
discussed. Here the important emphasis is given to the equalization transfers 
and their design. The basic principles of federal finance are presented by 
focusing on four main areas such as expenditure assignment, revenue 
assignment and intergovernmental fiscal transfers as well as sub-national 
borrowing. 
Chapter 3 entails the analysis of the international experiences of fiscal 
federalism in selected high developed and developing countries. The study is 
concentrated on lessons to be drawn in case of transition countries. Chapter 4 
presents the empirical analysis of fiscal federalism based on data from the 
Mongolian government sector. At first, the historical development of the 
government sector and recent economic developments are described then 
followed by an analysis of the structure and scope of the government sector in 
Mongolia. Based on this study the expenditure and revenue assignment, 
intergovernmental fiscal transfer and sub-national borrowing are analyzed. 
The policy recommendations for the improvement of the intergovernmental 
relations system concerning the four main pillars of the intergovernmental 
fiscal system of Mongolia are made at the end of the chapter. Chapter 5 
presents the summary and conclusions drawn on this thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical Review on Fiscal Decentralization 
As mentioned above many developing countries have implemented a variety 
of forms of fiscal decentralization as mean to achieve more effective and 
efficient government. Transition countries are also relying upon a new system 
of intergovernmental finance. However, there is no generalized principle of 
decentralization because the countries have different political, economic and 
demographic structures, institutions, traditions, geography and history as well 
as access to new technologies.  
Public services in most countries are carried out by different levels of 
government while some countries have a more federal system and others a 
more unitary government. The United States, Canada, Germany and Australia 
are among other smaller nations organized as federal states with three 
jurisdictional levels, whereas the United Kingdom (UK) and France are 
unitary states with two levels – central and local. The basic questions are, how 
public goods should be efficiently provided and how the costs of provision 
should be shared in between the jurisdictional levels? More specifically: 
should there be a centralized system where decisions are made at the central 
level and financed from general tax revenue or should a decentralized system 
been implemented where choices are made by local government and financed 
by local taxation?  
From a theoretic view point the government level, which is much closer to the 
people of their respective jurisdictions have better information of both 
preferences and costs (Oates, 1999). Therefore, the jurisdictional level with 
the best information should supply the respective public goods. If a decentra-
lized provision of the public goods is striven for, then a multilevel system of 
governmental structure raise an interesting set of fiscal problems, which is 
discussed as fiscal federalism or central/local governmental relations in the 
literature. In federal systems the constitution should solve efficiently the 
question, which level of government has to fulfill which public tasks (supply 
of public goods) and which taxes have to be assigned to which level of 
government or more specifically, which level of jurisdiction has the 
legislative power on tax law, which jurisdictional level gets the tax revenue, 
and which jurisdictional level has to administer the taxes?  
In this chapter the basic theoretical foundation of fiscal decentralization and 
principles of federal finance are discussed, and the attempt is made to answer 
the above mentioned questions. For this reason the definition of fiscal 
decentralization is presented and its impact on the national welfare will be 
assessed by reviewing the existing literature. Then centralized versus 
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decentralized government, theories of taxation and grants, as well as fiscal 
equalization will be taken into consideration. 
2.1. The Theoretical Background for Fiscal Decentraliza-
tion 
2.1.1 Definition and Assessment of Decentralization 
The design of the intergovernmental fiscal relations has become increasingly 
important in governmental practice and the basic structure of the government 
is experiencing a major change in both, developed and developing countries. 
In the past decades dissatisfaction with the central government in providing 
local public services has risen and the demand for more democracy has given 
elected officials more incentives for decentralization of the fiscal power, thus 
shifting resources to lower levels of government. Since the 1970s many 
industrialized and developing countries and, more recently, post communist 
countries have decentralized their governmental fiscal powers and functions 
from central government to sub-national governments. Formerly highly 
centralized countries like Spain, Italy or Belgium have been transformed into 
federal or quasi-federal states, and countries with a long history of federal 
traditions, like Germany and Austria, also have reformed their federal 
structures (OECD, 2002 and 2003). Of 75 developing and transition countries 
with population greater than 5 million, all but 12 claimed to have imple-
mented more decentralized governmental structures. This process of 
decentralization is actively supported by supranational institutions such as the 
WB, the United Nations, mainly in developing and former socialist countries 
(World Bank, 2007).  
Many different driving forces can be identified as cause for this decentraliza-
tion process. First of all the worldwide spread of democracy is referred as an 
important source for decentralization by enhancing a local participation. 
Another argument is that increasing economic and social prosperity will foster 
the demands for decentralization and local democracy. The rapid progress of 
the new information technologies, globalization and integration would expand 
the markets and increase transnational interdependency, hence national 
governments are too small to cope with globalization, and too large and 
inefficient to take account of local requirements (Stegarescu, 2005). 
Consequently these forces create both, political integration of the nation-states 
and fragmentation into regions at the same time.  
The problems that each decentralizing country faces are at the same time very 
different and very similar (Ebel, 1999). The differences arise from the 
diversity of the national economy, demography, geography and traditions. 
The fundamentals of the open economy and political goals serve as the 
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foundation of the policy similarities. The differences matter, but so do the 
similarities. The similarities tend to set the broad policy framework, which 
provides an instrument to address the country to country policy options that 
allows learning from each other’s experiences. 
There are many definitions for decentralization but generally the term of 
decentralization is defined as the transfer of responsibility for planning, 
management and resource raising and allocation from central government and 
its agencies to the lower levels of government (Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986). 
With regard to the degree of independent decision making at the sub-national 
level, three forms of decentralization are distinguished that include de-
concentration, delegation and devolution (Prud’homme, 1994). First, de-
concentration means the dispersion of responsibilities within central 
government to the local administrative units. De-concentration may take part 
in the administration where local administrative units have a responsibility for 
service delivery but the staffs remain under the direction and control of the 
centre. The local administration can have full or partly legislative sovereignty 
under the de-concentration. Second, delegation refers to a situation in which 
local government acts as an agent of the central government, executing a 
certain function on its behalf, which means that the legislative sovereignty is 
at the central government, while the administrative sovereignty is shifted to 
the sub-national government. Third, devolution refers to a situation in which 
not only implementation but also the authority to decide what is done is in the 
hands of the local governments so that the legislative and administrative 
sovereignties are shifted to the lower level (Petersen, 2008). In case of 
devolution the similar question regarding the tax autonomy will arise. 
The assessment of decentralization will clearly depend on what in realty has 
occurred: de-concentration, delegation or devolution. Besides, there is also a 
distinction between administrative, political, fiscal and economic decentrali-
zation (Litvack and Seddon, 1999). Administrative decentralization is the 
hierarchical and functional transfer of executive powers between different 
levels of government.  Political decentralization means that citizens or their 
elected officials have the power to influence decision-making at the local 
level. Fiscal decentralization refers to the fact that local authorities become 
responsible for the expenditure and revenue assignment, while economic 
decentralization implies the transfer of certain functions from the public to the 
private sector.  
The discussions above and table 2.1 show that de-concentration and 
delegation correspond to the administrative decentralization and devolution to 
the political and fiscal decentralization. In the following it is considered that 
devolution is the most far-reaching form of decentralization containing of the 
transfer of political, administrative and fiscal powers whereas de-
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concentration and delegation only include the transfer of administrative 
power. Therefore devolution is the form of decentralization, which especially 
has to be analyzed within this study. 
Table 2.1: Forms of Decentralization 
 Privatization De-
concentration 
Delegation Devolution 
Economic 
Decentralization X    
Administrative 
Decentralization   X X  
Political 
Decentralization    X 
Fiscal 
Decentralization    X 
Source: Steiner, 2005, p. 10. 
Bird (1998) argued that the evaluation also depends upon the decentralization 
approach, which can be top down and bottom up. The bottom up decentraliza-
tion stresses generally political values as improved governance in the sense of 
local responsiveness and political participation. This approach will produce 
not only efficient and equitable service delivery through better information 
but also lead to a greater participation, hence improved political stability. In 
case of the top down approach for decentralization the central government’s 
perspective may be to shift deficits downwards, or to achieve the allocation 
goal more efficiently or even to increase the level of the national welfare by 
delegating autonomy to the local governments.  
Another important point in the analysis of the fiscal decentralization is the 
determination of a “good” degree of fiscal decentralization. Whether it is one, 
which better achieves central government goals or one, which frees local 
governments from the central government dictates. The choice of perspective 
is thus essential when speaking about the issue of fiscal decentralization. 
2.1.2 Problems of Fiscal Federalism in Some Socialist 
Countries 
Since Tiebout’s article “A pure theory of local expenditure” was published, 
the field of fiscal federalism has developed substantially and many publica-
tions on fiscal decentralization have been contributed. From the above 
discussion on public economics literature one can conclude that the central 
government should be responsible for national policy and provide efficient 
levels of national public goods. The sub-national governments’ role is the 
24 
provision of efficient levels of local public goods for their constituencies, 
because they are better informed about the preferences of the citizens.  
The former socialist countries have had a highly centralized political and 
economic decision-making and administration. Changing the over-centralized 
system in order to achieve efficient and effective government was a difficult 
challenge for countries in transition. The transition countries were confronted 
with an extremely distorted initial situation and have faced severe macroeco-
nomic crisis. For instance, most transition countries experienced a fiscal 
crisis, which resulted in the decrease of revenues and increase of expendi-
tures. Major revenue sources of the former socialist countries were the state 
owned enterprises, which most of them became loss makers or the profits 
were “privatized”. In addition, the increase of tax arrears and social security 
contributions became a major problem. Finally many countries in transition 
faced the conflicts between old communists and new democrats, as well as 
ethnic problems. Making structural change in public finance and getting it 
right along is a difficult task (Jackson, 2001). Therefore, developing an 
effective government sector and implementing decentralization reform would 
be much more difficult for countries in transition. 
The UNDP (2005) has defined the number of differences in the current status 
of fiscal decentralization in transition countries and also points to a number of 
similarities. These similarities are predominantly the weaknesses in intergo-
vernmental fiscal relations, such as inadequacy of local government 
structures, unclear expenditure assignments and lack of revenue autonomy as 
well as poorly administered intergovernmental transfers. As a result of these 
shortcomings, transition countries faced a number of problems in fiscal 
decentralization.  
At first they had a bad sequencing in the decentralization strategies mainly 
because of the lack of comprehensive decentralization strategy. Secondly, 
most transition countries had a weak central government coordination 
mechanism for fiscal decentralization and too fragmented local governments. 
Finally, these countries had a lack of political commitment, which is an 
important factor for the success of decentralization. The main mistake in 
former socialist countries was that they devolved the revenue before making 
expenditure assignment. Therefore, the risk of getting fiscal decentralization 
wrong was high in transition countries.   
2.2 Theory of Public Goods  
2.2.1 Provision of Public Goods 
Generally, the public goods are defined as goods and services “for which 
there is non rivalry in consumption and non excludable” (Hyman, 1993, 
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p.130; Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980, p. 483). Non-rivalry in consumption 
means that a given quantity of public good can be enjoyed by many consum-
ers at the same time without decreasing the amount enjoyed by them. 
Examples of these goods are the national defense, television and radio 
transmissions; when the population increases no citizen will suffer from the 
reduction in the quantity of that service. Non excludability means that it is too 
costly and not feasible to exclude those who enjoyed the benefit but refused to 
pay for enjoying the benefits of a given amount of goods. However, 
geography can place a limit into the non excludability character of public 
goods, hence, they differ by the user capacities (Petersen, 2007). Therefore, 
public goods can be divided into different categories such as global public 
good, international public good, national public good, regional public good 
and local public good according to their geographical coverage of benefits. 
International public goods are most universal by its geographical coverage 
and all people can benefit anywhere in the world (Robbins, 2005). It includes 
international security, knowledge, the environment and economic stability. 
National public goods are those which are non excludable within a nation’s 
border such as national defense and legal system. Logically local public goods 
are the goods which are limited with their capacities to the small jurisdictional 
boundary. Traditional public finance theory argues that the government level, 
which is much closer to the people of their respective jurisdictions, has a 
better knowledge of both preferences and costs (Oates, 1999, p. 1123). 
Therefore, the jurisdictional level with the best information should supply the 
respective public goods. Following this notion the provision of public goods 
would be more efficient if local governments would supply local public 
goods, regional governments provide regional public goods and national 
government deliver national public goods, respectively. This assignment is 
also in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, which also has been 
implemented in the EU.  
Because of the non-rival and non-excludable character of public goods, 
people tend to hide their true preferences, for instance if individual receives 
goods and services whether he pays for it or not, he may be tempted not to 
contribute for the production of that goods and services. This situation is 
named as a free rider problem, which justifies the government provision of 
the public goods.  Therefore, public goods should be supplied by government 
financing through taxes, which ensure that everyone pays in accordance to his 
individual circumstances (regarding consumption and income).    
Local public goods are public goods, which benefits are non-rival only for the 
population who live in certain geographical area. These goods are most 
efficiently provided when they are financed by the local government. 
Example of these services are police and fire protection, public sanitation, 
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refuse collection, traffic control, roads, water and sewer services as well as 
the education. The main advantage of the local provision and financing of 
such public goods is that it allows governments to produce services in 
accordance with the variations in tastes and cost conditions. Thus, a federal 
system where decisions are made at the local level and financed from local 
taxation would be superior to centralized systems of the public goods 
provision. 
From the above discussion one can conclude that public goods do benefit 
those citizens in the jurisdiction where they are residents. But such often 
public supply also has beneficial effects on citizens of neighboring jurisdic-
tions, which called a spillover effects. Oates (1972) decentralization theorem 
states that in case of spillovers a centralized system is preferred and without 
spillovers decentralized systems are superior. So, when spillovers are small 
decentralization is the better alternative and when spillovers are large 
centralization is more promising. However, traditional theories argue that the 
centralized provision of public goods produces ‘one size fits all’ policy 
outcomes that cannot differentiate the heterogeneous local tastes. Hence, it is 
insensitive to the preferences of the local citizen. Thus spillovers are 
inevitable and they can be reduced by integrating the jurisdictions at the same 
level for the supply of public goods where spillovers likely happen (special 
purpose association). 
The implication from the discussions above is that provision of public goods 
could be efficient if different jurisdictional levels do supply the public goods 
with different capacities, steered by the citizens’ preferences. This means that 
central government should be responsible on national policy and provide an 
efficient level of national public goods and local governments should provide 
the efficient level of local public goods for their constituencies. Thus, the 
volume of public expenditures will be determined by the quantity of the 
public goods supplied, which are determined by the citizens’ preferences 
(using election mechanisms at all jurisdictional levels). 
In order to get such results, political and fiscal decentralization has to be 
implemented successfully, allowing election at the different jurisdictional 
level and providing the legislative power as well as revenue sovereignty at the 
sub-national jurisdictional levels. Therefore, questions of allocation efficiency 
and cost sharing arise, and constitutional arrangements should be imple-
mented, which decisions have to be made at the central government and 
financed from general tax revenue or to be made at the lower levels and 
financed by regional and local taxation. 
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2.2.2 Efficient Jurisdictional Structure 
As the discussions of the public goods have demonstrated, each service 
should be provided and the costs shared in line with the preferences of the 
residents within the relevant benefit region. Thus the provision of public 
goods which are locally limited is more efficiently supplied by lower level 
jurisdictions, hence leading to the concept of optimal community size.  
Musgrave (1989) has developed a model of an efficient design of the 
community size, which states that in an optimal fiscal community the 
marginal savings per capita service costs should be equal to the marginal per 
capita crowding costs for the services subject only to spatial limitation of 
benefits. According to this model the multiple fiscal units are different in their 
size and regional scope. Therefore, some goods are nationwide while others 
are quite local.  
So far we have assumed that the benefits of a particular public good are 
limited to just the space of the providing jurisdiction. But in the real world the 
benefits and also costs are overlapped between jurisdictions, which leads to 
the spillover effects mentioned above. Like all externalities this will result in 
an inefficient service provision and can be corrected through a central system 
of grants.  
2.2.3 Citizen’s Mobility 
A political jurisdiction is a defined area within which individuals make 
collective choice on publicly provided services. If the market mechanism fails 
to reveal consumer preferences for public goods then the political process can 
reveal preferences and define fiscal resources for the service delivery. 
Democratic voting is an efficient method for the preference revelation 
regarding to the public goods that links the tax and expenditure decisions. 
Only citizens of that jurisdiction can participate in the election, whose are 
affected by the provision of local public goods and share the costs for the 
provision of those goods. Tiebout (1956) developed a model, which stated 
that expenditures and taxes are widely differentiated among local political 
jurisdictions and a quasi-market process can solve the public goods problem 
for a particular jurisdiction (by inter-jurisdictional competition).  
The model assumes that all citizens are fully mobile among communities and 
have full information about the budgets of alternative political jurisdictions. 
As Tiebout pointed out, “Spatial mobility provides the local public goods 
counterpart to the private market’s shopping trip… Just as the consumer may 
be visualized as walking to a private market place to buy his goods, the prices 
of which set, we place him in the position walking to a community where the 
prices (taxes) of community services are set” (Tiebout, 1956. p. 422).  
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Therefore, individuals are “voting by their feet” and resettle in the communi-
ty, which offers the bundle of public goods and taxes they like best. An 
optimal community size corresponds to the minimum unit costs of public 
services. Communities larger than the optimal size try to discourage new 
residents, while communities smaller that optimal size seeking to attract new 
residents. This competition among the local governments will result in an 
efficient solution similar to that in the perfectly competitive markets.  
The Tiebout model is not a perfect description of the real world. There are 
also problem of inter-jurisdictional spillovers, which result in inefficiency for 
consumer or voters regarding the residential choice. These spillover costs and 
benefits also will affect the local government activities because of inaccurate 
reflection of the costs for services and taxes, which would make competition 
among local governments less effective. However, it provides a useful 
explanation of the mobility within a constrained geographical area.  
2.3 Centralized versus Decentralized Government 
2.3.1 Advantages of a Federal System of Government 
Public services in most countries are carried out by many units of govern-
ment, while some countries have a federal system and others a unitary 
government. Under the unitary system sub-national units function mainly as 
an administrative unit of the center, but a certain degree of local autonomy 
can even emerge in unitary states. Within federalism public sector decisions 
are made by different levels of government, which are independent from each 
other. However, in practice the distinction between unitary or federalist and 
centralized or decentralized government are often blurred.  A federal system 
of government is characterized by numerous levels of government and each 
level of government has own powers to provide services and raise revenues. 
Thus fiscal federalism is the division of taxing and expenditure functions 
among the different levels of government. 
Under centralized government decisions on the provision of the public goods 
are made by central government and will reflect the national median voter’s 
preferences. National consensus would fit in the case of national public 
goods, which would be consumed by all citizens independently of the location 
of their residence. However, for local public goods national decision making 
will be not effective, because these goods are benefiting only the population 
of in a particular jurisdiction.  For such goods, decentralized decision making 
provides the advantage of taking into account variations in preferences instead 
of the centralized one.   In decentralized governmental systems citizens’ 
decision with regard to the locations are influenced partly by the bundle of 
services provided and the associated taxes in alternative jurisdictions. This 
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may create incentives for local government to produce more efficiently its 
services and be more responsive to their citizens (Hyman, 1999. p. 634, and 
Rosen, 1999. p. 482.).  
In a decentralized system the communities impose externalities on each other, 
which will result in overspending or under-spending. As decentralization 
promotes the competition between local governments to attract a business, 
hence, the initial equilibrium will shift from the optimal point and this will 
lead to misallocation. In the case of developing countries the problems with 
regards to the provision of the public goods consist on satisfying the basic 
needs rather than to meet variation of tastes, and the voters make decisions on 
the basis of the personal, tribal or political party loyalties, so preferences are 
not expressed on their votes (Prud’homme, 1995). Therefore, the central 
government regulation is needed to limit the competition and to promote the 
cooperation between the jurisdictions. Moreover, in countries with less 
economic diversification, hence, more vulnerable to external factors such as 
international commodity process, natural disasters, chronic inflation and in 
addition with weak local administrative capacities, the central government 
control of tax and spending for the stabilization purpose would be superior to 
extensive decentralization (Ebel, 1999). 
From the above discussions one can conclude that the centralization or 
decentralization is a continuum rather than a dichotomy and effectiveness of 
the decentralization will depend on the optimal distribution of the taxing and 
expenditure responsibilities under consideration of the country specific factors 
such as economy, tradition, demography and topography. Therefore, the 
principle of subsidiarity allows making a decision by using both, the 
centralized and decentralized decision making mechanism in the federal 
governmental system. The principle of subsidiarity points to the fact that 
“decisions are taken as closely as possibly to the citizens”, which means that 
the lower level of government should provide the local public goods. If the 
local government does not have the capacity to manage the tasks then upper 
levels of the government should overtake that action.  
2.3.2 Public Choice and Fiscal Policy 
Because the markets often fail to define the demand for public goods, 
budgetary determination based on collective choice by political process is 
needed for the preference revelation on the provision of public goods. The 
public choice will be made through the elections where each individual has 
one vote. From the economic point of view a rational individual will choose 
the level of public goods supply, which exactly equalizes the marginal benefit 
(of the public goods) with the marginal cost (the individual tax yield). 
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In a democracy the prevailing collective choice rule is majority voting that 
has two forms: direct and representative democracy. When all voters have 
single peaked preferences, majority rule will produce a unique political 
equilibrium at the most preferred median outcome. However, under certain 
circumstances when two or more alternative issues exist, the majority voting 
would not result in a clear political equilibrium. The models of political 
behavior demonstrate that political parties attempt to maximize votes whereas 
models of bureaucratic behavior presume that bureaucrats tend to maximize 
the size of their budgets (Petersen & Mueller, 1999). Interest groups also 
influence the political outcomes, seeking to increase the subsidies to their 
constituencies. Thus, the political equilibrium will be influenced by politi-
cians, bureaucrats and special interest groups. Hence the outcome will be not 
efficient. However, voting is at least the second best solution for the 
preference revelation of public goods in a democratic society. 
Thus, decentralized elections will strengthen the citizen’s responsibility to 
participate in the political process and control the fiscal institutions in their 
use of public funds. The decentralized jurisdictional power will improve 
citizen’s participation on the budgetary decisions and strengthen the 
politician’s responsibility. This process would work properly only in a 
democratic system. The benefit principle would be equivalent to the market 
pricing, which ensure the voters’ evaluation of the public goods quality, 
hence, improve the political accountability under decentralization. This 
process is reflected by the principle of institutional congruency.  
Figure 2.1: Institutional Congruency 
 
Source: Blankart, 2006. 
The institutional congruency is achieved if beneficiaries, decision-makers and 
tax payers or voters fully coincide in case of certain public goods (figure 2.1). 
However, due to the spill-over effects, the institutional congruency is more or 
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less affected (figure 2.2). Then taxpayers from other jurisdictions have to 
contribute for the financing of the public goods. Another important principle 
of federalism is the principle of connectivity, where the legislative and 
revenue as well as administrative sovereignties are at one jurisdictional level. 
If the decisions made by order then the principle of connectivity is weakened 
(Petersen, 2008). Thus institutional in-congruency and non-connectivity will 
harm fiscal responsibility of the different government levels. Hence, to 
achieve effective fiscal decentralization the institutional settings should be 
taken into consideration. 
Figure 2.2: Institutional In-congruency 
 
Source: Blankart, 2006. 
Therefore, the efficient provision of public goods at the regional and local 
level should be implemented hand in hand with the appropriate voting 
mechanisms allowing the citizens to vote for their interests. Then the local 
authorities will get efficient incentives to produce an adequate quantity and 
quality of public goods, being financed by regional/local taxes. The citizens’ 
participation within the political process will also lead to an increased 
responsibility and declining corruption within the lower level jurisdictions. 
2.4 Theory of Taxation in Decentralized System 
As pointed out in Tiebout literature, fiscal decentralization has the benefit to 
allow people to influence the decisions of the government, which affect their 
lives positively. But it also has some costs, which might have a negative 
impact on the welfare of the people. Decentralized decision making can 
produce externalities in such a form that one unit of government can create 
costs for nonresidents through both, its public good supply and taxation 
decisions (Gordon, 1982). If decentralization should be realty, sub-national 
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governments must have sufficient revenues that are adequate to finance the 
expenditures which are assigned to them.  
Due to the mobility of local taxes, the sub-national governments are very 
reluctant to levy a high tax rate because of the fear to be in competitive 
disadvantages relative to other jurisdictions, and this will lead to under-
provision of public goods (Brueckner, 2004). Some local taxes are also 
exported to the residents of other jurisdictions and this tax exporting to non 
residents may lead to an under-estimation of the costs for service delivery in 
each jurisdiction of a decentralized system. Therefore, this chapter explores 
the theoretical aspect of taxation in a federal system, which is tax competition 
and tax exporting. 
2.4.1 Tax Competition 
A central idea of the modern tax competition literature is that local govern-
ments compete to attract capital by reducing the tax rates and public 
expenditure levels. Wilson (1986) argues that the tax competition exists 
whenever public production is labor intensive relative to private production 
and he demonstrated that local public expenditures financed by property 
taxation will distort local government decision making. Atkinson and Stiglitz 
(1980) also stated that distorting commodity taxes have an ambiguous effect 
on the optimal level of public goods provision. Oates (1972) describes this 
problem as “The result of tax competition may well be a tendency toward less 
than efficient levels of output of local services. In an attempt to keep taxes 
low to attract business investment, local officials may hold spending below 
those levels for which marginal benefits equal marginal costs, particularly for 
those programs that do not offer direct benefits to local business.” 
In other words, marginal costs will increase due to the costs from a negative 
impact of business investment taxation, and these additional costs might 
contain lower wages and employment levels, capital losses on homes or other 
assets, and reduced tax bases, therefore, will reduce public spending and taxes 
(Wilson, 1999). This means when each region independently chooses its tax 
policies to maximize the welfare of their residents, then its choice will affect 
the size of the tax bases to other regions, which is described as ‘fiscal 
externality.’ The implication from this is if all local governments behave like 
that, none of them gain competitive advantages hence regions are all worse 
off. Thus Tiebout equilibrium with full efficiency cannot be achieved hence 
each level of government faces a second-best problem of how to raise tax 
revenue with the least loss in welfare (Gordon, 1982).  
Two types of inefficiency will occur as a result of the independent behavior of 
the local governments. First, public good levels are set inefficiently, because 
regions failed to count the interregional externalities, and second, capital is 
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misallocated across regions, so that the marginal product of capital is 
relatively high in high-tax regions. A fully efficient allocation cannot be 
achieved if tax rates differ by regions, and identical tax rates are usually not 
consistent with efficient differences in public good levels across regions. So, 
the externalities that appeared in decentralized decision making are rationale 
for central government regulations. Central government can solve this 
efficiency problem through transfers to local government and regulation on 
local government tax bases. It is also true that decentralized government 
should avoid the use of non benefit taxes on mobile units (Oates, 1999, and 
Oates & Schwab, 1991).  
Up to this point we discussed the horizontal tax competition, where taxation 
in one region influences the tax base available to another region. There also 
exists vertical tax competition where one level of government diminishes the 
size of the tax base available to the other level of government. As a result tax 
rates are too high and create negative externalities; however, other aspects of 
political-economic environment must be specified, e.g., the behavior of the 
government levels, and timing of the actions undertaken by the government 
levels.   
Boadway, Marchand and Vigneault (1998) consider the case where the 
federal government is benevolent and moves first to influence the behavior of 
the state governments in their model. The result is that vertical tax competi-
tion is occurring at the state level but not at the federal level, because federal 
government ‘sees through’ the state budget constraints when making its own 
policy choices, hence equilibrium is efficient. If the federal and state 
government levels set their policies simultaneously, then the federal 
governments cannot influence the state policy choices. Hoyt (1996) has made 
an analysis of such cases, and in most situations benevolent federal govern-
ments can still manipulate their policy instruments to at least partially 
compensate inefficiencies at the state level. 
When all governments make simultaneous their decisions then the vertical tax 
competition problem will be dominating. The vertical tax competition creates 
inefficiencies when the state governments is unable to optimally manipulate 
the policy instruments of the local governments, due to commitment 
problems, information problems, or objectives other than welfare maximiza-
tion (Wilson, 1999). 
The public choice literature takes a rather different perspective. Brennan and 
Buchanan (1980) argue that tax competition improves welfare, because 
without the tax competition the size of the government could be excessive 
(Leviathan hypotheses). Rodden (2003) has made empirical analysis using 
limited OECD sample data and concluded that decentralization when financed 
primarily by autonomous local taxation is associated with smaller govern-
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ment, when funded by revenue sharing, grants, or centrally regulated local 
taxation then associated with larger government.  
The theoretical literatures demonstrate that the tax competition among 
governments has both good and bad aspects. The assessment suggests a role 
for intervention by the central authority with careful consideration of both 
political and information problems.  
2.4.2 Tax Exporting 
The capability to increase tax rates by local governments also can depend on 
the tax exportation, because some taxes imposed by sub-national governments 
are exported to the residents of the other jurisdictions. In a decentralized 
system the tax exporting to non residents may distort the costs for the 
provision of public goods in each jurisdiction, therefore raise a tendency to 
make non optimal decisions. As defined by McLure (1962) “tax exporting is 
the loss on real incomes suffering non residents of the taxing state as a result 
of the tax in question.” Thereby, certain amounts of increase in taxes might be 
valued as less than that amount by local taxpayers, and result in a competitive 
advantage for the taxing jurisdiction.  
Tax exporting lowers the cost of public services, and public goods are 
underpriced due to tax exporting, hence, regions tend to use the most easily 
exported taxes. If all taxes available to a region had the same exporting rate 
the choice among the taxes would not be distorted. There would be no 
incentive to adopt taxes with higher exporting rate even though the public 
goods would be relatively underpriced. Thus, no inefficiency problem would 
occur, however the public sector would tend to be relatively over expanded in 
each region. But further burdens may occur because for any one region the 
alternative forms of taxation do not result in the equal exporting rates. 
According to the theory of fiscal federalism taxes should be chosen on the 
basis of the consensus for the proper tax system, but not on the basis of the 
tax exporting ability.  
Tax exporting may distort individual decisions concerning the location of 
residence hence undermine the Tiebout hypothesis, because people may 
choose to live where net tax burdens are low. If overall tax export rates were 
the same for all the regions there would be no distortions on the choice of 
residential location. Tax exporting may also be influential in political 
allocation of governmental functions between tiers of the government. The 
regions with larger export rates can be expected to favor local governmental 
activities while those regions with low export rates might reasonably favor 
central government activities. It is difficult to say in which way the decision 
would be made in any given case, but it is clear that if the export rate enter 
into the decision, then the decision would be not efficient. Thus tax exporting 
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may have important implications for the vertical as well as horizontal fiscal 
relationships between governments (McLure, 1967). 
 Individual taxes differ by their export rates, for instance, tourist trade taxes 
and natural resource taxes are most easily exported (McLure, 1967). The tax 
exporting for the natural resource taxes as well as corporate income taxes 
(CIT) of foreign owned firms can be allowed (Sorensen, 2002). From the 
above discussion on the theory of taxation in decentralized system one can 
conclude that a more intense tax competition will lead to lower tax rates of the 
mobile income recipients, hence to lower tax revenues. The mobile taxpayers 
tend to move to jurisdictions with lower tax rates. If the mobility costs are 
lower then the tax differentials, competition among the jurisdictions would be 
higher. As a result the tax rates would be lower, which leads to a smaller 
government sector. In contrast, tax exporting allows jurisdictions to increase 
service provision by exporting the taxes to nonresidents. 
2.5 Theory of Grants 
The theory of an optimal constitution states that because of the nature of the 
public goods the best distribution of sovereignties exists in a federation, and 
in federal systems the optimal allocation of resources can be achieved only if 
grants exist (Breton, 1965).  The decentralized provision of public goods can 
improve efficiency by ensuring the better services, which suited better to local 
tastes and needs. Devolved taxing responsibilities on the one hand can be 
beneficial for the improvement of the local fiscal accountability, and on the 
other hand can deteriorate equity and efficiency of tax system. The fiscal 
capacity of the local governing units determines their ability to provide public 
goods and it varies by jurisdictions depending on the local tax bases and 
ability to export taxes. For example, if the tax rates are the same for all local 
governing units and all expenditures are financed by the own tax revenues, 
then the jurisdictions with lower per capita income supply less and lower 
quality public services. So, fiscal capacity can be measured by per capita 
income and per capita retail sales. 
As mentioned before the distribution function is best performed by the 
national government; therefore, national (federal) government should concern 
with equity across jurisdictions to ensure the minimum level of public 
services through-out the nation. This objective can be fulfilled by providing 
intergovernmental grants to the sub-national jurisdictions and it also corrects 
inter-jurisdictional externalities and helps to achieve an efficient allocation of 
public funds.  
Boadway and Flatters (1982) distinguished three reasons for the grants, which 
are closing the fiscal gap, correcting the spillover effects, and securing fiscal 
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equity. The grants differ mainly in terms of restrictions for the use of the 
funds by recipient government levels and are usually provided by higher 
levels of government to the next lower level of government. Some grants are 
transferred without any restrictions on use but others require recipient 
government to spend the grants on specific purposes. In general, three types 
of grants exist, which are matching grants, non matching grants and 
earmarked grants. 
A general unconditional grant is a transfer of funds from a higher level of 
government to a lower level for the equalization purpose, which includes the 
revenue sharing among the governments without limitation to be used for 
specific services. Public services such as education, housing, and waste 
treatment facilities generate spillover effects. When spillovers exist, the 
tendency is overspending or under spending, depending on the costs or 
benefits, which are spilling over and the extent of the spillovers among the 
jurisdictions. When spillovers result in undersupply of the public services, the 
matching grants will be reasonable to subsidize the public services which 
generate external benefits. The grants can be made for the use of specific 
public service, called earmarked grants. The distinctions between grants are 
artificial because of the fungibility1 of money, but the implications are 
important for the policy decisions. Therefore, this section makes a theoretical 
exploration of the different types of grants and its implication on the supply of 
public goods. 
2.5.1 Matching versus Non-matching Grants 
General purpose or lump-sum grants have only income effects, whereas 
matching grants have a substitution effects by reducing marginal costs for 
each unit of the certain services. Bradford and Oates (1971) demonstrated that 
matching grants will result in a higher level of production for the public 
goods. They considered two equal grants in volume that finance a single 
public good. The model assumes that grants are matching and non-matching 
as well as collective choices are made by majority rule. Figure 2.3 shows the 
analysis of the grants, where the budget line has a slope of –ti(1-m) which is 
the marginal tax per unit of the public good for each voter. In the figure 2.3 is 
assumed that the indifference curve have a standard shape, which is omitted 
and voter’s most preferred mix of expenditure on private goods per year and 
units of public good per year are represented in point E. At the point E he/she 
consumes QP1 units of the public good, gives up AM of his income in form of 
tax revenue and keeps OM of his income for the expenditure on private 
goods.  
                                                 
1 Fungibility means that money can be used for more than one purpose. 
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Suppose that the aggregate grant to the government is equivalent to the 
subsidy G, equal to the imputed share, which voters receive under a matching 
grant. Such grant is illustrated as a parallel upward shift in the figure 2.3. The 
grant has no limitation on use, hence, voters evaluate the grant as increase on 
their net incomes equivalent to AA’. So a general purpose grant is like a gift 
to the local citizens, which increase their net incomes, then this increase in 
income will result in an increase of expenditures on both private and public 
goods. In other words a non-matching grant will only have an income effect 
and raise consumption of the public as well as private goods. The effects of 
the grant will be dependent on the voter’s income elasticity of the demand for 
public goods.  
Figure 2.3: Matching versus Non-matching Grant of Equal Value 
 
Source: Musgrave, 1959. 
If a matching grant is paid to the citizens of the local community and the 
national government’s share of increased costs for more public good is m, 
then each citizen’s tax share would fall by a fraction of m from the original 
tax share. This would rotate the voters’ budget line from AB to AC. The 
introduction of matching grants reduces the tax rates per unit of the public 
good for all voters. The median voter’s most preferred outcome would move 
from E to, say, E’ in the figure 2.3. This will result in an increase of public 
good supply to QP2 and increase the tax from AM to AM’. Hence, a matching 
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point E’. Therefore matching grants are more efficient than non-matching 
ones in terms of increasing public good supply or the same objective can be 
implemented with lower costs by using the instrument of matching grants, 
whereas general non-matching grants can have some leakages, which support 
the consumption of private goods.  
The earmarked grant is the subsidy with a restriction to use only for the 
provision of a specified public good. This type of grants will increase the 
expenditures for the specific service like a general grants but will be more 
efficient, too.  
2.5.2 Tax Sharing and Grants 
The analysis shows that the different types of grants can be used to achieve 
different fiscal objectives. In case of centrally collected tax revenue, grants 
can be used to return the part of the tax revenue to the original jurisdiction, 
which is usually called “tax sharing”. As already discussed, the jurisdictions 
differ by fiscal capacity, hence, grants can be made to reduce inequality 
across the jurisdictions. So the transfer can be made by a higher level 
jurisdiction to a lower level jurisdiction according to its fiscal needs. For this 
purpose government can use general non-matching grants, which more or less 
have an equalization effect on the income of the recipients.  
Grants are also designed to internalize externalities, to increase the overall 
level of public goods and to increase the level of particular public services. As 
discussed earlier, these objectives can be fulfilled more efficiently by using 
matching and earmarked grants. The analysis illustrates that the grants have 
leakages; hence efficiency of the grant instruments can be measured by their 
leakages. Thus the effectiveness of the grant policy depends on the premises 
which are given. 
2.5.3 Fiscal Equalization 
The jurisdictions differ in their fiscal capacity and fiscal needs as well as the 
costs for providing public goods due to the geographic, demographic, socio-
economic and other factors. Fiscal equalization is attempted to mitigate the 
fiscal disparities within a federal or decentralized system of government by 
using monetary transfer of resources. 
Following the public finance theory mentioned above, fiscal equalization 
principally can be divided into two directions: (1) Vertical equalization when 
transfers are provided by the next higher level of government from its budget. 
(2) Horizontal fiscal equalization when it occurs between government units at 
the same level through financial transfers from rich communities to the poor 
communities (Dafflon, 2002).  
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In general fiscal equalization exists because of the regional disparities. On the 
one hand the basic rule for a federation states that finance should follow 
functions. But on the other hand tax assignment are often implemented with 
the results that one level of government is allocating taxes, which increase 
over time with a growing revenue and other levels are confronted with taxes, 
which in the revenue development tend to stagnate (e.g. property tax). This 
will induce the question how to balance function and finance. The final 
decisions are usually made by politicians and the key political concerns are 
whether equalization should be introduced or whether it can be justified on 
efficiency or equity arguments (Buchanan, 2002). 
If only the revenue side is considered, then the main causes of disparities 
between sub-national governments are the economic position and opportuni-
ties, economies of scale and differences in unit costs in the production of the 
public services. Opportunities for economic growth of the local government 
can be very different because of the geographic position, such as some 
regions are rich in natural resources and as a result their revenue raising 
capacities are very high relative to the resource poor regions. If the population 
is poor and small, some peripheral regions with few populations cannot attain 
a minimum service level. The unit costs of the production of public services 
differ because of the geographic condition and topography, for example, the 
cost for building roads or bridges will be higher in the mountain areas. The 
local choices on taxation and user charges will have an impact on the fiscal 
position of the local government but this would not have to be included into 
the equalization measure because this equalization impact results from the 
jurisdiction’s own choice.  
As mentioned above local fiscal equalization refers to reduce the fiscal 
disparities among the communities by monetary transfers. The fiscal disparity 
at the community level can be caused a variation in the revenue raising 
capacity and unit costs of the public services. Thus, equalization measures can 
be either resource equalization or cost (need) equalization, respectively. Cost 
equalization principally can be vertical equalization while resource equaliza-
tion can also happen at the horizontal direction.  
Equalization can be done explicitly by transfers with clearly defined purpose. 
If equalization is linked with specific conditional grants, the access to 
equalization instruments will be limited only to those communities, which are 
able to pay for additional expenditures (for the non-matched part). Equaliza-
tion also can be implicit, which is the case for infrastructure programs if more 
means are sent to the poor region than the rich ones. However, the above 
discussion is for the design of equalization schemes in countries with well 
developed statistical data. But for countries in transition and developing 
40 
countries, which does not have the required information bases, different 
indicators have to be used. 
2.6 Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Decentralized 
System 
The theoretical considerations reflect a trade-off in various pros and cons of a 
decentralized governmental structure. Since 1990 there were at least six 
empirical studies and most of them used the endogenous growth model 
(Breuss and Eller, 2004). The empirical studies do not show strong and clear 
relations between fiscal decentralization and economic growth and only partly 
support the theoretical hypothesis on fiscal decentralization and economic 
growth. Both, theoretical and empirical analyses tend to have inconclusive 
and ambiguous results.  
Therefore, it is difficult to draw a clear recommendation regarding the optimal 
degree of decentralization and each country should define an own country-
specific model of fiscal decentralization, which will contribute to the welfare 
of the country by improving the provision of public goods.  Following the 
Oates’ decentralization theorem mentioned above, discussion on the 
intergovernmental fiscal relations will be focused on four main areas, which 
are the assignment of expenditure responsibilities, the revenue assignment, 
and intergovernmental fiscal transfers as well as sub-national borrowing. 
2.6.1 The Assignment of Expenditure Responsibilities 
It is well known that regions and local communities have a wide variation in 
tastes and preferences; hence, efficiency in the provision of the public 
services can be achieved at best by decentralization. Within this perspective 
almost all public services other than national public goods should be delivered 
at the local level and local political agents should decide the service types, 
quantity, quality and local taxpayers would have to pay for these services. 
Hence, local governments would be responsible and accountable for their 
citizens and charge them for their services. 
To achieve accountability at the local level, it is important to establish a clear 
line of responsibility and accountability. If the functions and expenditure 
obligations for the different levels of government are unclear, then, the 
controversy and instability will occur in the decentralized system. The 
complete implementation of clarity in the expenditure assignment is very 
difficult to achieve because public actors from different jurisdictional levels 
may be involved in the supply of the respective services.  The expenditure 
assignment is a very important base line for the design of the revenue 
assignment and the transfers.  
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In the case of Latin America and other transition countries the revenue were 
assigned before the decision was made to transfer the expenditure functions 
from central to local government (Martinez-Vazquez, 1998), which was a 
main factor for the failure of the decentralization policy. Thus, expenditure 
assignment should be the first fundamental step to fiscal decentralization. The 
efficiency in the provision of the public services could be achieved at best 
with the concrete assignment of public task and the respective expenditures.  
Following the principle of subsidiarity, efficient expenditure assignment is to 
shift each function to the lowest level of government, which is able to fulfill 
this task in an efficient manor. But it also can be that local government is too 
small to carry out the responsibility efficiently (Rodden, 2003). Therefore, in 
assigning the expenditure responsibilities the central government should fix, 
which level of governments should be responsible for the specific functions 
and activities. In addition, the duplication and overlapping of the functions 
will hurt the accountability. However, these goals are not fully attainable 
because different level of governments can be appropriately involved in the 
provision of the same service.  
For example, on the delivery of the education and health services, central, 
intermediate and local governments have their respective functions such as 
central government setting policy and standards, whereas local governments 
are providing school and kindergarten services directly to the residents. In the 
case of transition countries the expenditures were mandated to local 
governments without providing revenue sources. The consequence was not a 
better service delivery but the increase of the budget deficits at the sub-
national governmental levels. So, the result was shifting the budget deficit 
downward by the process of decentralization (Shah, 2004). There is no 
general guideline for the optimal expenditure assignment but the adequacy 
could be evaluated with regard to the three basic functions of public finance 
or the goal set by the governments’ decentralization strategy. 
As we have argued above, the expenditure assignment is the first fundamental 
step for the design of decentralized system of intergovernmental finance. 
Therefore, without clear and specific assignment of expenditure responsibili-
ties, it is not possible to assess the adequacy of the tax and revenue assign-
ment as well as transfers to the different levels of government.  
General objectives of fiscal decentralization include efficient allocation of 
resources, equitable provision of public services to the citizens in different 
jurisdictions, macroeconomic stability and economic growth. Martinez-
Vazquez (1999) defined the four main principles or criteria for the effective 
expenditure assignment, which are efficiency, redistribution and stabilization 
objectives, no single best assignment, and the importance of a clear and stable 
assignment. 
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In order to fulfill efficiency in the public service provision, the expenditures 
should be assigned by the subsidiary principle and it also can be enhanced by 
benefit payments where consumption of benefits and costs of provision are 
linked. Following the public finance theory, the redistribution and stabiliza-
tion function can be best pursued by central government, since local or 
regional governments will be unable to obtain equity because they will attract 
poor from other areas while have to tax more heavily their citizens.  
There is no single best expenditure assignment at all, thus optimal expenditure 
assignment is one, which could be changed following the changes in costs and 
preferences. It is also important to have a clear and stable expenditure 
assignment, because false assignments would be a source of conflicts between 
central and sub-national governments, which leads to inefficient service 
provision. Therefore a specific expenditure assignment would protect sub-
national governments from the ad hoc decision of the central government and 
help to provide a continuous service provision.  
2.6.2 Tax Assignment 
For the implementation of the assigned functions sub-national governments 
should have sufficient own revenue sources. The question is which revenue 
sources can and should be assigned to sub-national governments and how 
these assignments can be achieved. This set of questions is commonly called 
the “tax assignment problem”2. This section addresses the question, which 
type of taxes is the most suitable for different jurisdictional levels and 
describes alternative methods of achieving tax assignments. 
As public finance theory and the Musgrave (1959) concept suggest, govern-
ment has three functions: macroeconomic stabilization, income redistribution 
and resource allocation. The stabilization function is to ensure high employ-
ment and price stability and is generally assigned to the central government 
because sub-national governments commonly cannot much affect to the 
macroeconomic situation within their areas and they also have a limited 
power to borrow. Thus taxes with predominant stabilization effects such as 
corporate income taxes and progressive personal income taxes should be 
assigned to the central government and taxes that are more insensitive to the 
macroeconomic conditions such as consumption taxes, general sales taxes, 
excises and property taxes can be assigned to the sub-national governments. 
The redistribution function is to assure the equitable income distribution also 
commonly assigned to the central government, due to the distortions in the 
                                                 
2 The tax assignment problem is a part of the revenue assignment which include tax 
assignment, design of the intergovernmental grants and sub-national borrowing. The 
latter two questions will be addressed in the following sections, thus here focus will be 
only on the tax assignment problem. 
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geographic allocation of the resources and the unsuccessful attempts of the 
sub-national governments in redistributive policies. The corporate income 
taxes and progressive individual income taxes are the most common 
instruments of the income redistribution and thus should be assigned to the 
central level of the government (McLure, 1999). 
The allocation function is related to the provision and financing of public 
services. Concerning both, equity and efficiency, the tax payments should 
reflect costs and benefits of public services. In order to encourage the 
responsible use of the economic resources the services provided by govern-
ment should be financed as much as possible by user charges and fees. So, 
each level of government should be assigned taxes related to their benefits of 
spending. The best example of these taxes is those levied on motor vehicles 
and fuel. Thus the proper tax assignment to the benefits depends on the 
expenditure assignments (McLure, 2001).  
As stated by Shah (2004) the assignment of taxes to the different levels of 
government has to consider four general principles. First, in order to keep 
efficiency of the internal common market, taxes on mobile factors (labor, 
capital etc) and tradable goods should be assigned to the central government. 
Second, progressive taxes should be assigned to the central government with 
the purpose of national equity. Third, taxes should be assigned to the 
jurisdictional level according to the ability to assess them. Fourth, to ensure 
accountability, the ability to raise own revenue sources should be matched 
with expenditure needs as closely as possible. Bird (2000) defines a sub-
national tax as one, which is assessed, decided at rates and collected by sub-
national governments. However in realty there are no such taxes, which have 
all above mentioned characteristics. Local taxes include user fees, property 
tax, trade tax and sales tax, which, however, are not sufficient to cover the 
total costs of the assigned expenditures.  
In the public finance perspective and with regard to the above mentioned 
principles on tax assignment one can conclude that to achieve fiscal autonomy 
at the sub-national government is a difficult task. The main problem for the 
tax assignment is to be seen in the fact that it usually does not provide 
sufficient revenue for the local governments to cover the costs for the 
assigned public tasks. 
Methods of Revenue Assignment 
Four different methods of revenue assignment can be observed in the existing 
federal systems (Petersen, 1993 and 2007). These methods differ by the 
degree of sub-national autonomy they provide (see figure 2.4). The separate 
taxation of the single jurisdiction, where sub-national governments have 
legislative, revenue and administrative sovereignties, provides most fiscal 
autonomy to the sub-national governments. But inequities, economic 
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distortions and also serious complexities related to the tax legislation and 
administration can occur under this approach, because of the separate 
activities of the single jurisdiction. These problems can be avoided by 
imposing the uniform ground-rules by federal government, for instance, rules 
for the definition and division of the corporate income tax base. 
Figure 2.4: Different Methods of Revenue Assignment 
 
Source: Petersen, 2007, p. 15. 
Alternatively, sub-national surcharges can solve above mentioned problems 
and provide most important fiscal autonomy to the jurisdictions. This 
approach is the most appropriate means of providing own marginal revenues 
to the sub-national governments especially in less developed and transition 
countries, where administrative resources are scarce (Mclure, 1999). The tax 
sharing is the alternative method of the revenue assignment, under this 
approach the sub-national governments receive certain fraction of the national 
taxes originating within their jurisdictions. This approach restricts sub-
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of the given revenues but do not have power to control the amount of 
revenues they receive. Thus, they cannot control the level of public spending.  
Revenue sharing or grants systems assign revenues of higher level of 
governments to lower levels of government. This approach of revenue sharing 
is not based on the original revenues; it redistributes the fiscal resources 
across the jurisdictions. This approach does not provide sub-national 
government with own marginal revenues, they only have autonomy on 
spending the revenues.  
As figure 2.4 illustrates, depending on the influence pursued by the higher 
level of government, the methods of revenue assignments are characterized by 
more central or de-central elements. The separate taxation provides more 
fiscal autonomy than quota systems and a pure grants system as top down 
approach is the most centralized form. 
Vertical Imbalance and Horizontal Disparities 
A system of tax assignment designed in accordance with the above mentioned 
principles can result in a vertical imbalance to various levels of government as 
well as horizontal fiscal disparities among the governments at the same level 
due to differences in fiscal capacities and costs of the public goods and 
services. Vertical imbalances also occur because the taxes assigned to the sub-
national governments cannot adequately be administered. However, 
particularly the assignment of natural resource taxes and corporate income 
taxes to the local or regional jurisdictions can create the horizontal disparities 
if the resources and economic activities are highly concentrated in few 
locations within a nation.  
If the tax assignment creates vertical imbalances and horizontal disparities or 
the assigned taxes will not provide sufficient revenues to finance the service 
provision, grants from the higher level of government can compensate vertical 
imbalances or offset horizontal fiscal disparities and also close the revenue 
gap at the sub-national levels.  
2.6.3 Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers 
The intergovernmental transfers are an important element of fiscal decentrali-
zation, which are addressing vertical imbalances and horizontal disparities as 
well as local government spending behavior. Regarding the intergovernmental 
transfers, their effects on the policy objectives are more important than the 
question of who is transferring or receiving them (Bird, 2000). Transfers must 
be designed to satisfy efficiency in the provision of the public services and in 
addition should be transparent and simple. Basically the transfer system is 
implemented by revenue sharing or forms of grants.  
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The important characteristics of any grants system are stability and flexibility, 
which are contradictory to each other. In order to achieve these characteristics 
of the transfer system, basically three methods are used: fixing transfers to 
central government revenues, paying them on an ad hoc basis (discretionary) 
or allocating them by formula. A sound transfer system distributes funds 
among different level of governments on the basis of a distributive formula, 
which takes into account the needs of the respective jurisdictional level. There 
are two quite different approaches used to define the transfers. First, simple 
unconditional lump-sum transfers ensure that local governments are able to 
provide a minimum standard of service provision. Second, central govern-
ment use local government as an agent to execute national policies by 
conditional transfers with specific objectives. Expenditure conditionality 
requires that grants are spent on specified services while performance 
conditionality focuses on outputs rather than inputs.  
2.6.4 Sub-national Borrowing 
Public debt and borrowing traditionally has been as an important source to 
finance long-term infrastructure projects because it enhances intergenerational 
equity. Such type of intergenerational sharing enables local government to 
undertake the large-scale infrastructure investments.   
Capital investment responsibilities should not be at the exclusive responsibili-
ty of central government. Hence, it should be assigned by the same principles 
as the recurrent expenditure assignment (Martinez-Vazquez, 1999). The main 
reason for the decentralized capital investment decisions are also efficiency 
criteria associated with being closer to the needs and preferences of taxpayers. 
In the case of assigning the capital investment decisions to the central level 
and maintenance and operations to the sub-national level creates a moral 
hazard type of problem and can lead to an inefficient service provision. Thus, 
the local ownership of the capital infrastructure is needed to achieve the 
efficient maintenance of the capital investment.    
In most cases the sub-national governments are unable to finance their capital 
investment responsibilities out of the current savings. The only practical 
solution to this problem is to borrow the necessary funds for the new 
investments. Public debt and borrowing traditionally has been an important 
source to finance long-term infrastructure projects because it enhances 
intergenerational equity. Such type of intergenerational sharing enables local 
government to undertake the large-scale infrastructure investments (Shah, 
1999). However, countries in transition and some developing countries have 
imposed strict restrictions on local borrowing because of insufficient revenue 
capacity of the local governments. More importantly rapidly growing local 
debt will endanger macroeconomic stability.  
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There are four basic debt controls which are applied in practice: a) primary 
reliance on markets; b) negotiations among the different levels of government 
for debt control; c) rule based debt controls, which are specified in the 
constitution or by specific law; and d) direct administration of the central 
government over the local borrowings.  
2.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
Following the public finance theory markets fail to supply the public goods, 
hence government should introduce policy measures to correct the market 
failure in the field of allocation, macroeconomic stabilization and income 
redistribution. Since the regions have different tastes and people are voting by 
feet for public goods so that jurisdictional level with the best information 
should supply the respective public services, which will at least in tendency 
result in economic efficiency on the allocation of public funds. Therefore, 
different government level should supply the public goods of different 
capacities according to the voters’ preferences. This means that central 
government should be responsible for the national policy and provide efficient 
levels of national public goods and local governments should provide the 
efficient level of local public goods for their constituencies. 
Since the markets fail to define the demand for public goods, the budgetary 
determination based on collective choice by political process is needed for the 
preference revelation on the provision of public goods and services. 
Decentralized elections will strengthen the citizen’s responsibility to 
participate in the political process and control the fiscal institutions for the use 
of public funds and decentralized jurisdictional power will improve citizen’s 
participation on the budgetary decisions and strengthen the politician’s 
responsibility. Therefore, to achieve efficient provision of public goods at the 
local level, the political and fiscal decentralization should be implemented 
step by step that allows citizens to vote for their interest and local government 
to provide and tax their constituencies and also to be responsible for service 
provision to the citizens. 
Decentralization has many benefits, but it also has costs if implemented in a 
wrong way. Hence, the countries should find the appropriate balance of 
centralization and decentralization in order to achieve an efficient and 
effective structure of the public sector. Thus the four main pillars of the 
intergovernmental fiscal relations system should be addressed to get a 
successful scope of decentralization. However, each country should develop 
an own strategy, which considers its specific conditions.  
Expenditure assignment is a very important base line for the design of the 
revenue assignment and transfers. The basic principle for the expenditure 
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assignment is the principle of subsidiarity, which means that national benefits, 
income redistribution and services with spillover effects (externalities) should 
be assigned to the central government. The assignment of expenditure 
functions actually involve different levels of government that is to provide, 
finance and regulate certain services. Thus additional policy issues are needed 
to address this situation in order to assure that different levels of government 
are effectively working together. The next step is the revenue assignment, 
which should be linked with the expenditure assignments. Once the allocation 
function of the government is related to the quality of service provision; hence 
taxes should be assigned following their benefits. The main problem for tax 
assignment is to be seen in the fact that it usually does not provide sufficient 
revenue for the local governments to cover the costs of the assigned public 
tasks. 
Therefore, intergovernmental transfers are an important element of fiscal 
decentralization, which address vertical and horizontal imbalances as well as 
local government spending behavior. Transfers must be designed to satisfy 
efficiency in the provision of the public services and in addition have to be 
transparent and simple.  
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Chapter 3 
Fiscal Federalism: International Experiences in Selected 
Countries 
In many countries around the world the fiscal relations between the different 
levels of government have come under inspection in order to improve public 
sector efficiency and promote economic growth. The main argument for 
decentralization is that a more responsive government to the local needs and 
mobility of the citizens will ensure the efficient resource allocation in the 
public sector. However, Bahl and Linn (1992, p. 392) argue that “Decentrali-
zation more likely comes with the achievement of a higher stage of economic 
development”. Their contention is that the above mentioned mechanisms of 
decentralization, which ensure the efficiency in the public service provision, 
do not work properly for the developing or transition countries. The local 
sector function is very different in these countries and thus only at well-
advanced stages of economic development the responsive local sector can be 
expected to emerge (Oates 1993).  
The extent of fiscal decentralization in developed and developing countries 
are very different, and the government sector in developing countries appears 
to be more centralized than in the developed ones because they have inherited 
very centralized structures from the old colonial or socialist system. Oates 
(1972) studied the measures of fiscal centralization with a sample of 58 
countries, which were significantly and negatively correlated with the level of 
per capita real income. This result also proved the Bahl & Linn (1992) 
argument that the threshold level of economic development where the fiscal 
decentralization emerges is relatively high.   
Many countries with formerly relatively high degrees of centralization 
lowered this degree and devolved the provision of public goods in some steps, 
whereas several countries like Canada, Germany, Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
Sweden and Switzerland with formerly relatively high degrees of decentrali-
zation lowered this degree somewhat (Thiessen, 2005). Thus, the worldwide 
trend appears to be convergence towards a medium degree of fiscal decentra-
lization. Due to this development and also to the difference in institutional 
structure, it is difficult to develop a universal model for decentralization. 
However, there is some widespread agreement on the general “norms” for the 
intergovernmental fiscal relations system around the world. The central 
question of the policy debate around the world is the division of fiscal powers 
among levels of government which is named intergovernmental fiscal 
relations. 
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This chapter studies the decentralization trends and experiences focusing on 
intergovernmental fiscal relations in developed and transition countries to find 
out lessons for the successful implementation of the fiscal decentralization in 
transition countries. The evaluation will be based on the use of criteria from 
the fiscal federalism theory with four broad areas, which are – as already 
mentioned above – the expenditure assignments, the revenue assignments to 
the different levels of the government and establishment of taxation autono-
my, equalization of income disparities between regions by intergovernmental 
transfer, and sub-national borrowing. 
3.1 Fiscal Decentralization Trends and Experiences in 
OECD 
3.1.1 Overview of fiscal decentralization in OECD  
The long term development of the decentralization in OECD countries are 
investigated based on data reported in the revenue statistics of the OECD, 
government finance statistics of the IMF, and research literature made by 
different scholars. The investigation was difficult and complex because of the 
lack of internationally comparable statistics and obstacles to obtain them.  
Table 3.1 shows the degree of fiscal decentralization in selected OECD 
countries, based on sub-national expenditures and revenues as percentage of 
consolidated governments’ expenditures and revenues. This index varies 
across countries and institutional design of states. In most federal countries 
the sub-national share of spending in consolidated government spending is 
higher than in the unitary states. However, this index is larger in some unitary 
states, for instance Nordic countries, and in almost all countries the sub-
national share on consolidated government spending exceeds the same share 
in total revenues. The expenditure and revenue figures indicate no unique 
pattern of development across countries, but in general the degree of 
decentralization has risen in the majority of OECD countries3. During the 
1985 to 2001 period as a result of the important constitutional changes, the 
sub-national share of expenditure and revenue increased in Belgium and 
Spain and also to a lesser extent in Canada, Finland, France, Italy and the 
USA.  
The indexes shown in table 3.1 are very weak indicators for the degree of 
fiscal decentralization. In order to focus only on government functions, which 
reasonably could be decentralized according to fiscal federalism theory, 
Stegarescu (2005) in his calculation used the same ratios, which excluded 
social security expenditures from the central government expenditures. The 
                                                 
3 Same results were observed in earlier studies carried out by Stegarescu (2005) and 
OECD (2003). 
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result was quite well, and figures revealed on average a more noticeable 
process of fiscal decentralization. 
Table 3.1: Sub-national Government Spending and Revenue for 
the Selected OECD Countries 
Countries 
Share in general 
government 
spending* 
Share in general 
government 
revenues 
Tax revenues as 
% of total 
revenues 
1985 2001 1985 2001 1985 2001 
Federal countries             
Austria 28.4 28.5 24.6 21.4 23.8 18.9 
Belgium 31.8 34.0 11.4 11.3 4.8 28.6 
Canada 54.5 56.6 50.4 49.9 45.4 44.1 
Germany 37.6 36.1 31.9 32.4 30.8 29.2 
USA 32.6 40.0 37.6 40.4 32.7 31.7 
Unitary countries             
Denmark 53.7 57.8 32.3 34.6 28.4 33.8 
Finland 30.6 35.5 24.8 24.7 22.4 22.4 
France 16.1 18.6 11.6 13.1 8.7 9.3 
Greece 4.0 5.0 3.7 3.7 1.3 1.0 
Ireland 30.2 29.5 32.3 34.6 2.3 1.9 
Italy 25.6 29.7 10.7 17.6 2.3 12.2 
Luxemburg 14.2 12.8 8.0 7.4 6.6 5.6 
Netherlands 32.6 34.2 11.4 11.1 2.4 3.5 
Norway 34.6 38.8 22.5 20.3 17.7 16.3 
Portugal 10.3 12.8 7.6 8.3 3.5 6.5 
Spain 25.0 32.2 17.0 20.3 11.2 16.5 
Sweden 36.7 43.4 34.3 32.0 30.4 30.8 
UK 22.2 25.9 10.5 7.6 10.2 4.1 
Source: Joumard and Konigsrud, 2003. 
* Excluding the transfers paid to other levels of government. 
Out of 22 OECD countries 17 had a higher degree of decentralization and a 
more strong process of decentralization was observed in Spain.  There is also 
evidence that sub-national governments increasingly rely on own revenue 
sources. Against the general trend in Germany, Ireland, Norway and UK the 
relative importance of intergovernmental transfers increased in the period of 
1985-2000 (see table 3.2).  
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Table 3.2: Revenue Received by Local Government for the 
Selected OECD Countries, (as a percentage of total revenue) 
Countries 
Tax revenues Non-tax revenues Grants 
1985 2000 1985 2000 1985 2000 
Federal countries             
Australia 42.5 40.5 37.0 45.4 20.5 14.3 
Austria 53.8 52.4 32.1 27.4 14.2 20.1 
Belgium 32.0 37.2 6.7 9.2 61.3 53.6 
Canada 36.5 40.6 15.6 19.9 47.9 39.5 
Germany 36.9 39.5 36.0 25.3 27.0 35.2 
Switzerland 50.9 48.2 32.4 34.5 16.7 17.3 
USA 39.3 37.8 22.1 23.6 38.5 38.6 
Unitary countries             
Denmark 44.0 52.9 10.0 7.8 46.0 39.3 
Finland 46.2 55.1 19.6 22.6 34.2 22.3 
France 46.7 45.1 18.9 19.3 34.4 35.5 
Iceland 72.0 74.0 20.0 17.3 8.0 8.8 
Ireland 5.4 4.9 20.0 18.7 74.6 74.6 
Italy 6.3 37.2 11.7 13.5 82.0 49.3 
Luxemburg 45.0 33.4 12.5 29.4 42.5 37.2 
Netherlands 5.6 9.7 14.0 20.2 80.4 70.1 
Norway 45.7 38.5 15.8 20.1 38.4 41.4 
Spain 56.3 66.5 19.4 11.0 24.2 22.6 
Sweden 57.7 74.9 20.5 5.7 21.8 19.4 
UK 30.8 14.3 21.1 15.6 48.1 70.1 
Source: Ahmad and Brosio, 2003. 
According to the conventional and improved indicators, there is strong 
evidence of fiscal decentralization in a majority of the OECD countries over 
the last three decades. This trend was especially strong in Belgium, France, 
Italy and Spain.  However, no unique development can be observed because 
several countries also exhibited a tendency to centralize the governmental 
sector. 
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3.1.2 Distribution of functions among the different levels of 
government 
Expenditures on education, health, and social security are the largest share of 
the sub-national spending in most countries, mainly on the regional level of 
government for federal countries (Joumard and Konigsrud, 2003). The same 
development was illustrated by the OECD (2002) for the EU member and 
applicant countries. But the relative importance of these items varies widely 
between countries. In Italy, Mexico, and Spain expenditures on education and 
health care were reassigned and thus the degree of fiscal decentralization in 
these countries tended to rise. In Canada responsibilities for some labor 
market policies were shifted to sub-national governments (Thiessen, 2005). 
Almost all macroeconomic policies such as all parts of industrial policy and 
also defense policy follow the economies of scale argument and are a central 
government function. In the UK most unusually, law and order, as well as 
police services are local authority activities. In Denmark, health and social 
security services are highly decentralized. 
Police services are usually centralized due to spillover and economies of scale 
considerations, and social security is typically centralized on the basis of the 
redistribution argument. Sub-national governments rarely play a major part in 
health service provision, because of the economies of scale and scope 
considerations. Many countries are rationalizing their supply of hospital 
services, where small clinics are closed down or transformed to deliver more 
specialized type of services, for instance in British Columbia of Canada, 
Finland, France and Italy introduced this reform in order to improve health 
care quality (OECD, 2001). If sub-national governments are responsible for 
the provision of public goods with externalities then a well designed transfer 
system is needed, so that it provides sufficient resources, however, expe-
riences prove that this task has not yet been satisfactorily solved (Thiessen, 
2003).  
3.1.3 Revenue Assignment  
Sub-national funding of the assigned responsibilities plays an important role 
on the local government spending behavior, and should meet several 
sometimes conflicting objectives. On the one hand, if local taxation allows 
spending to be matched with costs, sub-national government may better 
respond to the citizens’ preferences. On the other hand, the need for stable 
local revenues, efficiency in tax collection, and minimization of the costs 
often claim centralization of the taxing powers. In realty sub-national 
government rely on the different combination of resources such as tax 
revenues, non-tax revenues and grants (see table 3.2).  
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Table 3.3: Tax Revenues of the Main Local Taxes, 2001, for 
Federal and Unitary Countries (as % of total tax revenues of local 
government) 
  
Income 
and 
profits 
Pay-
roll 
Proper-
ty 
General 
consump-
tion taxes
Specific 
goods 
and 
services
Taxes 
on use 
etc 
Oth-
er 
tax-
es 
Australia - -  100 - - - - 
Austria 37.7 19.1 10.0 22.7 3.8 1.7 5.0 
Belguim 85.8 - -  1.4 7.9 4.6  0.3 
Canada - - 91.6  0.2 - 1.6  6.5 
Germany 77.1 - 16.6  5.2  0.5 0.4  0.2 
Switzer-
land  83.1 - 16.6 -  0.2 0.1 - 
USA   6.2 - 71.5 12.4  5.1 4.8 - 
 unitary countries (as % of total tax revenues of local government)
  
Income 
and 
profits 
Pay-
roll 
Proper-
ty 
General 
consump-
tion taxes
Specific 
goods 
and 
services
Taxes 
on use 
etc 
Oth-
er 
tax-
es 
Denmark 91.1 2.2 6.6 - - - - 
Finland 78.6 16.9 4.3 - - -  0.2 
France - - 49.1 - 7.6  3.4 39.8 
Greece - - 56.2 2.8 23.1 17.9 - 
Iceland 80.4 - 12.4 7.2 - - - 
Ireland - - -    100 - - - 
Italy 8.8 - 18.0 -  8.7 10.6 53.9 
Japan 47.5  27.4 31.1 7  8.1  5.4  1.0 
Luxem-
burg - 92.6  5.8 -  1.0  0.2  0.3 
Nether-
lands - - 57.5 - - 42.5 - 
Norway 90.6 -  7.5 - -  1.8 - 
Spain 25.3 21.9 37.4 11.7  9.9 13.7  1.9 
Sweden    100.0 - - - - - - 
UK - - 99.9 - - -  0.1 
Source: Ehtisham & Giorgio, 2006. 
Table 3.2 also provides some information on the composition of the sub-
national revenue sources for the EU countries. As we see the local taxation 
plays an important role in most countries, however, the variance across 
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countries within the ratio of own-tax revenues on total local revenues are very 
high, which is ranging from more than 70 percent in Iceland to about 5 
percent in the Netherlands. The grants also play an important role on the sub-
national financing, but in the last decades the role of tax financing has 
increased and the share of grants in local budgets have decreased in most 
countries. However, the tendencies were in the opposite direction in the UK 
and Ireland, among unitary countries, and Switzerland among federal 
countries. 
Table 3.3 illustrates the composition of the local tax revenues in the federal as 
well as unitary countries. In federal countries such as Australia, Canada and 
USA the majority of the local tax revenues consist on property taxes. In 
contrary the federal countries of the continental Europe (Belgium, Germany 
and Switzerland) rely more on income and profit taxes. In the case of unitary 
countries, the UK is relying only on property taxes, but Nordic countries 
exclusively rely on income taxation. Other countries such as Spain and 
Austria employ property and consumption taxes, which have a more balanced 
structure relative to the other countries. 
Therefore, in OECD countries the sub-national revenue composition varies 
considerably. In most countries the direct taxes are high in importance and 
almost everywhere the consumption taxes are a less important revenue source 
at the sub-national level. Local authorities have some discretion over the tax 
rate in OECD countries, and local business taxes varies from pure profit tax in 
Luxemburg and Japan to an origin based value added tax in Italy, and tax of 
fixed assets of the companies in some states of the USA and France (Fossen 
and Bach, 2007).  
The intensity of tax competition varies considerably, and competition to 
attract companies has often been more intense than competition to attract 
households specifically in USA and Canada. Finally, tax-sharing arrange-
ments make difficulties for individuals to assess the performance of the 
certain government level, and central government transfers also create 
discretionary features (Finland, Korea and Norway) at the sub-national level 
(Joumard & Kongsrud, 2003).  
3.1.4 Intergovernmental Grants 
Almost in all countries a gap between the local revenues generated and 
expenditure needs exists, because of the externalities, disparities in fiscal 
capacity among jurisdictions and requirements of the minimum service 
provision. Thus many countries extensively rely on intergovernmental grants. 
The design of intergovernmental grants and an equalization scheme varies 
from one country to another. The experiences in several OECD countries 
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concerning the transfer and equalization scheme show that the disincentive 
effects both for recipient and donor were recognized (Thiessen, 2005). 
Earmarked grants have been widely used on the ground that they could 
internalize externalities and assure minimum standards for the specific 
services across countries. For instance, in Switzerland the confederation 
contribution rates to cantonal expense reflect the confederation’s fiscal 
position when specific earmarked grants were introduced (Joumard & Giorno, 
2002). However, earmarked grants have resulted poor cost effectiveness and 
adverse distributive consequences. Thus many countries recently diminished 
the reliance on earmarked grants, in the 1990s Canada, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway and Sweden radically reformed their grant system (Joumard & 
Kongsrud, 2003).  
As mentioned above, the equalization scheme varies significantly across 
countries and the OECD survey for individual country revealed that the 
equalization scheme has failed to improve public service efficiency or to 
reduce disparities. In Italy an over-dependence on transfers hindered the 
development of poor region (Bibbee & Goglio, 2002), and similarly in Japan 
and Germany high level of investments in poor region have had a little 
success in economic convergence (Wurzel, 1999). 
3.1.5 Sub-national Borrowings 
The sub-national borrowing is one of the main pillars for the intergovernmen-
tal fiscal relations system, and the borrowing policy varies greatly across 
countries. In some countries there are little or no restrictions on sub-national 
borrowing while some countries allow for borrowing only with special 
permission. For instance, in Belgium, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, 
USA and Canada a wide freedom for sub-national borrowing exist, and in 
France, Germany, and Switzerland no restriction on the borrowing for 
investment projects are to be found. But the UK, Denmark, Spain, and Greece 
have a tight control over the sub-national borrowing (Joumard & Kongsrud, 
2003 and OECD, 2002).  
A general concern about fiscal decentralization is that it may increase the risk 
for macroeconomic instability (Bird & Tassonyi, 2003). Sub-national 
government with newly endowed financial freedom will be tend to spend too 
much, tax too little and borrow excessively, thus behave fiscally irresponsible 
(Prud’homme, 1995). Efficient resource allocation by government requires 
that all benefits and all costs of the public action are fully internalized. In 
order to achieve fiscal efficiency at the sub-national level, necessary 
institutional preconditions should be met, which are an efficient central 
government, an efficient banking system, and capital and land markets 
(Inman, 2003).  
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3.2 Fiscal Decentralization in Transition Countries  
The results of the studies on intergovernmental relations in industrialized and 
developing nations have shown a large variety in the extent of fiscal 
decentralization. Oates (1985) has made a study for 34 countries, and the 
sample statistics exposed an average share of central-government spending in 
total expenditure for 18 industrialized countries with 65 percent. In contrast in 
the sub sample of 25 developing nations the figure was 89 percent. But on the 
revenue side the central government share in total revenue was over 90 
percent for developing countries (Oates, 1999). Thus, developing countries 
are characterized by a relatively high degree of fiscal centralization, and the 
trend is the same for transition countries, which had a centrally planned 
economy before transformation. 
Former socialist countries have had a highly centralized political and 
economic decision-making and administration. Changing the inherited over-
centralized system in order to achieve efficient and effective government, was 
a difficult challenge for transition countries.  Implementing structural change 
in public finance and getting it right along is a difficult task (Jackson, 2001). 
Therefore, developing an effective government sector and implementing 
fiscal decentralization is one of the most important strategies for countries in 
transition. 
3.2.1 Expenditure assignment 
Many countries in transition have been reforming their government structure 
towards decentralization by implementing one or another form of decentrali-
zation policies since the 1990s. Comprehensive surveys and research have 
been done by international organizations as UNDP, OECD, IMF and WB. 
Most surveys in eastern European countries and countries of the former 
Soviet Union show that reforms have focused on the revenue assignment and 
transfers, before designing expenditure assignment at the sub-national level. 
MartinezVazquez and Bird named such strategy as “putting the car before 
horse”. Bird (1993) has made detailed analysis of the intergovernmental 
relations in Hungary, Poland, Russia, Romania, Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic, and China. The central government of these countries viewed fiscal 
decentralization as an opportunity to reduce central expenditures or shifting 
responsibilities “downstairs”. For example, in Hungary responsibilities for 
welfare expenditures were assigned to the local level, and in Russia social 
expenditures equivalent to six percent of gross domestic product (GDP) were 
transferred to the local level in 1992, which was a means to push the deficit 
down.  
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In the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland local government have detailed 
expenditure responsibilities formalized by law, but in Russia there is no legal 
definition of expenditure assignments except for social programs. In contrast 
to most transition countries in Romania e.g., education and health services are 
still a sole central responsibilities. Overlapping responsibilities on culture and 
social assistance between the government levels were common to many 
transition countries (Bird, 1993).  
In those transition countries, which were part of the Soviet Union, the 
expenditure assignments tend to agree with the public finance principle. Thus 
the services with local benefit impact such as tertiary hospitals, primary 
education, fire protection, and sanitation are assigned to the local government. 
The shares of sub-national expenditures in the consolidated budget remained 
constant in Russia and in the Baltic States, but fluctuated significantly in 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan. In most former Soviet countries social welfare 
expenditures are assigned to the sub-national level, which is against to the 
best-practice principle (Martinez-Vazquez, 1999). 
The OECD (2002) survey for the EU applicant countries found few similari-
ties in the expenditure assignment across the surveyed countries. For example, 
housing is the most important local expenditure in the all surveyed countries 
except Hungary. In Bulgaria and Hungary education and health sectors are 
also important local expenditure (see table 3.4). The data illustrates that the 
social expenditures were shifted to the sub-national level, which also proves 
the Shah (2004) argumentation that the decentralization in transition countries 
had a purpose to shift deficit downwards, which is against the best-practice 
principle and created disharmony among the different levels of government. 
Bulgaria has started the reform in 2002, and the objective was to balance the 
expenditures and revenues assigned to the sub-national level and to make 
transparent intergovernmental relations. In Romania the Law of Local Public 
Administration defines that local government have to provide the education, 
health, culture, youth and sport, public order, fire protection, and there also 
exist decentralized services of the ministries. In Slovenia the Local Govern-
ment Act defines the local tasks in general, while the specific allocation of 
functions is determined by individual sector laws.  
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Table 3.4: Current Sub-national Expenditures by Function, as a 
Share of Consolidated Government Expenditure, in the Selected 
Transition Countries, 2000 
  Bulga-ria 
Ro-
mania
Slovak 
Repub-
lic 
Slo-
venia 
Czech 
Repub-
lic* 
Hun-
gary* 
Pol-
and* 
General public 
services 18.1 33.2 19.1 27.7 4.9 47.2 44.0 
Defense 2.1 0.0    0.05 1.5 0.2 0.6 0.2 
Public order & safety 0.0 3.2 0.2 5.9 9.8 7.6 32.6 
Education 56.3 7.2 0.1 23.7 18.1 66.2 71.2 
Health 45.3 0.2 0.2 1.6 1.3 43.8 7.0 
Social security & 
Welfare 8.2 4.9 0.5 1.1 5.1 11.1 6.8 
Housing & 
community amenities 69.6  96.4 64.1 75.7 79.1 - 88.5
Recreation, cultural 
& religious affairs  27.2  49.7 26.7 45.8 54.6 45.6 74.4 
Fuel & energy 0.0    0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 - - 
Agriculture, forestry, 
fishing, & hunting 4.9    2.2 4.9 13.8 5.1 5.2 32.5 
Mining, manufactur-
ing & construction 
except fuel & energy  
0.0    0.0 1.1 0.0 9.3 12.7 28.0 
Transportation & 
communication 23.5  36.4 21.5 23.2 43.7 12.2 64.0 
Other economic 
affairs 11.4    5.1 3.1 24.7 3.5 10.6 18.0 
Other functions 0.9    3.1 4.3 0.9 42.9 1.0 2.3 
Total current 
government 
expenditure. 
Consolidated % of 
GDP 
40.0 33.5 41.8 44.1 43.0 44.0 43.6 
Total current sub-
national expenditure. 
% of GDP 
7.0 3.4 2.7 5.3 7.9 10.4 12.1 
Source: OECD, 2002 
* for 1999. 
Despite these reform efforts there are still some problems in the expenditure 
assignment in transition countries such as lack of formal assignment, 
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inefficient assignment, ambiguity and co-sharing responsibilities (UNDP, 
2005). The experience of Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine show that the lack 
of formal assignment destabilizes intergovernmental relations. Another set of 
problem is that in early years of transition most countries have assigned the 
capital expenditure associated with the capital infrastructure, and funding of 
the social welfare services to the sub-national level, but the responsibility for 
public utilities (water and sewage) were assigned to the central government.  
3.2.2 Revenue assignment 
Sub-national revenue consists of three main sources, which are taxes, grants, 
and non-tax revenues, and the analysis of this section will be focused on tax 
revenues. As mentioned before because of political and administrative 
grounds only few taxes are available for the use as sub-national revenue 
sources, hence it may lead to vertical or horizontal imbalance of revenues 
among the governments. This problem is especially severe in case of the 
transition economies due to other macroeconomic problems. 
Table 3.5: Overall Revenue and Expenditure Levels for the 
Selected Transition Countries, 1999 and 2000 
  
Total sub-
national 
revenues (as % 
of total 
gov.revenue) 
Total sub-
national 
revenues (as % 
of GDP) 
Total sub-
national 
expenditures 
(as % of 
GDP) 
Bulgaria (2000) 16.9   7.3   7.0 
Czech Republic (1999) 20.8   8.6   7.9 
Estonia (1999) 22.1   7.8   7.1 
Hungary (1999) 26.7 11.1 10.4 
Latvia (1999) 26.0 10.8   9.5 
Lithuania (1999) 22.8   7.3   6.3 
Poland (1999) 28.8 12.0 12.1 
Romania (2000) 12.9   4.4   3.4 
Slovak Republic 
(2000)   5.6   2.4   2.7 
Slovenia (2000) 12.4   5.3   5.3 
Mean 19.5   7.6   7.2 
Source: OECD, 2002. 
Therefore, decentralization of taxing powers may not be fully matched to the 
decentralization of the functions. However, in transition countries the taxing 
powers are much more centralized than economic considerations would allow. 
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Local governments have a very limited access to own source revenues such as 
property taxes and user charges, even for these taxes they have autonomy 
only with respect to setting tax rates within limits defined by the central 
government (Shah, 2004). 
One simple way of determining the fiscal decentralization is how often sub-
national revenue accounts for over 25 percent of total government revenues. 
The mean figure for transition countries is 19.5 percent, but it is higher in 
some countries such as Poland (28.8 percent), Hungary (26.7 percent) and 
Latvia (26 percent). The data show that Hungary is more decentralized than 
others, whereas the Slovak Republic is a less decentralized country among the 
surveyed transition countries (see table 3.5). As already mentioned the 
composition of sub-national revenues is very diverse in the transition 
countries. For example, the percentage of the grants is ranging from 4.1 
percent in Lithuania to 50 percent in Hungary (see table 3.6).  
Table 3.6: The Structure of Sub-national Revenues in Selected 
Transition Countries, 1999 and 2000 
  
Tax revenues 
(% of total 
revenue) 
Non-tax 
revenues (% of 
total 
revenue) 
Grants 
(% of total 
revenue) 
Bulgaria (2000) 46.3 13.1 39.9 
Czech Republic 
(1999) 47.7 36.3 16.0 
Estonia (1999) 68.4   9.1 22.5 
Hungary (1999) 33.0 17.0 50.0 
Latvia (1999) 56.0 20.4 23.6 
Lithuania (1999) 91.0   4.8   4.1 
Poland (1999) 24.5 24.2 51.3 
Romania (2000) 69.7 13.8 16.5 
Slovak Republic 
(2000) 67.1 20.9 12.0 
Slovenia (2000) 58.5 18.1 23.3 
Mean 56.2 17.8 25.9 
Source: OECD, 2002. 
Bird (1993) has made detailed analysis of the tax assignment in transition 
countries and among all the surveyed countries, only in Hungary and Russia 
the sub-national governments have a large share in total revenues. In 
Hungary, sub-national governments get a share of personal income taxes 
(PIT), initially 100 percent, then 50 and 25 percent, and in Russia the sub-
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national governments get 20 percent of the value added tax (VAT), 100 
percent PIT and 60 percent of the corporate profit tax revenue. In most former 
Soviet republics the PIT is assigned to the sub-national level. In Hungary, 
Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, and Russia the property tax is assigned to the sub-
national level, but the tax rates are significantly differentiated. Another tax 
granted to local government is the tax on individual business, which was 
introduced in Romania and Hungary, but this tax is not an efficient one as the 
author mentioned. Another possible local revenue source is the motor vehicle 
tax. Because of widespread exemptions the tax administration has become 
serious problems in the transition countries.  
The discussions above suggest that the choice of the tax assignment differs 
across countries. This is caused by the fact that the lower level taxes often 
create inefficiencies in the resource allocation and cause inequities among 
individuals and jurisdictions. In addition the administrative costs can increase 
significantly, and these problems are more severe for some taxes than others 
(Shah, 2004). Thus tax decentralization should be made with care, balancing 
the costs and benefits of fiscal decentralization in each country.  
3.2.3 Intergovernmental Transfers 
Intergovernmental transfers are an important source of revenues for sub-
national governments in transition countries. In 1999 they were accounting 
for 25.9 percent of total revenues in the average at the sub-national level in 
selected transition countries (see table 3.6). In designing the transfer system 
the central government should pay attention to the policy outcomes such as 
efficiency, equity and sub-national fiscal soundness. There are some broad 
objectives for national fiscal transfers, which are achieving vertical and 
horizontal balance, compensating spillovers, attaining national equity and 
creating macroeconomic stability, and each may apply in various degrees in 
different countries (Shah, 2004).  
As Bird (1993) survey results have shown, the most sub-national governments 
in the transition countries were highly dependent on transfers. Table 3.7 
illustrates that in average about 70 percent of revenues at the sub-national 
level came from transfers and the other standard approaches such as capital 
financing. Russia, China and Vietnam had no explicit arrangement for 
intergovernmental grants. In other countries the transfers were the most 
important revenue sources but decisions were made on an ad hoc base. 
Hungary was an exception, where an explicit formula for grants was used. 
Almost in all transition countries the revenues and expenditures were 
mismatched at the different levels of government so that the transfers had a 
balancing role. In terms of horizontal equity most countries were concerned to 
provide some minimum service level in education and social assistance. 
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While until 1993 Hungary had a relatively well developed grant system, in 
contrast in Romania, Russia, and in most of the other former Soviet republics 
transfers were entirely discretionary and negotiated on ad hoc bases. 
Table 3.7: Structure of Sub-national Government Finance, in the 
Selected Transition Countries, before 1993 
  
Own 
resources, 
% 
Shared 
taxes, % 
Total local 
resources, %
Transfer 
from central 
government, 
% 
Hungary 18.0 13.0 31.0 68.5** 
Poland 50.0 25.0 75.0 25.0 
Romania 25.0 0.0 25.0 75.0 
Czech Republic 9.0 6.0 15.0 85.0 
Slovad Republic 71.0 4.7 76.0 24.0 
China* 15.0 85.0 100.0 0.0 
Bulgaria 4.4 49.4 53.8 46.2 
Russia - 95.0 95.0 5.0 
Source: Bird, 1993 
* figures for 1985; ** 51.4 is a grants and 17.1 is a Social Security Funds transfers 
Until 1999 the transfer systems in transition countries has made some 
progress, for example the Czech Republic and Poland introduced a formula 
based system, and in particular capital grants were allocated in accordance 
with specific government programs in the Czech and Slovak Republic. In 
Hungary in the period from 1993 to 1999 the most important sub-national 
revenue source was grants. It had a quite complicated transfer system, where 
grants were classified as normative grant, purpose oriented matching grants, 
deficit grants, special or targeted subsidies for supporting municipal 
investment, and equalization grants (Chang Woon Nam, 1999). The OECD 
(2002) has demonstrated that nearly two-thirds of grants were specific grants 
in the surveyed transition countries. For instance, the Czech Republic, 
Romania, and the Slovak Republic relied only on specific grants, while in 
contrast Bulgaria relied more on general grants whereas other countries had a 
mixed system.  
From the discussions above one can conclude that no uniform patterns of 
transfer systems did exist since countries differ by policy objectives and 
circumstances. The intergovernmental transfer systems in transition countries 
have made some progress since 1990, however, more reforms are needed in 
order to achieve efficiency and equity in resource allocation in the public 
sector.  
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3.2.4 Sub-national Borrowing 
The information about sub-national borrowing will complete the picture of the 
sub-national finance in transition countries. Almost in all transition countries 
the debt for the local level were drawn on the central bank following the five 
year plans in the former system. Thus, the borrowing facilities provided to the 
sub-national government in these countries have roots from the former 
planning system. Local access on borrowings are even restricted in western 
countries for several reasons such as macroeconomic stabilization. Local 
access to credit requires well functioning financial markets and credit worthy 
local governments. In transition countries the capital market is underdeve-
loped and local government creditworthiness is weak, hence sub-national 
access to credits is limited (Shah, 2004).  
Local debt in forms of bank credits and municipal bonds are relatively new 
financial measures to cover the expenditure needs in transition countries. 
Municipalities can borrow from domestic as well as foreign banks, and issue 
bonds in Poland, Hungary, Czech and Slovak Republic.  So the Czech 
Republic, Romania, and Slovak Republic have little or no control over sub-
national borrowing. In the other extreme, Latvia and Lithuania permit 
borrowing only with special permission (OECD, 2002). The central govern-
ment policy in transition countries is to control but not to assist the local 
borrowing. In addition due to lacking autonomies to tax, sub-national 
governments have low revenue capacities. Therefore, as Shah (2004) 
proposed, a first transitory step to provide credit market access for local 
governments may be to establish municipal finance corporations running on 
commercial principles and to decentralize taxes, which is important for the 
establishment of the private sector’s confidence to local governments. 
3.3 Discussion 
Former socialist countries have had a highly centralized political and 
economic decision-making and administration. Changing the inherited over-
centralized system to achieve efficient and effective government, was a 
difficult challenge for transition countries. Due to the former system, 
transition countries had more centralized governmental structures than 
developed countries, especially compared to countries being on the way to a 
more decentralized government or public sector. The worldwide trend in 
developed countries has led to a medium degree of fiscal decentralization, 
while the trends in transition countries are towards lowering the degree of 
centralization in last two decades.  
The analysis of this section was focused on the decentralization of the 
intergovernmental fiscal structure across selected OECD and transition 
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countries. Due to the individual intergovernmental fiscal system of each 
country, the comparison should be made with care. The availability and 
comparability of the statistical data about the degree of fiscal decentralization 
and intergovernmental relations system set clear limitations for such 
comparisons. Even though general norms for the intergovernmental relations 
system exist, the division of fiscal powers among the different levels of 
government varies from country to country because of the variations in 
institutional settings, fiscal capacity and other circumstances. However, fiscal 
decentralization in various transition countries has had a number of similari-
ties, especially with regard to the shortcomings of the intergovernmental 
fiscal relations (UNDP, 2005). Further progress in this agenda requires 
learning from past experiences of industrial countries as well as from more 
experiences of the transition countries.  
As mentioned above the similarities in transition countries are mostly the 
weaknesses in intergovernmental fiscal relations, such as inadequacy of local 
government structures, unclear expenditure assignments, lack of revenue 
autonomy, and poorly administered intergovernmental transfers. As a result of 
these shortcomings, transition countries have faced a number of problems in 
fiscal decentralization. Firstly, they had a bad sequencing in the decentraliza-
tion strategies mainly because of a lack of a comprehensive decentralization 
strategy. Secondly, most transition countries had a weak central government 
coordination mechanism for fiscal decentralization and too fragmented local 
governments. Finally, these countries had a lack of political commitment, 
which is an important factor for the success of decentralization. Therefore, the 
risk of getting fiscal decentralization wrong was high in transition countries.  
Some lessons can be drawn from the review of the experiences both in the 
industrialized and transition countries. First, periodic reviewing of expendi-
ture assignment is essential to rearrange responsibilities in line with changing 
economic and political circumstances. Second, it is essential to link spending 
and taxing decisions, otherwise accountability will be diminished in the 
public sector. Third, properly designed transfer systems will encourage 
competition in the supply of public goods, but in transition countries the 
supply is very much transfer dependent, which has undermined the fiscal 
discipline and accountability. Fourth, tax decentralization and development of 
the capital markets will enhance sub-national credit access. Finally, the 
greater degree of decentralization in the institutional environment is needed, 
which has not been sufficiently addressed in the reform efforts in most of the 
transition countries. 
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Chapter 4 
Fiscal Decentralization: Empirical Evidence for Mongolia 
Tiebout (1956) argued that the expenditures and taxes are widely differen-
tiated among local jurisdictions so the individuals “voting by their feet” and 
locate in the community which offers the bundle of services and taxes they 
like best. Thus the jurisdictional level with best information on both, the 
citizens’ preferences and costs should supply the respective public goods 
(Oates, 1999). For local public goods, decentralized decision-making provides 
the advantage of taking much better into account the variations in preferences 
than centralized one. In addition, fiscal federalism has a positive impact on 
the problem of corruption (Petersen, 2008). However, in decentralized 
systems jurisdictions impose externalities on each other and the competition 
between jurisdictions will shift the initial equilibrium which might lead to 
misallocation. In addition, for the developing countries with less economic 
diversification and vulnerable for external shocks, the central government 
control over the taxing and spending decisions would be superior to extensive 
decentralization. 
Therefore the decentralization and centralization is a continuum rather than 
dichotomy and effectiveness of the decentralized decision-making will 
depends on the optimal distribution of the taxing and expenditure responsibili-
ties under consideration of the country specific factors such as economy, 
tradition, demography and geography. Each country should define an own 
country-specific model of fiscal decentralization, which will contribute to the 
welfare of the country by improving the provision of public goods.  
Therefore this chapter provides empirical research on the intergovernmental 
fiscal relations system of Mongolia by focusing on the four main pillars of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations system mentioned above. Before analyzing 
the tax and expenditure responsibilities, chapter 4.1 and 4.2 describe the 
history of the government sector and the current economic development in 
Mongolia. The other sub-chapters investigate the structure and scope of the 
government sector followed by an analysis of the expenditure assignment, 
revenue assignment and intergovernmental fiscal transfers as well as sub-
national borrowing. Finally some policy recommendations are made with 
regard to the improvement of the intergovernmental fiscal relations system of 
Mongolia. 
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4.1 Brief History of Mongolian Government Sector 
This section aims to provide an inquiry into the Mongolian governmental 
structures focusing on the fiscal relations in historical terms from the creation 
of the unified state to the present.4 
Before discussing the state structure of the Mongolian Great Empire 
established by Chinggis Khaan in 1206 a brief history of an ancient Mongo-
lian state structure and life style is presented. Then the most important periods 
for the further development of the Mongolian governmental system are 
described in more detail. 
The Ancient Mongolian States 
The Mongolian political history has a long tradition from the ancient 
Mongolian state of Khunnu5, which was founded 209 before Common Era 
(B.C.E). The Khunnu State was formed by integrating 24 Aimags. This 
ancient political history can be divided into the Khunnu state (B.C.E 209-
156), Syanbi state (156-235), Nirun state (330-550), Tureg (552-840), and the 
Mongolian Khanlig period (840-1206). The leaders of these states were kings 
and the administration had a military structure.6 The king was called as 
Shanuy, and had an Assembly (Khuraldaan), which consisted of 24 chairmen, 
who were the heads of the Tumen (the highest unit that could mobilize 10,000 
soldiers). The Shanuy was head of the Assembly and responsible for 
convening the Khuraldaan, launching laws and regulations as well as 
managing domestic and foreign policy. The Khuraldaan had two meetings in a 
year and the functions to elect the Shanuy, to decide questions regarding the 
taxation, jurisdiction and war. The Khunnu state had own financial resources 
derived from internal and external taxation, but detailed information about the 
tax system are lacking.  
Ishjamts (1974) and Jugder (1987) argued that according to the territory, 
culture, tradition, economy and language the Khunnu is an ancestor of 
Mongolia. Khunnu was powerful state in central Asia and its territory 
extended from the Great Wall in south to the Baikal lake in north, and Il 
Tarvagatai in west as well as Korea Bay in east side.  
 
                                                 
4 For the period before 1990, the description draws particularly on the work of 
Sukhbaatar (2000), Rinchin (1996) and Chimid (2004) as well as Lhaashid (2009).  
5 “Xiongnu” is the modern Chinese pronunciation of Khunnu. 
6 The lowest unit of that hierarchical structure was Aravt with a capacity to mobilize ten 
soldiers, and the next level was consisted from ten lowest units and could mobilize 100 
soldiers. The highest level was Tumen with a capacity to mobilize 10,000 soldiers, 
which was formed from ten 1,000s. 
68 
Mongolian Great Empire (1206-1634) 
According to Lhaashid (2009) this period of Mongolian state can be divided 
into three phases, which are the Mongolian Great Empire (1206-1294), 
Mongolian Great Uyan Empire (1295-1370) and the United Mongolian 
Khaans’ age (1370-1634). Within this period the Mongolian governmental 
structures were dominated by a hierarchical military system. In 1189 Temujin 
was enthroned as a king of the Mongolian Empire and reorganized jurisdic-
tions into the thousandth structure.7  The first assembly of the Khuraldai 
(parliament) was organized in 1206 on the river Onon. The Khuraldai 
declared the Mongolian Great Empire and titled Temujin as a Chinggis 
Khaan. It also passed the new Constitution of Mongolia, which was named 
“Ikh Zasag”. 
The law had about 54-57 articles and defined the authorities of the Chinggis 
Khaan and Khuraldai, organization and structure of jurisdictions, regulations 
regarding the taxation and custom duties. The head of the regions levied taxes 
to herdsmen and the volume of taxes were depended on number of popula-
tion, cattle and economic capacities of the jurisdictions. According to the 
legal framework the regions had a partial legislative and administrative 
sovereignty. 
Chinggis Khaan appointed 95 chairmen of the 1,000s, which were local 
government and as well as the second level of the hierarchical structure of the 
army. The lowest unit was tenths with a capacity to mobilize ten soldiers and 
horses in a crucial occasion. The next level comprised from ten cohorts and 
was named as 100s, and ten 100s were named 1.000s, respectively (see figure 
4.1). Thus, during this period the Mongolian state was characterized by the 
military administrative structures based on a feudal system, and the further 
development of the jurisdictions was based on these military units. 
                                                 
7 Myangat was the basic jurisdictional unit with a capacity to mobile thousand soldiers 
and consisted of ten 100s. 
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Figure 4.1: Governmental Structure of the Mongolian Great 
Empire, 1206-1634 
Source: Based on data from Gaadamba (1990). 
Chinggis Khaan had a Committee of advisors and the Khuraldai as well as the 
State Van (prime minister) for the administration of the governmental affairs 
(figure 4.1). The Khuraldai had a regular meeting every three years, and was 
responsible for the domestic and foreign policy, defense, and some state 
services. The Khuraldai also set the tax rate and bases. The main issues of the 
domestic policy were to define the administrative units, formatting the 
government structure, establishing public services, launching and executing 
law. With regard to the foreign policy Khuraldai has made decisions for 
introducing diplomatic relationship, giving equal rights for the religions, 
keeping trade roads (silk road) and encouraging foreign trade, cultural 
exchange, protecting its borders and citizens, as well as managing subordi-
nated nations.  
The function of the lower units (10s and 100s) of the local government was 
purely for war and army purposes, while upper units (1,000s and 10,000s) 
were organized as administrative units with territories and citizens under the 
administration of their respected nobles. So, the two upper units (Tumen and 
Myangat) were the real local governments or jurisdictions characterized by 
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their territory, citizens and administration. The nobles of the 1,000s and 
10,000s were appointed by Chinggis Khaan. For instance, the Chinggis 
Khaan’s resolutions stated that “Khoorchi should administer the Tumen 
(10000s), which consists from three 1000s of Toorin and Takhai Ashsig8 with 
Adargani Chinos Toolis and Telegnud Aimag along the river Erchis” 
(Chimid, 2004). This resolution illustrates many characteristics of the 
jurisdictional structures of that time. The social system was a feudal one, 
hence the military character was diminished with the lords’ ownership and the 
soldiers became vassals. By the variation of time family (Otog and Aimag) 
based arrangements were established in Mongolia. 
Manchu Occupation Period (1758-1911) 
After the collapse of the Mongolian Great Empire (1206-1634) step by step 
Mongolia was conquered by Manchu9 from 1634 to 1758 and the country was 
completely administered by Manchu Chin Dynasty from 1758 until 1911. 
During this period the basic jurisdictional unit was named Otog (clan),10 
which was succeeded from the 1,000’s structure. In the 16th century for 
instance, Tsahar Tumen had eight Otogs, North Mongolia seven Otogs, and 
South Mongolia five Otogs (Dalai and Ishdorj, 2003). During this period there 
were also jurisdictional units called Aimag, which was a lower unit of Otog. 
As noted in historical books, in every historical period of the development 
Aimag was a jurisdictional unit in Mongolia, however, its function and 
structure was changed by the time to time. From the second half of the 16th 
century the jurisdictional unit Khoshuu became dominant, which was 
organized by consolidating Otogs. This Khoshuu system was dominated for 
about 380 years in the Mongolian state administration and after the people’s 
revolution it was reformed into Soum. 
The policy of the Manchu Chin state was focused on the fragmentation of the 
Mongolian government with the purpose to weaken its power. Thus, at the 
end of the 18th century the central Mongolia had 86 Khoshuu and the inner 
Mongolia had 49 Khoshuu. This structure remained until the end of the 
Manchu Chin occupation period (Chimid, 2004). This jurisdictional structure 
was based on the old military administrative system. The Khoshuu11 was the 
basic administrative unit and divided into Soums, and some Khoshuu had 
only one, while others about 10 Soums. Thus, the Khoshuu was the local 
government in the Mongolian jurisdictional structure until the socialist period. 
                                                 
8 “Takhai Ashig” is the name of the Myangats’ king, and the resolution proves that 
Myangat (1000) were unified into the Tumen (10,000). 
9 South Mongolia was occupied at first in 1639, Central Mongolia in 1691, Blue lake 
Mongolia in 1723 and West Mongolia in 1758, respectively. 
10 Otog means a family or fireplace in Mongolian language, but in 15th century it was also 
jurisdictional unit with territorial base. 
11 Myangat was transformed into Khoshuu. 
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The outer Mongolian government structure in the Manchu Chin Dynasty was 
divided into five administrative levels, which are the Aimag, Khoshuu, Soum, 
Otog and 10 yurts.12 The Manchu state passed and executed law named 
“Organizing the Soum thinking about the man” in Mongolia. The paragraph 
146 of the law stated that “Families with 150 men in age from 18 to 50 would 
call a Soum in the Khoshuu, and the leader, deputy, and six chasers were 
appointed, while six Soums should have a chairman.” Thus, during the 
Manchu occupation period, Soums had rather a military organizational 
character than an administrative one.  
Monarchy Period (1911-1921) 
The jurisdictional structure remained unchanged as in the Manchu occupation 
period and the basic administrative units were the Aimag and Khoshuu. The 
Aimag had an Assembly consisting of Aimag’s Khan and Khoshuu Noyon 
(governors) as representatives of the respected administrative units and 
executing functions such as distributing tax revenues to the Khoshuu, 
appointing Khoshuu governors, and providing public services (transport, post, 
and defense). The Aimag had no taxing autonomy, while Khoshuu had 
revenue and legal sovereignty.  
Socialist System (1921-1990) 
After the people’s revolution, the Mongolian jurisdictional structure was 
going through a wide range of reforms transforming predominantly military 
structures into a civil jurisdictional structure. This transformation can be 
divided into four phases regarding the basic qualitative changes.  
The two important modifications have been made during the first phase of a 
reform (from 1921 to 1923). The Aimag Khans became elected officials 
instead of the inherited status by the “Statute for the Limitation of the Van 
and Gun’s Powers” passed in 1921. The dominant legislative authority was 
the Ardiin Ikh Khural (People’s Great Assembly or Parliament) and Khoshuu 
also had own People’s Assembly. The governor of the Khoshuu was 
appointed by the Khoshuu Assembly, and the central government representa-
tive body was appointed separately with functions to implement or to 
introduce governmental policies.  
During the second phase of the reform (from 1923 to1931) the Soum was 
reformed as a middle jurisdictional levels consisting of 150 families, which 
had an own Assembly and a Soum governor was elected by this assembly. 
The basic function of the Soum was to work as an intermediate between the 
upper and lower government levels for the implementation of the state 
policies. By the “Mongolian Jurisdictional Statutes” of 1923 the Mongolian 
                                                 
12 Yurt is the traditional nomadic dwelling with rounded building used by Mongols and 
Central Asian nomads.  
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jurisdiction was divided into five levels, which are Aimag, Khoshuu, Soum, 
Bag, and Arvan. The Bag (community) consisted of 50 families and 
functioned to provide primary information about population and livestock 
(census data), and the Bag governor was elected by referendum. The Arvan 
consisted of ten families and the leader elected by the ten families meeting 
and had a function to assist the community leader and collect taxes. The 
reform of this period was entirely focused on Soums while the next reform 
step was focused on the capacity building of Aimags. 
Figure 4.2: The Jurisdictional Structure of Mongolia, 1960-1990 
Source: Chimid, 2004, p. 39. 
During the reforms of the 1931-1952 eight Aimags were reorganized into 
thirteen and the Khoshuu were abolished and new Soums were established. 
The Aimags had own centers, where public services such as education, health 
and culture were provided. Soums basically were reorganized, establishing 
the herdsmen’s unions and agricultural cooperatives. In general, the reform of 
this period can be defined as a transfer from nomadic structure into the settled 
jurisdictional structure.  
The resolution of the conference of the Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary 
Party in 1959 stated that “The practical life has proved that Soums should be 
integrated into the herdsmen’s union and the Soum governor should be 
combined with unions’ director. Thus, the director of the herdsmen union and 
Soum governor will form one administrative body…Hence, our primary 
production and jurisdictional unit is Soum.” It means that Soums were 
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reorganized as the primary production and jurisdictional units, which 
completely changed their essence, as it can be seen from figure 4.2. As a 
result of this reform at the Soum level the professional body of the state 
administration was completely eliminated and replaced by business and party 
functionary without administrative capacities and experiences. Thus, local 
governments have lacked professional capacities and the local institutions 
remained underdeveloped until today. 
Transformation into Democratic Government (1990 until to date) 
The new Mongolian Constitution was adopted in 1992 and provides the legal 
foundation for the government structure. The constitution stated that 
“Mongolian government should be divided into Aimags and Capital city, and 
Aimags are subdivided into Soums, whereas the Capital city is subdivided 
into districts, and Soums are subdivided into Bags, while districts are 
subdivided into sub-districts (Khoroo)”. The idea of this statement in the 
constitution of 1992 was to make a radical change within the jurisdictional 
structure in order to correct distortions, which were the result of the socialist 
reorganization. But the only new element was the recreation of Bags.  
The Constitution also defined that “Aimag, Soum and district are economic, 
social and jurisdictional units (subjects) with own functions and self-
governance”. This is another new approach so that many small Soums should 
be integrated on the basis of their economic, social and natural characteristics. 
By the resolution of 1994, the cities of Darkhan and Erdenet were reorganized 
as Aimags and the Aimag centers got the Soum status. As a result, Mongolia 
has 21 Aimags with 329 Soums and 1559 Bags, and the capital city has nine 
districts and 117 sub-districts.  
4.2 Reform Efforts in the Government Sector 
4.2.1 Economic Development 
Mongolia is a large landlocked country covering an area of 1.5 million square 
kilometers with a population of about 2.6 millions people, having an almost 
homogenous population with some small ethnic minorities. Since 1990 
Mongolia has started the transition towards market economy and democracy, 
and during the first five years of the transition process the macroeconomic 
situation was unstable and the economy was in recession. In the following 
years Mongolia has implemented a number of policy efforts to improve 
governance as well as economic growth and currently Mongolia is named as 
one of the “rapid reformers” in the group of the transition economies. 
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Figure 4.3: Inflation Rate in Mongolia, 1990-2009 
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Source: Data from annual report of Mongol Bank, 1991-2009. 
In the period from 1991 to 1993 prices were liberalized, trade barriers 
lowered, state owned enterprises privatized and a tight fiscal and monetary 
policy was implemented. As a result the economy was stabilized: the inflation 
dropped from 325 percent in 1992 to 57 percent in 1995 and the growth 
process took place since 2000 (figure 4.3 and figure 4.4).  
Figure 4.4: GDP Growth in Mongolia, 1989-2009 
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Source: Data from Statistical Year Book of Mongolia, 2000-2009. 
The size of the public sector dropped from 51.8 percent of GDP in 1993 to 
about 34.4 percent in 2000.  Mongolia’s real GDP growth turned positive at 
2.3 percent in 1994 and reached a peak level of 12.4 percent in 2008 (see 
figure 4.4). The overall budget deficit dropped from 14.7 percent of GDP in 
1993 to 2.1 percent in 2004, and in 2005 and 2006 a surplus was observed 
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(see figure 4.5). The debt to GDP ratio more than doubled from 41.1 percent 
in 1995 to 93.9 percent in 1999 but since then it was decreasing as a 
consequence of the surpluses in the 2005/2006 and is currently slightly 
increasing again. 
Figure 4.5: Budget Deficits as Percentage of GDP, 2000-2009 
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
B
ud
ge
t D
ef
ic
it 
as
 %
 o
f G
D
P,
 %
 
Source: Data from Statistical Year Book of Mongolia, 2000-2009. 
Mongolia’s macroeconomic transition to a market economy was quiet 
successful in the first five years. However, unfavorable external condition, 
harsh weather and weak public expenditure management eroded most of the 
stabilization gains (Government of Mongolia, 2003). The size of public sector 
remained too large and continued to expand. The resource allocation of the 
public sector has concentrated on cash transfers to the population and was 
inefficient in terms of service provision.  
For restoring growth and improving public sector outcome Mongolia was 
confronted with triple challenges, which are to avoid deficits by strengthening 
public finance, to discipline the allocation of public spending across the 
jurisdictions, and to improve efficiency and effectiveness of the public service 
provision (Enebish, 2004).  
4.2.2 Recent Reform Efforts 
Since 1990 decentralization has been part of Mongolia’s reform agenda. The 
“Management Development Program” of 1992 decentralized the political 
system and created management capacity at the local level of government. 
The “Public Service Law” of 1999 defined the tasks and directions of the 
public service system and Mongolia’s reform policy on the “Trends and 
Structure of Government Activities” clarified the structure of authorities and 
functions of the central government. In 1991-1996 the central government 
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tried to maintain macroeconomic stability, and responsibilities for the service 
provision were increasingly shifted to the lower levels of government, 
however, ability to raise revenues and local capacities were limited at the 
local level. Local government share in the consolidated government 
expenditure rose to 35 percent, while the local share in the consolidated 
budget revenue decreased to 23 percent in the mid-1990s. All these decentra-
lization efforts have been concentrated on the administrative side of the 
government and little efforts have been made towards fiscal decentralization. 
As a result Mongolia became a de-concentrated state with fiscal centraliza-
tion. 
Despite the elaborated rules and regulations for the management of public 
resources, informal practices were significantly different before the reform of 
2003. Both, IMF and WB, recognized in their studies a weak financial 
discipline in Mongolia and identified many causes including lack of 
commitment to achieve such a discipline: a unreliable, unstable and unpre-
dictable budget management framework, the violation of budget rules, a weak 
budget preparation process lacking hard budget constraints, and the lack of 
control of the government cash payments by the Ministry of Finance (MoF).  
In order to address these issues, the Mongolian government undertook the 
next stage of reforms, which included series of measures to enhance the 
budgeting process, such as increasing transparency, linking policy priorities 
with budget resources, rationalizing the system of norms, introducing a 
Treasury Single Account (TSA) system, and improving the reporting system. 
These reform measures were based on the  concept of New Pubic Manage-
ment and legalized by the Public Sector Finance and Management Law 
(PSFML), which was passed in 2002 by Parliament. According to the 
PSFML, most social services were assigned to the central government and the 
service provision tasks were delegated to the local governments. Consequent-
ly, Mongolia remained a de-concentrated state with fiscal centralization and 
local governments neither had significant revenue raising powers nor control 
over the intergovernmental transfer system.  
In a nutshell, decentralization in general and fiscal decentralization in specific 
has followed a top down approach being implemented slowly and without any 
integrated decentralization strategy. So far decentralization has remained 
incomplete. Thus this section makes an empirical analysis for the intergo-
vernmental fiscal relations, and defines the basic problems at the jurisdiction-
al levels, which are the key factors to the successful decentralization policy. 
Then policy proposals are developed to promote reform processes in the areas 
under consideration. 
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4.3 Structure and Scope of the Government Sector in 
Mongolia 
The institutional and legal framework for intergovernmental finance defines 
the structure of government, and designs incentives for interaction between 
different levels of government. The effective intergovernmental system 
requires that all levels of government are clearly defined. Thus this section 
gives a description and assessment of the government structure in Mongolia 
and on this basis some policy recommendations are developed. 
The unique character of Mongolia must be described before starting with the 
analysis of the government structure that afterwards to consider in the policy 
recommendations. Mongolia is a country with vast territory and very small 
population, where an urbanized and nomadic culture coexists, having an open 
minded population with very high literacy and education levels. 
 4.3.1 Sub-national government structure 
Mongolia’s constitution, which was adopted on 13 January 1992, provides the 
legal foundation for the government structure. Mongolia is a unitary state with 
central government and three levels of sub-national governments. As defined 
by IMF (1986) the provincial or regional bodies are “governmental units 
exercising a competence independently of central government in a part of 
country’s territory that encompasses a number of localities”. Following this 
definition the upper level of sub-national government has a provincial status 
for Aimag and Capital city. The provinces are subdivided into Soums and the 
Capital city is divided into districts, which are local governmental units. The 
lower layer of local government consists of communities, which are Bag13 
(rural sub-district) and Khoroo (urban sub-district). As a result, Mongolia has 
21 provinces with 329 Soums14 and 1559 Bags; the capital city has nine 
district and 117 sub-districts. The Capital city and provinces are intermediate 
tears of government, and Soums are local governments. Bag and Khoroos are 
the lowest formal administrative units (see figure 4.6). According to the 
Constitution, the administrative and territorial units of Mongolia are 
organized on the basis of both, self-governance and state administration. The 
system of intergovernmental fiscal relation is based on the Constitution, the 
law on Administrative and Territorial Units (LTAU), and the PSFML.  
                                                 
13 Soum is the rural district equivalent to a county and Bag is the rural sub-district, which 
is the community level. 
14 In the Statistical Year Book of 2007 there are 331 Soums, but some Soums were 
reorganised in Khubsgul and Bayan-Ulgii respectively, so that there are 329 Soums at 
the moment. 
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Figure 4.6: Current Jurisdictional Structure of Mongolia 
 
Source: The Law on the Territorial and Administrative Units of Mongolia, 2006. 
The highest legislative body is the national parliament, the State Great 
Khural. Self government is vested on the Assembly (Khural) of the jurisdic-
tion, which is a democratically elected representation of the local citizens for 
a four years legislative period. The executive body of Aimags and Soums are 
governors, who are nominated by the respective Khurals and appointed by the 
next level of government. The prime minister appoints the Aimag and 
Ulanbaatar (Capital) city governors. Correspondingly, Soum and Khoroo 
governors are nominated by their respected Assembly and appointed by the 
Aimag governors.  
Provincial (Aimag) Level 
Aimags in Mongolia are a de-concentrated tier of central government, which 
were formed on the basis of the former structure of the socialist period. As 
mentioned before, Mongolia has 21 provinces with a mean population of 
about 70,000 inhabitants and an Aimag consists of 18 Soums in average. 
Aimag governors run the local administrative organizations, play the role of 
local representatives of the central government, and serve for the term of four 
years. Governors make, implement, monitor, and evaluate local policies. In 
addition, Governors’ offices also provide administrative services such as civil 
registration, and issuing licenses and permits. Local governors can veto the 
decisions of the Local Assembly. They are general budget executors with 
authorities to spend resources available to them, however they do not have 
any decision making powers regarding the local taxation.  
 
 
Central Government 
Aimag – 21 
(Province) 
Capital city 
Soum – 329 
(County) 
District - 9 
Sub-district (Khoroo) - 121 Bag – 1559 
(Community) 
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Table 4.1: Assembly Size in Mongolia (by Number of Populations) 
Population  Number of representatives 
   
Province (Aimag)  to  50,000 25 members 
      50,001-90,000 30 members 
      90,001 and 
more 
35 members 
Capital city  40 members 
Soum to    2,000 15 members 
        2,001 - 9,000 20 members 
        9,001 and 
more 
25 members 
District to  20,000 21 members 
      20,000-80,000 25 members 
      80,000 and 
more 
35 members 
Source: Based on Constitution and LTAU of Mongolia, 2006. 
According to the Constitution, the administrative and territorial units are 
organized on the basis of both, self governance and state management. The 
Aimag Assembly is elected by local citizens and the size of the Assembly 
varies with its population (see table 4.1). The basic functions of Aimags' and 
Soums' Assemblies are to serve as representative bodies of the local people, to 
pass regulations for their respective political and administrative jurisdictions, 
to monitor the local administrative bodies, and to approve the budgets of their 
respective Aimags and Soums as well as control their execution. 
The Capital city of Mongolia is Ulaanbaatar, and it has a unique status 
defined by the Law about Legitimacy of the Capital city. Ulaanbaatar is 
subdivided into nine districts, which are equivalent jurisdictional levels to the 
Soum. The Capital city has own property within its boundary and has an 
independent budget. The Capital city’s governor is appointed by the prime 
minister as nominated by the city Assembly (Khural). The city Khural has an 
authority for regulating migration, public services, transportation and 
communication, and can veto against the establishment of economic entities 
affecting the environment.  
County (Soum) Level 
The local government level in Mongolia is formed by the county or Soum 
level. The Soum governance structure includes Soum Assembly and the 
governor. Mongolia has 329 Soums with a mean population of about 4.600 
people, but about 79 percent of the Soums have a population less than 4,600 
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(see figure 4.7). There are also Soums with a population less than 1,500 and 
most people of the Soums are nomads.  
Figure 4.7: Distribution of Soums by Population Size Range 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from Statistical Year Book, 2000-2008. 
Only few businessmen and public servants are living in the Soum centers. 
Rural Soums represent 93 percent of the total number of Soums and 42 
percent of the national population. Therefore, most Soums are too small to be 
economically efficient, which means that no economies of scale for the 
private as well as the public services are to be observed in these areas. 
The functions and appointment procedures of the Soum governor is similar to 
the Aimag level. The organizational structure for the Soum governor’s office 
is defined by the Aimag governor, but salary funds and staffs are controlled 
by MoF. The Soum and district Assemblies are elected by their citizens and 
the size of the Assemblies varies from 25 to 40 representatives according to 
their population size (table 4.1).  Soum Assemblies have an authority to 
decide the social and economic development of their jurisdictions.  
Community (Bag) Level 
The Constitution defines that Soums have to be divided into Bags, and 
districts into Khoroos (urban sub-district), and according to this statement the 
lowest and basic level of the jurisdictional structure are Bags and Khoroos in 
Mongolia.  By the amendments of 2008 in the Law about State Service, the 
governors of Bags and Khoroos should be appointed by the respective Soum 
and district governors. Formerly they were nominated by Bag and Khoroo 
Assemblies and appointed by the governors of the higher level government. 
The government decision to appoint the Bag and Khoroo governor by upper 
level governor is a backward step, which illustrates the centralizing tendency 
in Mongolia. 
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The Bag as a community level plays a very important role within the 
Mongolian jurisdictional structure. Conceptually Bags should play an 
important role for the defining the local preferences and providing public 
services, deciding basic social-economic issues as well as organizing people’s 
participation on self governance and implementation of the state policy for 
their constituencies within the territories. Since the Mongolian Great Empire 
the Bag was the lowest jurisdictional unit in Mongolia that consisted of ten, 
twenty and in maximum 100 families. The Bag was and to be the most 
suitable traditional unit for the jurisdictional structure in the country with vast 
territory and nomadic life style.  
Table 4.2: The Amount of the Bag and Soum by Aimag, 2002 
Aimags All Soums 
All 
Bags 
Urban Bags Rural 
Bags total Aimag Soum 
Arkhangai  19   99  24   6  18   75 
Bayan-Ulgii  13   84  24   9  15   60 
Bayankhongor  20  102  25   7  18   77 
Bulgan  16   73  20   4  16   53 
Gobi-Altai  18   82  10   6   4   72 
Gobi-Sumber   3    9   5   5 -    4 
Darkhan-Uul   4   24  16  18 -    8 
Dornogobi  14   57  17   5  12   40 
Dornod  14   65  27  10  14   40 
 Dundgobi  15   69  12   9   3   57 
Zavkhan  24  113  30   6  24   83 
Orkhon  22   19  17  16   1   20 
Uburkhangai  19  108  29   8  21   79 
Umnugobi  15   54  11   5   6   43 
Sukhbaatar  13   67  25   8  17   42 
Selenge  17   49  39   5  34   10 
Tuv  27  102  33   6  27   69 
Uvs  19   89  25   9  19   61 
Khovd  17   91  28  10  16   63 
Khubsugul  23  120  32  10  22   89 
Khentii  11   83  25   8  17   58 
Total 329 1559 474 170 304 1085 
Source: Chimid, 2002, p. 93. 
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As table 4.2 illustrates, there are 1559 Bags and the Capital city with 121 
Khoroos, hence, in total 1680 basic jurisdictional units in Mongolia. 
According to the population census, about one million inhabitants are living 
in the capital city and the rest of the population is living in rural areas. About 
30 percent or 474 Bags are located in Aimag and Soum centers and about 70 
percent or 1085 Bags are located in rural area with nomadic people (table 
4.2). 
Table 4.3: Comparison of the Quantity of Bags 
Jurisdiction 
The amount of bags Difference 
1950 1959 2002 from 1950 
from 
1959 
Soum 323 260 329  6  69 
Khoroo  10  32    9 -1 -21 
Total 333 292 338  5  46 
Bag   2740   1692   1559 -1181    -133 
Khoring 141 190 121     -20  -69 
Total   2881   1882   1680  -1201    -202 
Source: Chimid, 2002, p. 92. 
Table 4.3 illustrates the comparison of the Bags quantity in different periods 
of the Mongolian development and it demonstrates that the total amount of 
Bags in 2002 does not differ substantially from the situation about 50 years 
ago, however, during this period the population significantly increased. The 
amount of the Soums was increased from 1950 to 2002, while the amount of 
the Bags was decreased during the same period. As a result the Soums 
became smaller in size and Bags are enlarged. 
The analysis of the Bags by their location, population, and economic 
conditions demonstrates that there is a huge variety of Bags in Mongolia. The 
smallest Bag in rural area consisted of 51 families (Tuv Aimag) and the 
biggest one of 368 families (Uvurkhangai Aimag). 
There are also rural Bags consisting of 259 families while Bags, which are 
located at the Soum center, consists of 116 families (Tuv Aimag). In case of 
rural areas having more than 100 families and with vast territory it would be 
very difficult to manage services and deliver information as well as organize 
Assembly. Historicaly, the Bag is the product of the Mongolian culture and 
the traditional basic jurisdictional unit of the Mongolian state with socio-
cultural roots, which evolved from the Mongolian Great Empire period. 
In summary, according to the current jurisdictional structure Mongolia has a 
large number of small Aimags and Soums, which are very fragmented, but 
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Bags became larger in size, which is not suitable for the efficient and effective 
public service delivery in a vast territory with small population living in 
nomadic culture.  
4.3.2 Shortcomings within the Existing Structure 
A sound local government structure is an important foundation for a sound 
system of intergovernmental fiscal relations (Boex, Martinez-Vazquez & 
Timofeev, 2004). The overall sub-national government structure is appropri-
ate and provides a clear division between the central government and 
provincial governments. However, current practices differ from the legislation 
in Mongolia. For instance, by law local Assemblies approve and execute the 
budget of the respective jurisdictions, in practice they are obliged to approve 
the budget as the governors submitted.  
As mentioned before according to the Constitution and the LTAUs Mongolia 
are organized on the basis of both, self-governance and state administration. 
Thus the governors of the sub-national units have a dual function: as 
representation of the central government they implement central government 
policies at the sub-national level, and they also implement the decisions of 
their constituencies as represented by the local Assembly.  
Due to the current legislation, Mongolia has a large number of extremely 
small local governments and this fragmentation could be detrimental for the 
ability of local government to deliver public services effectively. It should be 
noticed that most people in communities are living in nomadic life style and 
few small entrepreneurs and public servants are living at the Soum centers. 
Alesina and Spolaore (2001) stated that larger governmental units (by 
population size) can have benefits such as rely on more efficient form of 
taxation, economies of scale, and less costs for the uninsurable shocks. Thus 
the amalgamation of the Aimags and Soums as well as segregation of the 
Bags would result in a more effective jurisdictional structure, which supports 
efficient public service delivery. 
To address the issue of fragmentation, the government of Mongolia has 
passed the Law on the Management and Regulations of the Regional 
Development in 2003 that aims to reduce the number of sub-national units in 
the country, and also has introduced a regional development program. 
According to this law Mongolia has formed four regions: the west region with 
five Aimags, the mountain region with six Aimags, the central region with 
seven Aimags, and the east region with three Aimags. By the law the regions 
should have a regional council and a regional centre. The head of the regional 
council should be appointed by the prime minister, and council members are 
the governors of the Aimags of that region. As defined in the law, the regional 
council is financed from the central budget. However, the regional council has 
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nor the status of jurisdiction and neither central government organization. 
Bolton, Roland & Spolaore (1997) noted that costs and benefits of the 
integration are not equally distributed among all members, hence a majority 
might vote against the amalgamation. The result of the referendum about the 
amalgamation of Aimags into four regions was negative, which proved the 
Bolton et al finding. Currently the regional development program is not 
effective in practice and the regional councils are existing more like symbols 
than having any political influence.  
4.3.3 Reform Proposal 
In order to have a sound system of intergovernmental fiscal relations, it is 
important to have efficient local governmental structures. Therefore, the 
Mongolian government should consider reforms in the structure of the local 
governments. In order to optimize the size and structure of the sub-national 
jurisdictions the implementation of the following measures are highly 
recommended. It is worth to note that these activities should take the 
historical tradition into consideration, which means the regional and local 
characteristics, topography and size of the territory as well as the preferences 
of the population. Such reform should concentrate on the following elements: 
• Decrease the Aimags’ quantity by amalgamating some Aimags from 21 
(current quantity) to 10 so that the average population for one Aimag will 
be increased to about 140 000 inhabitants. 
• Correspondingly, reduce the amount of Soums up to 200 by merging small 
Soums that the average population size for Soums can reach about 8000 
inhabitants, which would be an economically efficient level for public as 
well as private production. 
• In contrast to these measures, increase the amount of rural Bags (commun-
ities) in order to enhance service delivery at the basic units and improve 
activities of the Bag Assembly by motivating citizens’ participation in the 
direct democratic process. The average size for a Bag would be more or 
less optimal if it comprises about 80 to120 families or 320 to 480 inhabi-
tants15 (Chimid, 2002). 
• Redefine the number of the assembly’s board members according to the 
new structures. 
• Increase the frequency of the Assembly’s meeting for a certain time 
period16. 
                                                 
15 Te average persons in families are 4.2 in rural area.  
16 By law the Assembly should have at least two meetings per year. 
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• All the above mentioned changes should be legitimized in a new law on 
self governance and local budget. In order to have an effective result of the 
change, it is necessary to develop a plan on the bases of a comprehensive 
survey including the territorial size, population density and movement, 
residency, ethnicity, infrastructure facility such as roads, communication, 
and energy supply.  
4.4 The Expenditure Assignment in Mongolia 
The expenditure assignment should be the first fundamental step to fiscal 
decentralization. The efficiency in the provision of the public services could 
be achieved at best with the concrete assignment of public tasks and the 
respective expenditures. Following public finance theory the distribution of 
government responsibilities among different levels of government belongs to 
the allocation function of government. In order to achieve the efficient 
resource allocation in the public sector, the expenditures should be assigned 
following the subsidiarity principle. However, there is no single best 
expenditure assignment at all, thus optimal expenditure assignment should be 
changed following the changes in costs and preferences. 
The expenditure assignments in Mongolia were inherited from the centrally 
planned economy hence was very centralized. However, since 1990 reforms 
have made many attempts to shift responsibilities for spending decisions to 
the local level. This section describes the formal assignments of expenditure 
responsibilities as well as the actual spending between 2000 and 2008, 
evaluates the performance of the system of expenditure assignments, and then 
concludes with a summary and policy recommendations regarding the 
expenditure assignments. 
4.4.1 Description of the Expenditure Assignment 
The Constitution of Mongolia provides a broad assignment of functions for 
the territorial and administrative units and their governance. In this regards, 
the law states; “Local self-responsible jurisdictions resolve independently the 
socio-economic issues of the respective Aimag, Capital city, Soum, district, 
Bag and Khoroo, and organize the citizens’ participation on the decisions for 
national issues. The upper level bodies are not allowed to be involved into 
these issues being in the competencies of the local self-governing bodies.” 
The LTAU provides detailed regulations of the administrative system, 
structure and competencies of the jurisdictions, and clearly defines the 
authorities of the Aimag, Capital city, Soum, district, Bag and Khoroo 
Assemblies, the authorities of the chairmen and board members as well as the 
authorities of the Aimag, Capital city, Soum, district, Bag and Khoroo 
governors. The PSFML entails detailed regulations connected with authorities 
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and responsibilities of the budget entities and officials with regard to the 
budget cycle and personnel management as well as the division of responsi-
bilities for service provision among different levels of government. 
Bag and Khoroo (Community) Level 
The constitution defines that Bag and Khoroo Citizen’s Assemblies have the 
authority to resolve socio-economic issues of the respected territories without 
any involvement of the upper level administrative bodies. According to the 
LTAU, Bag and Khoroo Citizen’s Assemblies have the following nine 
authorities:  
a) sending proposal for the nomination and resignation of the governor,  
b) deciding assembly’s organizational issues,  
c) discussing and evaluating governor reports,  
d) sending proposals to the Soum, district governor for the assistance, 
support and encouragement of the citizens, 
e) sending proposals to the Soum, district governor for the tax exemptions 
of the families, 
f) providing the execution of the basic rights of the citizens, 
g) debating and sending proposal on the issues of the environmental 
protection,  
h) other authorities in accordance with the law. 
The constitution states that the governor implements the respected assembly’s 
resolution and as representative of the central government has responsibilities 
to provide the law enforcement and implementation of the upper level 
administrative bodies decisions on his/her territory. As defined by the LTAU 
Bag and Khoroo governors have the authority in the following spheres: public 
order and safety, agriculture, health, food supply, education, social care and 
assistance, postal services, environment protection, fire protection and 
statistical data preparation. Their functions largely comprise the administra-
tive support for the central government policies in the mentioned spheres and 
primary data collection on the community’s socio-economic situation.  
Soum and District (County) Level 
Soum and district assemblies have an authority to debate and approve socio-
economic issues of the respected jurisdictions other than within the authorities 
of the president, parliament, central government, ministries, agencies, and 
upper level assemblies, which is divided into three broad categories such as 
assembly’s internal organization, monitoring and socio-economic develop-
ment of the jurisdiction. The defined authorities include the approval of the 
general direction for socio-economic development of the respective jurisdic-
tion, debate and approve Soum, district budgets upon the submission of the 
governor, monitor the tariffs for goods produced by locally owned enterprises, 
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set the rates for local taxes and fees within the limits defined by law, and 
manage locally owned properties.  
The article 29 of the LTAU defines the general authorities of the Aimag, 
Capital city, Soum, and district governors’; the article 30 of the law defines 
authorities of the Aimag and Capital city governors, and the article 31 
authorities of the Soum and district governors. Correspondingly, Aimag, 
Capital city, Soum and district governors have shared authorities in the 
spheres of finance, planning, tax collection, local property administration, 
agriculture, mineral resource and land use, construction, parks, transportation, 
road building, communication, energy supply, education, health, culture and 
sports, social security, sanitation, public order and safety. Instead of these 
broad authorities the Soum and district governors have the following 
authorities: 
a) to manage Bag, Khoroo governors activities, 
b) to appoint and resign Soum and district deputy governors with consen-
sus of the Assembly’s board members, 
c) to resolve issues on land owning by individuals and business organiza-
tions according to the laws, 
d) to distribute land according to the license issuance of the upper level 
authorities, 
e) to organize the collection of the taxes and fees and to transfer them to 
the respected budgets, 
f) to monitor sanitation of the service organizations in the territory, 
g) to solve the question for building houses, changing roads and commu-
nication lines on the basis of the local citizens suggestions, provide 
services such as water supply, garbage collection, park maintenance, 
street lights, 
h) to appoint and resign the staffs of the budgetary bodies with consensus 
of the upper level administrative bodies, 
i) other authorities in accordance with the law. 
Aimag and Capital City (Province) Level 
According to the LTAU Aimag and Capital city assemblies have authorities 
defined in article 18 which are similar to the Soum and district authorities and 
also have specific authorities to resolve the bond issuance, decide realization 
and transfer of locally owned properties, privatization policy for local 
properties upon the governors’ proposal, and other authorities in accordance 
with the law. 
Aimag and Capital city governors have besides the general authorities defined 
by article 29 of this law the following specific authorities: 
a) to manage Soum and district governors activities, 
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b) to appoint and resign Aimag and Capital city deputy governors with 
consensus of the assembly’s board members, 
c) submit, implement and develop infrastructure policy for the jurisdic-
tion, 
d) to make decisions with regards to the establishment of joint enterprise 
on the basis of the assembly’s resolution, 
e) to monitor and implement issues on defining land ownership, distribut-
ing land, mining and prospecting mineral resources in accordance with 
the law, 
f) to administer defense, disaster protection and public order,  
g) to register, inform and control the population movement, 
h) to monitor the resolution of the Soum and district governors with 
regard to the consistency with the law, 
i) to appoint and resign the head of the budgetary bodies with consensus 
of the respected administrative organizations if specified in the law, 
j) to appoint and resign the heads of the locally owned or joint enterprises 
in accordance with the law, 
k) to develop proposals for setting up protected areas in the respected 
jurisdiction and submit the proposal to the Assembly, 
l) to determine and implement the per pupil variable costs for the schools 
according to the methodology issued by ministry of education, 
m) other authorities in accordance with the laws. 
As mentioned above, the PSFML provides the assignment of responsibilities 
for the budget institutions and disposers of all level of government. The law 
also distinguishes between pure responsibilities of local governments and 
those of central government responsibilities as well as the delegated 
responsibilities to the local level by the central government. Local govern-
ment own expenditure responsibilities are financed from the local budget and 
delegated responsibilities are financed by the central government. The 
portfolio ministers17 determine the output based budgets and expenditures in 
accordance with the government action plan and general guidelines for the 
socio-economic development. The general manager who is head of the state 
budgetary bodies delivers outputs and receives fund from the central budget 
in accordance with the contract made with the portfolio ministers.  
The governors of the provinces are responsible for the delivery of the core 
local services and delivery of the delegated outputs, as well as raise revenue 
from the local sources. Governors of the Soums and districts are responsible 
for the delivery of the core local outputs and deliver central budget financed 
output to the province governors by contract. The functions contracted out to 
                                                 
17 As stated in PSFML the portfolio ministers are line ministers and governors of the 
provinces and counties. 
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the local government level comprise the support for central government 
policies and key social services: education, health care, culture, labor, social 
welfare, and social security.  
Among these broad areas of responsibilities, core local government responsi-
bilities defined by PSFML include: 
o sanitation and garbage collection, 
o environment protection, renewal and maintenance, 
o pest eradication and control, 
o local road maintenance, 
o sewage, 
o flood barrier and soil protection, 
o fire protection, prevention and mitigation, 
o local public infrastructure facilities, 
o fight and prevent from infectious diseases of animal. 
Aimag governors have an authority to manage activities of the budgetary 
bodies and monitor the delivery of the output by contract while they do not 
have financial authority because the conditional transfers for financing social 
services are earmarked and prohibited to use the funds for other purposes by 
law. 
As described above the Constitution makes a broad assignment of functions 
for the jurisdictional levels and their governance and it provides the legal 
foundation for the jurisdictions for deciding their own affairs. The LTAU 
assigns some specific functions to the Aimag and Soum government while 
other functions are assigned jointly to the Aimag and Soum levels. However, 
most public functions are assigned to the governors of the respected 
jurisdictional levels. So far, these legal provisions are quite ambiguous and 
have many duplicated assignments. They provide no guidance for resolving 
conflicts between Aimag and Soum governments on the assignments for the 
shared responsibilities mentioned above.  
The next attempt for a more clear assignment of expenditure responsibilities 
was made with the PSFML, which was approved by State Great Khural 
(parliament) in 2002 and came into effect from January 1, 2003. The law 
distinguishes between pure responsibilities of local and central government 
and as well as delegated responsibilities to the local level by the central 
government. As a result the expenditure responsibilities for social services 
such as education, health, culture and sports shifted to the respective 
ministries. According to this law local expenditure responsibilities are 
financed from local revenue sources and delegated responsibilities are 
financed by central government. Therefore the law limits sub-national 
discretion on their socio-economic issues and service delivery, which 
contradicts with the authorities given by the Constitution and LTAU. 
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Table 4.4: The Assignment of Expenditures in Mongolia 
Functions 
Role and responsibilities by government 
level 
Defining Financing Providing 
1 2 3 4 
General public services        
 Parliament Central  Central  Central  
 Government Central  Central  Central  
 Local government Central  Local Local 
 Foreign relation Central  Central  Central  
 Defense Central  Central  Central  
 Public order and safety Central  Central local 
Education      
 Kindergarten  Central  Central Local 
 Primary school Central  Central Local 
 Secondary school Central  Central Local 
 Universities Central  Central Central/local
Health       
 Hospitals Central  Central Local 
 Health resorts Central  Central Local 
 Hygiene and Epidemiology Central  Central Local 
Social protection and social welfare       
 Social protection  Central  Central Central/local
 Social assistance Central  Central Central/local
Housing and community amenities       
 Housing  Central/local Central/local Central/local
 Sanitation and disposal Central Local  Local  
 Water supply Central Central/local Central/local
 Sewage Central Central/local Central/local
Recreation and culture       
 Recreation  Central Central local 
 Sports and culture Central Central local 
 Information Central Central/local Central/local
Economic affairs       
 Fuel and energy Central Central Central/local
 Finance and economic  activities Central Central/local Central/local
 Agriculture Central Central/local Central/local
 Mining and mineral resource Central Central Central/local
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1 2 3 4 
 Construction and road Central Central/local Central/local
 Transportation and communication Central Central/local Central/local
 Other economic activities Central Central/local Central/local
Environmental protection Central/local Central/local Central/local
Unclassified services Central Central/local Central/local
Source: Authors’ own estimation based on the respected laws and budget data on 2003-
2008. 
The de jure expenditure assignment in Mongolia generally complies with the 
general public finance principle that each level of jurisdiction should be 
responsible for expenditures within its geographical scope. The services 
which provide benefits beyond a single jurisdiction such as defense, foreign 
relation, postal service and civil aviation are assigned to the central govern-
ment, and the services with local benefit areas such as sanitation, sewage, 
environment protection, and fire protection are assigned to the local 
jurisdiction. Correspondingly the services such as education, health, social 
welfare having benefits that are not only local but also national are shared 
tasks among the different levels of government. 
The decision on expenditure responsibilities are very complex and should 
have the three important dimensions that must be considered in making 
assignments such as defining, financing, and providing the services. Table 4.4 
gives an overview on the current situation in Mongolia based on law and 
existing budget data from 2003 to 2008. There are some expenditure areas in 
which two or three levels of government have shared responsibilities. 
However, most responsibilities on defining and financing public services are 
assigned to the central government and only service provision responsibilities 
at the local level.  
In summary, according to the current legislation Mongolia became de-
concentrated state with fiscal centralization. The existing expenditure 
assignment does not make differences between the responsibilities for 
funding, regulating and implementing expenditure programs. There are also 
many duplications and overlapping functions between different jurisdictional 
levels, which requires the reassignment of the expenditure responsibilities. 
4.4.2 Degree of Expenditure Decentralization 
In the literature different measures are used to investigate the degree of the 
centralization in the respective country. As already discussed above it is 
difficult to choose a fully satisfactory measure of the extent of decentraliza-
tion because of theoretical problems and limitations on the data availability. 
The ratio of the sub-national expenditures as percentage of consolidated 
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expenditures, and sub-national expenditure as share GDP are used to measure 
the degree of decentralization in Mongolia. 
After the reform of 2003 the shares of local expenditures to total expenditures 
dropped sharply as a result of the relatively limited expenditure responsibili-
ties assigned to the local level.  
Figure 4.8: Sub-national Expenditures as Percentage of Consoli-
dated Expenditures, 2000-2008 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Ministry of Finance. 
Figure 4.9: Expenditures as Percentage of GDP, 2000-2007 
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Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Ministry of Finance. 
This trend can be observed in figure 4.8 where sub-national expenditures as a 
percentage of consolidated expenditures sharply declined from 31.7 percent in 
2000 to 7.7 percent in 2003. Sub-national expenditures as a proportion of 
GDP experienced also a sharp decline from 13 percent to 2.7 percent from 
2000 to 2007, respectively, but have been relatively stable since 2003. 
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Consequently, the central government expenditures as a percentage in GDP 
increased from 29 percent in 2000 to 40 percent in 2007 (see figure 4.9).
Figure 4.10a: Aimag Expenditures as Percentage of Total Gov-
ernment Spending, Including Capital City, 2003-2008
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Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Ministry of Finance.
Figure 4.10b: Aimag Expenditures as Percentage of Total 
Government Spending, Excluding Capital City, 2003-2008
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A closer look for the breakdown of expenditures by the Aimag level is 
illustrated in figure 4.10a and 4.10b. The Aimag expenditures as share of 
consolidated government spending including the Capital city for 2003 to 2008 
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are illustrated in figure 4.10a, and the same data excluding Capital city 
illustrated in figure 5.10b, respectively.  
The figure 4.10a indicates that over two-third of local government expendi-
tures are accounted for Ulaanbaatar (Capital) city, most Aimag expenditure 
shares are less than 0.2 percent in consolidated government spending from 
2003 to 2008 (see figure 4.10b). The Orkhon, Tuv, and Selenge as well as 
Umnugobi Aimags’ expenditure shares are about 0.3 percent in consolidated 
government spending in the same period (figure 4.10b). 
As mentioned before, the Mongolian government undertook the next stage of 
reforms to deal with a weak financial discipline, which included series of 
measures to enhance the budgeting process, increase transparency, linking 
policy priorities with budget resources, rationalization of the system of norms, 
introducing a TSA system, and improving the reporting system. These 
measures were based on the PSFML. According to this reform, most public 
service responsibilities including social services were shifted to the central 
government. Therefore, the sub-national expenditure shares in the consolidat-
ed expenditures are very small which illustrates a centralizing tendency of the 
government sector in Mongolia. Even though local public goods assigned to 
the lower level jurisdictions they are lacking of own revenues to provide these 
services.  
Expenditure Patterns by Functional Classification 
The shares at each level of government for major expenditure classifications 
are shown in table 4.5. The central government finances 100 percent of 
national defense, almost 100 percent of social security and assistance, energy 
and heating, mineral resource mining, manufacturing and construction 
expenses. The costs of other functions were shared by different levels of 
government before 2003. However, after the execution of the PSFML most 
expenses for the social services were shifted to the central government. 
Sub-national governments financed about two-thirds of all expenditures in 
education and health in 2001 and 2002, then after the reform of 2003 these 
expenses were completely shifted to the central government. Similar trend are 
observed for the social safety and public order, which was financed by about 
45 percent from the local governments in 2001 to 2002, then almost 100 
percent of the expenses were paid by central government from 2003 to 2008. 
This large shift in the expenditure assignment in 2003 reflects the sharp 
decrease of the local government shares in the national economy. While the 
central government represented 72.4 percent of all expenditures in the 
national economy in 2002, by 2003 its share was increased to 94.3 percent.  
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Table 4.5: Distribution of Expenditures between Government 
Levels, 2001-2008 
Level of government 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Central government 72.08 72.40 94.33 93.28 92.90 95.73 93.24 95.36
Provincial government 27.92 27.60 5.67 6.72 7.10 4.27 6.76 4.64
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
General public services 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Central government 58.22 58.82 62.45 58.73 57.70 70.12 53.77 59.82
Provincial government 41.78 41.18 37.55 41.27 42.30 29.88 46.23 40.18
Defence 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Central government 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Provincial government 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Social safety and public 
order 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Central government 53.56 55.58 99.60 99.67 99.99 99.94 99.94 100.00
Provincial government 46.44 44.42 0.40 0.33 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.00
Education expenditures 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Central government 32.61 32.30 99.74 99.86 99.88 100.00 99.86 100.00
Provincial government 67.39 67.70 0.26 0.14 0.12 0.00 0.14 0.00
Health expenditure 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Central government 36.37 38.12 99.61 99.71 99.74 99.77 91.03 99.84
Provincial government 63.63 61.88 0.39 0.29 0.26 0.23 8.97 0.16
Social security and 
assistance 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Central government 98.97 98.89 99.96 99.92 99.93 99.90 100.00 99.93
Provincial government 1.03 1.11 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.07
Housing and community 
amenities 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Central government 26.48 14.30 40.89 14.16 12.49 19.80 23.07 21.22
Provincial government 73.52 85.70 59.11 85.84 87.51 80.20 76.93 78.78
Recreation, culture and 
sports 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Central government 57.59 58.25 92.63 90.00 92.68 96.89 96.91 98.08
Provincial government 42.41 41.75 7.37 10.00 7.32 3.11 3.09 1.92
Energy and heating 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Central government 98.74 99.19 98.99 99.47 99.62 99.56 98.16 99.71
Provincial government 1.26 0.81 1.01 0.53 0.38 0.44 1.84 0.29
Agriculture and forestry 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Central government 88.77 89.31 97.47 97.21 96.79 96.67 96.47 92.74
Provincial government 11.23 10.69 2.53 2.79 3.21 3.33 3.53 7.26  
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Government level 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Mineral resource, 
mining, manufacturing 
and construction 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00
Central government 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 98,02
Provincial government 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,98
Transportation, 
communication 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00
Central government 95,80 94,39 83,43 76,32 69,88 87,37 94,83 79,38
Provincial government 4,20 5,61 16,57 23,68 30,12 12,63 5,17 20,62
Other economic 
activities 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00
Central government 50,68 57,47 89,96 90,41 89,28 99,29 99,05 95,69
Provincial government 49,32 42,53 10,04 9,59 10,72 0,71 0,95 4,31
Unclassified services 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Central government 96,3 96,9 97,7 96,3 94,4 95,4 94,5 97,9
Provincial government 3,7 3,1 2,3 3,7 5,6 4,6 5,5 2,1  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Ministry of Finance. 
Therefore, de-facto sub-national government supplies only four services, 
which are the general public services (40 percent), housing and community 
amenities (80 percent) and agriculture and forestry (4 percent) as well as 
transportation and communication according to the data from 2003 to 2008. 
Table 4.6 presents the expenditures by economic classification of selected 
Soum and Aimag, and it illustrates that a large portion of the local expendi-
tures are assigned to current spending, which accounts for more than 90 
percent of total spending for Aimags, and 100 percent for the average Soum. 
Hence, no capital expenditures are assigned to the Soum level and only a 
small part (less than five percent of total spending) are assigned to the Aimag 
level, which is spent on capital and road repairs. With regard to capital 
expenditure responsibilities the investment decisions are made at the central 
level and maintenance, operation of facilities are organized at the local level, 
which creates many problems18 at the local level and leads to inefficient 
service delivery. It is important to note that own revenues of the Soums and 
Aimags only cover the operational expenses of the respective governor’s 
offices. The rest of the local government expenditures are covered by the 
provincial or the central government transfers, respectively. 
                                                 
18 In the interview the governor of the Erdenebulgan Soum of the Arkhangai Aimag noted 
that the facilities of the new school building is too expensive due to the incompatible 
heating system for the regional condition, and there are many such cases in other 
Soums.     
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In average the composition of the aggregated provincial budgets remained 
relatively stable after 2003. However, the relative shares of the provincial 
governments varied substantially across the Aimags. The degree of centraliza-
tion of the provincial finances was higher in those Aimags being mostly 
dependent on central government transfers, and relatively lower in the Capital 
and industrial cities, which provide the transfers to the other provinces.  
Table 4.6: Aimag and Soum Expenditures by Economic 
Classification, 2002-2004 
Types of expenditure BulganAimag
Uvs 
Aimag
Khentii
Aimag 
Dundgobi 
Aimag 
Average
Soum* 
A. CURRENT EXPENDI-
TURE 93.1 97.4 94.6 97.4 100.0 
 1. Goods and services 89.3 95.7 93.6 96.2 100.0 
   a. Wages and salaries 42.0 39.8 40.2 43.5 47.3 
   b. Social security 
contributions 10.8 10.2 9.8 10.5 12.0 
   c. Purchase of goods and 
service 36.2 45.7 43.6 42.2 31.8 
       c.1. Heating 10.8 11.2 14.0 12.6 9.3 
       c.2. Fuel and transporta-
tion 5.6 4.9 3.8 3.5 2.2 
 2. Subsidies and transfers 4.1 1.7 1.0 1.2 0.0 
B. CAPITAL EXPENDI-
TURE 6.9 2.6 5.4 2.6 0.0 
   a. Investment 3.2 2.6 3.4 1.1 0.0 
   b. Capital Repairs 0.4 0.0 1.6 1.5 0.0 
   c. Assets 1.3 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 
   d. Road Building and 
Repairing 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 
(A+B) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Raich, 2005, p. 32. 
Even though the PSFML defined the expenditure assignment to the different 
levels of government, it created the problem of unfunded mandates at the 
local level.19 As a result of the execution of this law and the implementation 
                                                 
19 The basic concept of the PSFML is the new public management that focused on result 
oriented budgeting, accrual accounting, and performance pay etc. The law supposed to 
support the decentralization process in Mongolia.  
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of the TSA20 the sub-national budget autonomy is very restricted and local 
government became financially dependent from the central government. 
Hence, the unfunded mandates problem that imposes expenditure require-
ments on local governments without adequate funding is one of the major 
problems in Mongolia at the present day.  
4.4.3 Discussion 
The literature on international experiences suggests that there is no single 
optimal solution for the expenditure assignment, hence, the adequacy of the 
division of the responsibilities can be judged in accordance with the goals set 
up by the government in its decentralization strategy. However, there exist 
some general principles of expenditure assignment that can be used for the 
analysis of the expenditure assignments.As mentioned in the theoretical part 
the general objectives of fiscal decentralization include the efficient allocation 
of resources via responsive government, equitable provision of public goods, 
macroeconomic stability and economic growth.  
The main criterion for effective expenditure assignment is the efficient service 
provision that the government satisfy needs and preferences of taxpayers as 
well as possible. This can be achieved at best by the “subsidiarity principle”, 
which states that responsibility for service delivery should be assigned to that 
level of government, which has the best information on the preferences of 
their electorate as well as the involved benefits. Only if the local jurisdictions 
lack the necessary capacity to manage a task than the upper jurisdictional 
levels should be involved, too. 
According to the current legislation most functions related to the public 
service delivery are assigned to the governor of the respected jurisdictional 
levels. PSFML makes a clear distinction between the pure local and delegated 
responsibilities. However, the existing expenditure assignments are not clear-
cut and have many duplication and overlapping responsibilities among the 
different governmental levels. Thus, more clarity is needed.  
The authority and responsibility for the key social services including 
education, health, and culture is clearly divided between the central and local 
governments, but these services are entirely financed from the central budget. 
The level of expenditures and service provision standards are established by 
the central government and only the provision of these services is assigned to 
local government. As a result of de facto assignment the local governments 
fulfill only very basic municipal functions and important local functions such 
as education, health and culture are under the command of the central 
                                                 
20 According to this system the MoF transfers the budget to the account of the budget 
entities on monthly bases. As noted the local governors the revenue distribution from 
the MoF is not based on the local needs and creates difficulty in the financing. 
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portfolio ministers. Hence local governments act as de-concentrated agencies 
of the central government rather than as autonomous budget units, which 
leads to inefficient service delivery. 
With regards to the capital expenditures the investment decisions are assigned 
to the central level, while maintenance and the operation of the facilities are 
assigned to the local level, which have also had a negative impact on the 
efficient service provision. The capital investment should not be in the 
exclusive responsibility of the central government, and it should be assigned 
to the different levels of government as for recurrent expenditures (Martinez-
Vazquez, 1999). Thus further clarification of the assignments for the capital 
expenditures is needed. In addition the ownership of assets doesn’t follow 
with the assignment of functions at the local level, which also became one of 
the important factors to the inefficient service delivery at the local level.  
According to the theory of public finance local government should be 
responsible for allocation and central government should be responsible for 
equity and stabilization. The local governments usually would not be able to 
undertake effectively the functions related to the equity considerations, such 
as social welfare and housing for low income people, due to the mobility of 
the citizens. The services with benefits beyond the single jurisdiction are 
assigned to the central government while the services with local benefit areas 
are assigned to the local government in Mongolia. Correspondingly, defining 
the policy and financing responsibilities for the services with spill-over effects 
are assigned to the central government and only the service provision function 
is assigned to the local government. Thus, the existing assignment in 
Mongolia is in line with the principle of expenditure assignment in public 
finance. 
There is no single best assignment, for instance in case of public services such 
as education and health the nature of services can be both local and national. 
Specifically primary education and primary health services may be local by 
the size of benefit area, however with the relevance in welfare and income 
distribution it can be national as well (Martinez-Vazquez, 1999). Therefore 
the best assignment is that which can change by time with the shift on costs 
and preferences. However, there is need for stable assignment for a given time 
period, and without the concrete assignment the intergovernmental fiscal 
relations will be unstable and public services delivery will be inefficient. 
The public goods have a spatial limitation of benefit incidence, hence each 
service should be provided and costs shared in line with voters preferences. 
The benefit principle should be implemented to a possible extent through fee 
financing or benefit pricing that voters can evaluate the jurisdictional 
performance in comparison to the paid taxes, which is named principle of 
institutional congruency and connectivity (Petersen, 2008). In the current 
100 
expenditure assignment in Mongolia the beneficiary of the social services are 
local residents, but decision maker is central government, and taxpayers or 
voters are from different jurisdictions. Hence, it is nearly impossible to 
provide services according to the local preferences and link the expenditure 
and taxation for the local jurisdiction. In this case the central jurisdiction or 
ministers are responsible on the decision for supply and financing the social 
services, and local jurisdictions responsible for the administration of these 
services. Because of the institutional in-congruency and non-connectivity 
people have became discontent with the political system and developed 
mistrust in the government, what has damaged the fiscal responsibility of the 
local jurisdictions in Mongolia.  
In decentralized systems the failure to establish clear assignments for each 
level of governments by law creates conflict between the central and sub-
national governments and can lead to inefficient and ineffective service 
provision. In total, the current expenditure assignments in Mongolia do not 
violate the general principles of expenditure assignment. However, there exist 
overlapping in and duplications of responsibilities as well as problem of 
unfunded mandates, which creates unclear assignments and inefficient supply 
of public services. Therefore, the differentiation of the expenditure responsi-
bilities by distinguishing defining, financing and providing of public services 
among government levels is needed. In addition the harmonization of the 
many laws, decrees, and departmental orders should be implemented. For this 
reason, it is highly recommended to conduct a comprehensive survey of the 
actual expenditure assignments at different levels in detail, in order to 
understand the actual expenditure assignments that have been working in the 
past years. 
4.4.4 Reform Proposal on the Expenditure Assignment 
From the economic and political science perspectives fiscal decentralization 
will improve resource allocation and accountability, which results in an 
efficient and effective supply of public goods and supports private markets. 
The expenditure assignment is a first and fundamental step for decentraliza-
tion. It also would be a main criterion for the assessment of the revenue and 
tax assignment as well as the needs and effectiveness of the transfers. Thus 
Mongolian government should determine the decentralization strategy and set 
its goals clearly, then define the expenditure assignment, which best suits 
Mongolian tradition and national peculiarities by using general principles and 
best practices..  
On the basis of the analysis the following policy proposals are recommended 
for the solution of the problems on the expenditure assignment in Mongolia: 
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• In order to solve the problem of vagueness and to obtain a clear distinction 
between decision making of the executive bodies, the interaction of the 
competencies between different levels of self governing bodies have to be 
defined and norms for the decision making process of the assemblies have 
to be clarified. For these reason the Law of Territorial and Administrative 
Units should be replaced by new law on Self Governance and Local 
Budgeting and the new law should include the following aspects of the 
expenditure assignments: 
9 Due to the fact that Soums are too small and lack of the neces-
sary capacity to manage public services efficiently Aimags can 
be proclaimed as local government. 
9 Provide the condition so that each jurisdictional level to have a 
democratically elected assembly and governor. 
9 Capital city, Aimags, and Soums should be provided an indepen-
dent and predictable revenue sources. 
9 Competencies of the assembly should be clearly defined on each 
jurisdictional level. 
9 In order to solve the dual subordination problem in the education, 
health, and cultural sectors the competencies related to the ser-
vice delivery should be shifted to the Aimag governor. 
9 The assembly should be provided authorities on the defining, fi-
nancing and providing local public services. 
• Amendments in the State and Local Property Law should be made in order 
to provide conformity with the new Law on Self Governance and Local 
Budget with regards to the property ownership, particularly in case of 
education, health, culture, social safety and public order. 
• Amendments in the Public Procurement Law should be implemented so 
that local governments have some authorities on the implementation of the 
investment decisions with regards to the local services. 
• Discontinue the assignment of the some portion of the capital expenditures 
to the Parliament members, which is increasing in amount by each budget 
year. 
Based on the reassignment of expenditure responsibilities, the tax sharing 
rates and transfers should be reevaluated to provide sufficient sources for 
those services being assigned to the sub-national governments.  
The harmonization of the laws, decrees, departmental orders that effect and 
overlap expenditure assignments will be a more difficult tasks. Therefore, a 
comprehensive survey on the actual expenditure assignments should be 
conducted so that the regulatory power and responsibility for financing, as 
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well as service deliveries could be more decentralized. For instance, the roles 
of the central ministries such as education and health should be defined in the 
context of stronger sub-national level income e.g., for primary school and 
tertiary hospital. 
4.5 Revenue Assignment  
Once local governments are assigned to certain expenditure responsibilities, 
the second question to be addressed regarding the intergovernmental fiscal 
relations focuses on the revenue assignment. Governments rely on a wide 
variety of tax instruments for their revenue needs and the decision on tax 
assignment is important for the efficiency and effectiveness of the service 
provision. The important concept for the effectiveness of decentralization is 
the linkage between revenue raised and services provided by the local level.  
Therefore this section examines the issues in the revenue assignment among 
the different government levels in Mongolia. It includes the description of the 
current revenue assignments, an analysis of revenue collection trends and 
discussions of the problems in the current revenue assignments. Finally some 
policy recommendations for future reforms are developed. 
4.5.1 Degree of Revenue Decentralization in Mongolia 
Local government budget revenues comprise from own-source tax revenue 
(own revenue in the further text), non tax revenue and capital revenue as well 
as transfers. There also exists non budget revenue, which consists of funding 
from international organizations and donations from citizens and enterprises. 
The local government own revenues consist of local taxes and shared taxes in 
Mongolia. The latter comprise of VAT, royalties and license fee for mining 
and prospecting minerals and the former consist of PIT, property tax, vehicle 
tax, land payment, other taxes and fees. Non tax revenues are proceeds of 
dividends, rent, interest and fines, budget entities own revenue and other 
revenues. The capital revenues consist of income from the capital selling.  
Figure 4.11 illustrates the aggregated sub-national revenues as share of GDP. 
The total budget revenues as share of GDP was increased from 33.4 percent in 
2000 to 52 percent in 2006, while in contrast sub-national revenues as share 
of GDP were decreased from 6.5 percent in 2000 to 2.8 percent in 2007. The 
sub-national revenue as percentage of the consolidated revenue had the same 
dynamics as sub-national revenue as share of GDP (see table 4.12).  
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Figure 4.11: Sub-national Revenue as Percentage of GDP 
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Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Ministry of Finance. 
Figure 4.12: Sub-national Revenue as Percentage of Consolidated 
Revenue 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Ministry of Finance. 
Table 4.7 illustrates the overall revenue and expenditure levels in Mongolia. 
The aggregated sub-national revenues accounted for 6.5 percent of GDP and 
about 19.6 percent of the consolidated budget revenues and were equivalent to 
196.8 percent of total local government expenditures in 2000. The ratio of the 
sub-national revenue to sub-national expenditure was decreased to 95.8 
percent in 2003. This dramatic change was a result of the public sector reform 
of 2003, which shifted the major public service responsibilities to the central 
government. Correspondingly, the revenues were also reassigned in favor of 
the central government and aggregated sub-national revenues accounted to 9.4 
percent of the consolidated budget revenues in 2003.  
104 
Table 4.7: Overall Revenue and Expenditure Levels, 2000-2008 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Sub-national revenue as % of 
GDP 6.5 7.6 8.4 3.3 3.1 2.8 3.4 2.6
Sub-national expenditures as 
% of GDP 12.9 13.9 13.6 3.4 3.6 3.1 3.6 2.7
Sub-national expenditure as 
% of the sub-national 
revenue 196.8 183.4 161.1 95.8 101.6 101.3 97.6 103.6
Sub-national revenue as % of 
consolidated government 
revenue 19.6 20.3 24.9 9.4 9.5 9.3 7.0 6.6  
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Ministry of Finance. 
Figure 4.13: Percentage Shares of the Three Main Sources of 
Revenue for Sub-national Governments, 2000-2008 
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Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Ministry of Finance. 
The figure 4.13 illustrates the percentage shares of the three main sources of 
revenue such as tax revenue, non-tax revenue and transfers in the consolidated 
sub-national revenues from 2000 to 2008. The tax revenues play an important 
role in the sub-national revenues, which accounted about 80 percent of the 
total sub-national revenues from 2000 to 2002. However, shares of tax 
revenues in the total sub-national revenues were decreased to 66.7 percent in 
2003. The share of transfers in the total sub-national revenues have been 
increased during this period from 5.9 percent in 2003 to 23.9 percent in 2008.  
Table 4.8 illustrates the tax sharing among central and sub-national govern-
ments from 2000 to 2008 in Mongolia. Until 2003 the PIT including payroll 
taxes were assigned to the sub-national governments, and the corporate 
income tax and excise taxes as well as VAT were shared among the central 
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and sub-national governments. In 2003 the payroll tax was assigned to the 
central government and tax sharing of the CIT and excise taxes were removed 
from sub-national revenue sources and shifted to the central government 
budget. 
Table 4.8: Shared Taxes Allocated to Sub-national Governments, 
2000-2008, in % 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007* 2008**
PIT 100.0 10.0 100.0 16.5 17.4 18.1 18.2 16.7 10.4
Corporate income 
tax (CIT) 25.7 37.5 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Value added tax 12.0 6.6 30.7 19.0 17.1 16.9 18.4 16.6 20.0
Excise tax 20.1 20.3 6.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Royalty 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.4 6.8 8.8 16.7 22.7 31.2
License fee for 
mining and 
exploring mineral 
resources 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 48.3
Note:    * - data from the expected budget execution. 
** - data from the approved budget plan. 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Ministry of Finance. 
As a result the sub-national government revenue share of GDP decreased 
from 6.5 percent in 2000 to 3.3 percent in 2003 (see figure 4.11). The 
statistical data proves the centralizing tendency since 2003, both in the 
expenditure as well as in the revenue assignment in Mongolia.  
4.5.2 Description of the Revenue Assignment in Mongolia 
The Parliament defines the tax bases and rates for custom duties, direct and 
indirect taxes in Mongolia. The Aimag Assembly has the right to define tax 
bases for the fees on the extraction of the natural resources other than 
minerals and common minerals, and tax rates for the fees on usage of springs 
and herbs within the limits set by Parliament. The General Tax Code (GTC) 
uniformly formulated and defines the tax bases and rates as well as fixes 
ceilings for sub-national taxes, and CBL defines the central and local taxes. 
The main distinction in the revenue assignments in Mongolia is between own 
revenue and shared revenue. The Aimag and Soum governments generate 
their own revenue. However, the tax revenues permanently assigned to Aimag 
and Soum government are considered own revenue, even though sub-national 
governments have little or no autonomies on the bases and rates for the vast 
majority of these taxes.  
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Shared revenue refers to three taxes: VAT, royalty and license fee for mining 
and prospecting minerals, where VAT is shared at temporary rates between 
central and provincial governments. The tax sharing rates for the royalties and 
license fees are determined by the 2006 amendment in the Consolidated 
Budget Law (CBL).  
Table 4.9: Legislative Control over Sub-national Own Revenues, 
2008 
Tax
Legislative level 
determining tax 
base
Legislative level 
determining tax rate
Budget to which 
tax revenues go
Personal income taxes Central Central Local
VAT Central Central Cent/Prov
Immobile property tax Central Central Provincial
Gun ax Central Central Local
Vehicle tax Central Central Provincial
Stamp duty Central Central Cent/Loc
Land payment Central Central Provincial
License fee for mining and prospecting 
mineral resources Central Central Cent/Prov/Loc
Royalty Central Central Cent/Prov/Loc
Timber usage fee Central Cent/Prov Local
Payment for usage of hunting 
resources Central Central Cent/Loc
Fees on the extraction of the natural 
resources other than minerals Provincial Provincial Local
Fee for water usage Central Central Local
Fee for the extraction of the common 
minerals Provincial Provincial Local
Fee for springs usage* Central Provincial Local
Fee for herb usage* Central Provincial Local
Note: *- These tax rates are set by province and capital city assemblies within the limits 
defined by parliament. 
Source: Authors’ evaluation based on the respected laws and decrees. 
In order to achieve real revenue autonomy, sub-national governments must 
have a substantial autonomy at best over the tax rate. The degree which sub-
national governments exercise control over their own-source revenues is 
illustrated in table 4.9.  
The sub-national governments are able to set the rates for the fees on springs 
and herb usage within limits defined by parliament, and imposed the fees on 
the extraction of natural resources other than minerals as well as common 
minerals. However, these fees are not productive and generate tiny revenues 
for the local budgets. Almost all taxes are legislated by central government 
and sub-national governments have a limited autonomy to introduce their own 
taxes. As stated in the LTAU, the Aimag and Soum Assemblies have a right 
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to introduce only the fees on usage of the pastures, local roads and bridges, 
and the communities do not have any legislative sovereignty with regard the 
taxes in Mongolia.  
Hence, the tax bases for custom duties, direct and indirect taxes are under the 
exclusive legislation of the national Parliament and tax rates are partly to be 
influenced by the lower jurisdictional levels. The sub-national governments 
lack of fiscal autonomy for the efficient provition of public services for their 
constituencies in Mongolia. 
Table 4.10 illustrates the common taxes shared by all jurisdictional levels 
(central, provincial as well as county taxes). The shared taxes include VAT, 
royalties and license fees for the mining and prospecting mineral resources. 
The payroll tax, corporate income tax, custom duties, excise taxes, windfall 
taxes, gasoline and diesel taxes are central government taxes, and land 
payment, immobile property tax and vehicle tax are provincial taxes. 
Correspondingly, PIT including livestock tax, other taxes and fees are county 
taxes in Mongolia. The central, provincial and common taxes are under 
exclusive legislation and administration of the central government. The most 
local taxes are also under the central legislation with partial legislative 
sovereignty for the local government. 
Table 4.10: Existing Tax System in Mongolia – Classified by 
Jurisdictional Level 
Common Taxes Central taxes Provincial taxes Local taxes 
VAT, 
Royalty, 
License fees for 
the mining and 
prospecting 
mineral 
resources. 
 
Payroll tax, 
Corporate income 
tax, 
Custom duties, 
Excise taxes, 
Gasoline and diesel 
taxes, 
Windfall taxes. 
  
City tax21, 
Land payment, 
Immobile property 
tax, 
Vehicle tax. 
 
PIT including livestock 
tax 
Gun tax, 
Stamp duty, 
License fee for hunting, 
Fees for the use of 
natural resources other 
than minerals, 
Fee for herb usage, 
Tax on extraction of the 
common natural 
resources, 
Fees for the usage of 
water and springs. 
Source: Authors’ evaluation based on General Tax Code (2008) and Consolidated Budget 
Law (2002). 
                                                 
21 The city tax is not yet introduced due to the lack of legal framework. 
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Table 4.11: Revenue Distributions between Government Levels, 
2003-2008 
Level of government 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007* 2008*
Total tax revenue 100 100 100 100 100 100
Central budget 92,2 92,2 91,8 93,7 93,0 63,8
Aggregated sub-national budget 7,8 7,8 8,2 6,3 7,0 36,2
Perssonal income taxes 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Central budget 84,4 82,5 82,0 81,9 88,9 89,5
Aggregated sub-national budget 15,6 17,5 18,0 18,1 11,1 10,5
Corporate income tex 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Central budget 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Aggregated sub-national budget 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
VAT 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Central budget 92,6 94,0 93,4 93,3 94,0 93,4
Aggregated sub-national budget 7,4 6,0 6,6 6,7 6,0 6,6
Excise taxes 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Central budget 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Aggregated sub-national budget 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Property tax 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Central budget 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Aggregated sub-national budget 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Royalty 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Central budget 87,5 93,4 91,3 83,2 77,4 70,0
Aggregated sub-national budget 12,5 6,6 8,7 16,8 22,6 30,0
Custom duties 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Central budget 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Aggregated sub-national budget 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Other taxes 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Central budget 80,6 84,2 84,1 92,5 92,0 5,9
Aggregated sub-national budget 19,4 15,8 15,9 7,5 8,0 94,1
Non-tax revenues 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Central budget 90,1 90,6 91,8 94,6 96,3 96,2
Aggregated sub-national budget 9,9 9,4 8,2 5,4 3,7 3,8
Note: Revenues from social insurance payment was included into the budget until 2007. 
The sharp increase of the other taxes on the sub-national share in 2008 were due to 
sharing of the license fees for mining and prospecting minerals among central, provincial 
and local levels. 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Ministry of Finance. 
Table 4.11 illustrates the existing revenue distributions between different 
government levels in Mongolia from 2003 to 2008. The revenue sharing was 
regulated by the annual budget law until 2008. The sub-national tax revenues 
were relatively stable and small, which accounted about from 7 to 8 percent of 
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the consolidated tax revenues in 2003 to 2007, but rose to 36.2 percent in 
2008. This change was due to the mineral resource tax sharing introduced by 
new tax law in 2008. The economic growth has fostered the development of 
the mining sector in Mongolia.  
However, mineral resource mining usually has negative externalities such as 
environmental pollution. Before 2008 the royalties were shared at temporary 
rates among central and provincial governments, the license fees for mining 
and prospecting minerals were assigned to central government. The mineral 
tax sharing rates are formalized by the 2006 amendments in the CBL. 
Table 4.12 represents the vertical distribution of common taxes in Mongolia. 
The revenues from royalties are shared by 70 percent for the central 
government, 20 percent for the Aimag and 10 percent for the Soum level. The 
revenues from the license fees for the mining and prospecting minerals are 
shared by 50 percent for the central government, 25 percent for the Aimag 
and 25 percent for the Soum level. The revenues from the VAT should be 
shared by 80 percent for the central and 20 percent for the provincial levels. 
However, the shares of the VAT are negotiated in between the central and 
provincial government, and sharing rates are fluctuating from year to year. 
For instance, VAT has been distributed by 92.2 percent to the central and 7.4 
percent to the provincial government in 2003, but 94 percent to the central 
and 6 percent to the provincial government in 2007. Thus the VAT revenue 
sharing is unclear and unstable and generates uncertainty as well as reduces 
predictability for the sub-national budgeting and planning in Mongolia. 
Table 4.12: Revenue Sharing in Mongolia 
Type of taxes Share of the central government, % 
Share of the 
Provincial 
government, % 
Share of the county 
government, % 
VAT 80  20  - 
Royalty 70  20  10  
License fees for the 
mining and 
prospecting mineral 
resources 
50  25  25  
Source: Based on Consolidated Budget Law, 2002. 
As shown in the table 4.11 tax sharing in between central and sub-national 
governments have increased from 2003 to 2008. During the period from 2003 
to 2007 the central government received more than 90 percent of the total 
revenue, the provinces about 6 to 8 percents of the total tax revenue in 
Mongolia. The composition of the consolidated tax revenue by types of the 
taxes is shown in figure 4.14. In 2007 the windfall taxes were the taxes with 
highest revenue collections, which accounted in 26.4 percent of the consoli-
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dated tax revenue, followed by the VAT, CIT, excise taxes and royalties as 
well as export and import duties.  
Figure 4.14: Composition of Consolidated Tax Revenue by Tax 
Types, 2007 
 
Source: Statistical Year Book of Mongolia, 2007. 
Only four taxes raised revenue of more than 70 percent of the consolidated 
tax revenue in Mongolia. According to the current legislation the most 
productive taxes are assigned to the central government and less productive 
taxes are assigned to the sub-national level. Therefore, sub-national govern-
ments have very limited revenue autonomy and are dependent on the 
intergovernmental transfers from the central government. 
Figure 4.15: Composition of the Consolidated Sub-national 
Revenues by Revenue Sources, 2003-2008 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Ministry of Finance. 
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Figure 4.15 illustrates the composition of the sub-national revenue by revenue 
sources from 2003 to 2008. The shares of the revenue from tax sharing in the 
consolidated sub-national revenue were increased from 20 percent in 2003 to 
46 percent in 2008. The shares of the equalization transfers were about 10 
percent, which remained relatively stable during the same period. 
The common tax pool and intergovernmental grants are parts of the revenue 
sharing system in Mongolia. Within the common tax pool the legislative 
sovereignty for the most taxes is at the central government. With regard to the 
intergovernmental transfer, the tax revenues for all taxes are collected by the 
central government, then transfers are distributed from the central budget to 
the province budgets. Therefore, sub-national governments are lacking of 
capacities to determine their revenues to finance own affairs. Hence, it is 
important to shift revenue autonomy to the sub-national level in Mongolia. 
With regard the administrative sovereignty, Mongolia has a vertical fiscal 
administration under the authority of the MoF. All taxes are collected at the 
provincial and county level then local taxes are transferred to the respected 
budget accounts and other taxes are concentrated in the national budget. Then 
the revenue is partly shared and transfers are allocated to the province level. 
The sub-national tax departments are subordinate level of the National Tax 
Authority (NTA) and operate as its agencies. Thus, the administrative 
sovereignty is at the central level in Mongolia. 
Within the current system, sub-national governments have no incentives to 
increase revenue collection. In fact, any increase in local revenues is 
equalized by reductions in either the tax sharing or transfers. Therefore, the 
current system encourages local governments to find extra-budgetary sources 
of income and sets incentives for an under-estimation of tax revenues. 
Concerning the sub-national revenue, there a number of issues associated with 
revenue assignments. Despite the fact that Soums and Aimags have access to 
the own tax revenues, the revenue volumes of these taxes are very limited. 
The environmental hardships of Mongolia sometimes have negative impacts 
on local farmers, which have an impact on the collection of livestock taxes 
and land payments. According to the existing revenue assignment, the 
legislative and administrative sovereignties are at the central level with partly 
separated revenue sovereignty for some taxes. Thus lower jurisdictional levels 
have no influence on legislation, administration and sub-national tax revenue 
in Mongolia.  
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4.5.3 Vertical fiscal imbalances and horizontal disparities in 
Mongolia 
A system of tax assignment designed in accordance with the principles of 
public finance and subsidiarity usually produce vertical imbalance in the 
revenues availability to various levels of government or horizontal fiscal 
disparities among governments of the same level. 
Vertical fiscal imbalances 
Vertical fiscal imbalance occurs when expenditures assigned to a given level 
of government are higher or lower than revenue from own sources. The lack 
of revenue autonomy at the sub-national level was the major cause of the 
vertical imbalances in Mongolia. Tax and revenue sharing as well as transfers 
are normally designed to equalize the vertical imbalances. McLure (2001) 
argued that neither tax sharing nor revenue sharing provides marginal sources 
of own revenues for sub-national governments. In most cases the bases and 
rates for the sub-national taxes are determined by central government and 
Mongolia is not an exception. 
The vertical fiscal imbalances can be measured by two different ways. The 
first one is to look for a surplus or deficit for each consolidated level of 
government before borrowings, and the second way is to examine the sub-
national expenditures that are financed by own-source revenues. However, the 
first one tends to be biased towards central or federal government level. The 
second coefficient for vertical imbalance is calculated as one minus the share 
of the sub-national expenditures that are financed from transfers and shared 
revenues. The coefficient takes values between zero and one, with values 
closer to zero indicates a larger vertical imbalance (Martinez-Vazquez & 
Boex, 2001). The coefficient calculated by the budget data for 2007 is 0.301, 
which indicates that the vertical imbalance is relatively high in Mongolia. 
Table 4.13 represents the per capita tax revenues (per capita revenue in the 
further text) by Aimags including the central share from 2003 to 2007. The 
highest per capita revenue is for Orkhon Aimag, which accounted to 443.2 
thousand Tugrug in 2007, followed by Umnugobi, Ulaanbaatar, Gobi-
Sumber, Sukhbaatar, Dornogobi and Darkhan-Uul Aimags. According to the 
five year average figures the lowest per capita revenue results for Bayan-
Ulgii, Bayankhongor and Arkhangai Aimags. According to the current 
legislature about 50 percent of the sub-national total tax revenue is transferred 
to the central government budget.  
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Table 4.13: Per Capita Tax Revenue by Aimags, 2003-2007, 
in thousands of Tugrug22 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 average
Arkhangai 8.726 9.047 16.285 19.205 20.308 14.714
Bayan-Ulgii 7.626 8.862 14.855 16.783 13.725 12.370
Bayankhongor 6.959 9.809 14.605 12.685 25.018 13.815
Bulgan 13.512 16.534 45.751 49.544 56.178 36.304
Gobi-Altai 10.419 12.437 18.685 20.959 21.387 16.778
Dornogobi 36.967 49.739 60.143 72.466 94.877 62.839
Dornod 17.074 20.513 27.477 38.080 46.459 29.921
Dundgobi 22.254 24.446 30.443 30.068 34.575 28.357
Zavkhan 12.683 14.447 20.708 22.541 19.786 18.033
Uburkhangai 9.536 11.357 16.386 18.952 27.103 16.667
Umnugobi 19.620 29.993 64.171 122.872 154.449 78.221
Sukhbaatar 13.107 12.362 21.204 119.882 103.099 53.931
Selenge 20.237 26.685 35.952 46.609 69.241 39.745
Tuv 14.754 17.901 29.053 44.785 53.776 32.054
Uvs 12.959 16.441 20.781 24.864 22.927 19.594
Khovd 11.697 12.977 17.971 21.138 18.476 16.452
Khubsugul 10.976 11.696 17.031 18.890 18.311 15.381
Khentii 14.200 15.329 21.546 24.883 32.159 21.623
Darkhan-Uul 44.174 47.064 60.075 75.771 79.823 61.382
Ulaanbaatar 72.650 97.737 112.016 122.547 127.274 106.445
Orkhon 104.391 191.290 197.344 273.570 443.160 241.951
Gobi-Sumber 83.449 109.819 134.419 131.819 107.222 113.346  
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Ministry of Finance. 
Table 4.14 illustrates the per capita expenditures by Aimags from 2003 to 
2007. According to the five year average figures the highest per capita 
expenditure is for Umnugobi Aimag (112,461 Tugrugs in 2007) followed by 
Gobi-Sumber, Orkhon, Sukhbaatar, Tuv, Dornogobi and Gobi-Altai. The 
lowest per capita expenditure is for Bayan-Ulgii followed by Bayankhongor, 
Arkhangai, and Dornod Aimags. 
                                                 
22 The Tugrug is the name of the Mongolian currency. 
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Table 4.14: Per Capita Expenditure by Aimags, 2003-2007, 
in thousands of Tugrug 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average
Arkhangai 10,237 13,093 14,459 17,924 34,907 18,124
Bayan-Ulgii 9,217 11,070 12,379 13,810 26,852 14,666
Bayankhongor 11,287 16,119 17,339 19,300 39,888 20,787
Bulgan 15,467 21,916 26,437 32,930 54,230 30,196
Gobi-Altai 15,713 23,764 26,209 33,290 57,937 31,383
Dornogobi 26,864 32,204 35,874 25,329 62,505 36,555
Dornod 11,692 15,925 14,684 15,133 36,856 18,858
Dundgobi 17,826 22,244 23,208 20,184 54,367 27,566
Zavkhan 13,612 16,493 20,213 22,777 43,730 23,365
Uburkhangai 11,527 15,261 14,728 8,160 32,691 16,473
Umnugobi 18,923 32,863 39,620 61,129 112,461 52,999
Sukhbaatar 17,207 18,739 22,613 27,252 64,056 29,973
Selenge 14,291 20,474 21,403 20,850 35,594 22,522
Tuv 16,427 27,402 30,551 38,944 63,003 35,266
Uvs 15,600 19,038 19,290 21,627 41,502 23,411
Khovd 11,886 16,777 17,909 18,785 38,894 20,850
Khubsugul 10,379 12,189 13,462 15,722 34,308 17,212
Khentii 14,101 18,202 19,466 22,353 50,173 24,859
Darkhan-Uul 12,316 15,706 17,194 18,283 33,379 19,375
Ulaanbaatar 13,966 23,283 22,757 15,619 45,743 24,274
Orkhon 21,150 26,064 34,418 27,944 71,785 36,272
Gobi-Sumber 45,369 46,260 49,262 38,287 96,246 55,085  
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Ministry of Finance. 
As table 4.15 illustrates, the expenditure needs for the local governments 
often exceeds their revenue capacities. For instance Gobi-Altai Aimag has 
covered about 30 percent of its expenditure needs by own revenues for the 
period 2003 to 2007, which is the lowest value among the 21 provinces. In 
contrast, the ratios of the per capita revenue and per capita expenditure are 
exceeding 100 percent for Orkhon, Capital city, Darkhan-Uul, Umnugobi, 
Dornogobi, Burgan and Selenge Aimags. Correspondingly, the ratio is about 
50 percent for other 14 Aimags. Therefore, Aimags with ratios higher than 
100 provide transfers to the other 15 Aimags, which have very low fiscal 
capacities in comparison to their fiscal needs. 
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Table 4.15: Share of the Per Capita Revenue in the Per Capita 
Expenditure, 2003-2007, in % 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Arkhangai 55.5 42.6 51.8 53.5 57.3 
Bayan-Ulgii 41.4 42.1 36.7 36.1 47.5 
Bayankhongor 33.1 28.1 36.0 42.0 65.3 
Burgan 60.8 49.7 128.7 111.7 102.7 
Gobi-Altai 36.2 29.1 27.7 42.5 35.1 
Dornogobi 91.5 97.5 95.5 167.8 119.7 
Dornod 71.6 60.6 73.8 89.2 89.6 
Dundgobi 51.2 41.0 42.3 53.0 46.9 
Zavkhan 40.3 33.1 32.4 44.5 36.1 
Uburkhangai 43.2 34.5 42.0 83.5 79.2 
Umnugobi 64.8 64.3 96.1 137.2 150.0 
Sukhbaatar 49.0 44.7 50.3 212.9 82.1 
Selenge 63.7 55.4 75.1 86.0 148.8 
Tuv 64.1 53.5 79.7 62.3 84.9 
Uvs 50.2 41.6 35.6 32.5 35.6 
Khovd 56.5 39.9 41.6 45.0 41.9 
Khubsugul 58.0 48.7 50.5 51.7 53.8 
Khentii 68.5 49.6 52.3 52.1 62.4 
Darkhan-Uul 102.2 92.7 95.1 134.4 123.4 
Ulaanbaatar 182.7 133.9 154.5 231.3 106.4 
Orkhon 296.4 454.1 322.3 431.5 425.0 
Gobi-Sumber 74.5 62.3 71.2 107.6 41.4 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Ministry of Finance. 
Horizontal Disparities  
The horizontal fiscal imbalance occurs when taxable capacity is unevenly 
distributed across sub-national jurisdictions. There are different methods to 
measure horizontal fiscal imbalances. The simplest approach is to compare 
per capita revenue collections and per capita expenditures across jurisdictions. 
However, both measures may be misleading indicators of the horizontal fiscal 
disparities (Martinez-Vazquez, 1999). Therefore, additional analysis of the 
fiscal capacity and the fiscal need measures are needed for more precise 
examination. Due to regional disparities in per capita income, jurisdictions 
differ by their fiscal capacities, hence a well balanced design of revenue 
sharing and the fiscal equalization system is an important part of the 
intergovernmental fiscal relations system. The more detailed discussion of the 
design of the fiscal equalization system will be presented in the next section.  
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The Analysis of the Fiscal Capacity 
The per capita income can demonstrate regional disparities more precisely, 
but this data is lacking because of non-regionalized national accounts 
statistics. Thus the per capita tax revenue and the per capita consumption or 
per capita turnover will be used as a proxy measure for the regional fiscal 
capacities in Mongolia. Due to the data availability for the regional tax 
revenues, the analysis is based on the revenues for a five year period. It 
should be noted that the fluctuations of the per capita revenue is very high due 
to a rapid economic growth since 2005. 
Figure 4.16a: Per Capita Revenue across Provinces, 2003-2007 
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Figure 4.16b: Per Capita Revenue across Provinces, 2003-2007 
(Excluding Capital City and 5 rich Provinces) 
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Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Ministry of Finance. 
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Figure 4.16a and 4.16b illustrate the distribution of the per capita revenue 
across provinces from 2003 to 2007. The per capita revenue is indicated in the 
vertical axis while population size is in the horizontal axis. The per capita 
revenue is very high in the Capital city because the most businesses and 
population (about 40 percent) are concentrated in the Capital city. There also 
exist rich provinces with high per capita revenue. In figure 4.16b the Capital 
city and 5 rich provinces (Orkhon, Darkhan-Uul, Gobi-Sumber, Umnugobi 
and Dornogobi) are excluded in order to decrease deviations from the mean 
value.  
The estimated national median average line for the per capita revenue is on 
17,100 Tugrug (shown in the figure 4.16b). There are seven provinces with 
per capita revenue below the national average, which are Arkhangai, Bayan-
Ulgii, Bayankhongor, Gobi-Altai, Uvurkhangai, Khovd and Khubsgul 
Aimags. Hence, fourteen provinces and the Capital city are with per capita 
revenue above the national average value. Therefore, one can conclude that 
the provinces below the national average line for the per capita income are 
poor Aimags and those above the line are at least richer or rich Aimags. 
As table 4.16 illustrates, there are large disparities in per capita revenue 
collections across provinces, including the central revenue share, and these 
disparities are steadily increasing. The highest per capita revenue in 2003 was 
15 times higher than lowest and by 2007 this difference has increased to 32, 
which demonstrate the increasing trend in regional disparities in Mongolia.  
Table 4.16: Measures of Provincial Disparities: Per capita 
Revenue (Including central share), 2003 – 2007, (thousand of 
Tugrug) 
Mean Minimum Maximum
2003 25,8 7.0 104,4
2004 34,8 8,9 191,3
2005 45,3 14,6 197,3
2006 60,4 12,7 273,6
2007 72,2 13,7 443,2  
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Ministry of Finance. 
The disparities were created by the increasing economic concentration in a 
small number of the Mongolian regions. The Capital city alone represented 
66.8 percent of total tax revenues, including the central share in 2003, and 
56.4 percent in 2007 (see table 4.17). Orkhon Aimag represented 15.3 percent 
of all revenue collections in 2007, and five rich provinces represented 13.4 
percent of all revenue in 2007. The other 15 provinces together represented 15 
percent of all revenues, including the central share, which is equivalent to the 
only Orkhon Aimags’ revenue in 2007 (table 4.17).  
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Figure 4.17a and 4.17b illustrate the distribution of the per capita consump-
tion across provinces from 2003 to 2007 in Mongolia. The per capita 
consumption analysis was made to verify the evidence from the per capita 
revenue analysis. The national median average line for the per capita 
consumption is at 20,500 Tugrug, which is higher than the per capita revenue. 
Table 4.17: Concentration of Total Revenue Collections of the 
Provinces, 2003 – 2007 (Including Central Share) 
(percentage shares of total revenue collected by 21 provinces and 
capital city) 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Capital city 66.8 67.4 65.1 60.4 56.4
Orkhon 8.1 11.1 9.4 10.8 15.3
5 high revenue 
provinces 10.4 9.2 10.6 12.3 13.4
Revenues of the other 
15  provinces 14.8 12.3 14.9 16.5 15.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Ministry of Finance. 
Theoretically, the per capita consumption is usually higher than the per capita 
revenue due to the impact of the shadow economy. In the provinces with 
small per capita income subsistence economy is dominating so that the 
shadow economy in these Aimags is larger than in the rich Aimags. In the 
subsistence economy citizens have some possibilities to earn a sufficient wage 
in a legitimate manner, and working in the shadow economy is often the only 
way to earn money for providing minimal living standard (Schneider, 2005). 
The private savings are not included into the per capita consumption and 
saving rates were about 30-35 percent during the estimated period, which 
means that the per capita income is larger than the per capita consumption 
because the income consists of consumption and savings. 
There are eight provinces below the median average line of per capita 
consumption such as Arkhangai, Bayankhongor, Gobi-Altai, Uvurkhangai, 
Zavkhan, Tuv, Khentii and Khubsgul. The analysis proves that both per capita 
revenue and consumption are below the median average line in Arkhangai, 
Bayankhongor, Gobi-Altai, Uvurkhangai, Zavkhan and Khubsgul. Corres-
pondingly, these provinces are the poor jurisdictions, which get transfers in 
order to provide a certain minimum standard of public services for their 
constituencies.  
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Figure 4.17a: Per Capita Consumption across Provinces, 2003-
2007 
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Figure 4.17b: Per Capita Consumption across Provinces, 2003-
2007 
(Excluding Capital City and 5 rich Provinces) 
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Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Ministry of Finance. 
In order to develop formula by which equalization transfer would be allocated 
the fiscal needs of the provinces are analyzed by regression method by using 
panel data. Figure 4.18a and 4.18b illustrate data for population size and per 
capita expenditures of the provinces in a scatter diagram for 2003 to 2007. As 
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shown in the figures 4.18a and 4.18b there is a tendency that in smaller 
jurisdictions the per capita expenditure is higher than in bigger jurisdictions. 
For instance, Gobi-Sumber Aimag is the smallest jurisdiction with per capita 
expenditure of 96,300 Tugrug and a population of 12,600 people. In contrast, 
Ulaanbaatar is the biggest jurisdiction represented by per capita expenditures 
of 45,700 Tugrug with a population of 1,031,200 people in 2007. Hence, the 
larger the population, the lower is the per capita expenditure. This can be 
explained by decreasing economies of scale because of the high fixed costs 
within the public goods supply. This corresponds to the Tiebout U-shaped 
curve with respect to the population or community size (Tiebout, 1961). 
Beyond that a minimum level of the per capita expenditures can be derived 
from the data by defining the estimated average cost function of expenditures 
(Kirn and Petersen, 2007). The investigation of the relationship between per 
capita expenditure and jurisdictions’ size is made by panel analysis. The 
expenditure needs can be expressed on an average basis and the estimations of 
the average cost function are made in two different scenarios to ensure that 
the model fits good for Mongolian circumstances. 
Figure 4.18a: Distribution of the Per Capita Expenditure by 
Jurisdictions’ Size, 2003-2007 
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Figure 4.18b: Distribution of the Per Capita Expenditure by 
Jurisdictions’ Size, (Excluding the Capital City) 2003-2007 
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Source: Authors calculation based on data from the Ministry of Finance 
Scenario 1 
The relationship of the per capita expenditure and population size is defined 
by using the data for all juricdictions, however, the degree of explained 
variation is low in this case. The expenditure level is affected by city and 
mining effects, hence the Capital city and five rich provinces are excluded in 
a first step of the calculation. The expenditure level for 2007 is affected by 
world market price increase for minerals, thus in a second step the data for 
2007 are excluded from the calculation. The estimated average cost function 
of expenditures is a polynomial function, which is U-shaped with the 
minimum at 117,600 inhabitants (figure 4.19). According to this function the 
minimum per capita expenditure should be 13,500 Tugrug. However, this 
estimation doesn’t fit the real situation because population of the provinces 
ranges from 40,000 to 120,000 people excluding the Capital city with a 
population of more than one million and Gobi-Sumber with a population of 
12,600.  
In order to simplify the model the polynomial function is approximated by a 
linear function. Due to the low economic development the average minimum 
per capita expenditure is defined at the median average population size. The 
median average population is at 80,600 inhabitants for the selected sample 
data. Thus, according to the estimated linear function the national standard for 
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public goods will be at a per capita expenditure of 18,700 Tugrug in the 
scenario 1 calculation. 
Figure 4.19: The Estimated Average Cost Function of Expendi-
tures (Scenario 1) 
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Source: Authors calculation based on data from the Ministry of Finance 
Scenario 2 
In the second scenario the first two steps of the optimization are similar as in 
the previous scenario, and in step three the smallest jurisdiction Gobi-Sumber 
is excluded. The result gives not a very high degree of explained variation due 
to the high expenditure level in Tuv Aimag which is located 43 km from the 
Capital city. Thus, in step four Tuv Aimag is excluded, and the estimated cost 
function results in a polynomial function. Then the polynomial function is 
approximated by a linear function, which illustrated in figure 4.20. Due to the 
low economic development the national standard of local public goods can be 
defined as average per capita expenditure which is 17,100 Tugrug at the 
average population of 81,500 people.  
Population, thousand 
Pe
r c
ap
ita
  e
xp
en
di
tu
re
, t
ho
us
an
d 
123 
Figure 4.20: The Estimated Average Cost Function of Expendi-
tures (Scenario 2) 
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Source: Authors calculation based on data from the Ministry of Finance 
Such a minimum standard of public services should be delivered in order to 
improve living conditions and achieve economic growth. Thus, jurisdictions 
with per capita expenditure below the national average such as Arkhangai, 
Bayan-Ulgii, Dornod, Uvurkhangai, Khubsgul and Khovd should get transfer 
for providing at least the national minimum level of public goods for their 
constituencies. The jurisdictions located to the left hand side of the graph 
should get additional equalization transfers due to the smallness and these are 
Burgan, Gobi-Altai, Khentii, Sukhbaatar and Dundgobi as well as Gobi-
Sumber Aimags. The small Aimags do not profits from the economies of 
scale so that they need additional transfers from the central government or the 
rich Aimags. 
The analyses have proven that in particular the industrial structure and tax 
assignment can worsen the horizontal disparities. In Mongolia, most 
industries are concentrated in the capital city so that Ulaanbaatar alone raises 
about 60 percent of total tax revenues. In addition uneven distribution of 
natural resources and the sharing of natural resource tax and lisence fees 
contributed to the regional disparities, for instance in favor of the Orkhon 
Aimag, where a cupper mining factory is located. The Orkhon Aimag alone 
represented 15 percent of all revenue collections, which is almost equal to the 
revenue of the other 15 provinces. The five rich regions are also provinces, 
which are exploiting natural resources. Therefore, revenues are highly 
concentrated in the industrial areas and provinces being rich in natural 
resources in Mongolia. 
Population, thousand 
Pe
r c
ap
ita
  e
xp
en
di
tu
re
, t
ho
us
an
d 
124 
Another factor that influences the regional disparities is involved within the 
VAT sharing arrangements. Because the VAT redistribution is made by 
population size, the provinces with small population size get little revenue 
from the VAT sharing, in contrast the provinces with bigger population size 
will get more revenue from the VAT sharing. For instance, the smallest 
province Gobi-Sumber has got ten-times lower revenue from VAT sharing 
than Khubsgul, which is the biggest in population size among the provinces. 
Thus, regional revenue disparities can be reduced if the VAT revenue would 
be shared with the provinces on a per capita basis, as is done for instance in 
Germany (Petersen, 2008). 
In case of the Capital city, Orkhon and Darkhan-Uul Aimags, all are industrial 
centers, so they have higher revenue collections, for instance Orkhon Aimag’s 
own source revenue including VAT sharing is four times higher than its 
expenditure needs. Bulgan and Umnugobi Aimags are natural resource rich 
areas that also raise own-source revenue. Including the shared VAT, their 
revenues are larger than their expenditures since 2005. Therefore, in order to 
solve the problem of horizontal disparities the provinces with high fiscal 
capacities should provide equalization transfers to the central government or 
to the other provinces and the volume of transfers should be carefully 
decided. 
4.5.4 Current Shortcomings 
The lower levels of government should have considerable own revenues 
determined by themselves within limits that provides them the opportunity to 
adjust their revenues at least at the margin. There are only very few taxes, 
where sub-national governments have influence on tax rates, thus on their 
own revenues. The most important and productive taxes are VAT, corporate 
income tax, payroll tax and excise taxes, which are under sole control of the 
central government. In other words, sub-national governments cannot control 
their revenues or they have not enough own revenues, which is one of the 
most important characteristics of insufficient local fiscal autonomy.  
Conceptually, the revenue sources granted to sub-national governments 
should be sufficient to cover their expenditure responsibilities, or at least on a 
minimum level as mentioned above.  According to the PSFML, major social 
services are assigned to the central government and provided by local 
government via earmarked transfers. The PSFML defines also core local 
government functions, however, local government own revenues are not 
sufficient for the provision of these core local services. Thus local govern-
ments are often financing the core local services by foreign aid programs, 
which became obvious in interviews with Soum governors. The local 
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revenues raised by own taxes are often too low to cover at least the local 
government operational expenses. 
The taxes levied by the sub-national governments should not over burden the 
relatively mobile factors of production. The most of the tax revenues assigned 
to sub-national governments are levied on relatively immobile factors such as 
property taxes and land payments. In Mongolia, immobile property tax and 
land payments are assigned to the sub-national level which is in line with the 
above mentioned principles. Theoretically, natural resources gains should be 
transferred to the central government because they increase regional 
disparities. In Mongolia, central government fully determines all taxes on 
natural resource extraction and revenues of these taxes are shared among 
central, provincial and local governments. Therefore, these assignments have 
fostered horizontal disparities among the sub-national jurisdictions.  
The VAT revenues are shared among the central and provincial governments, 
but sharing rates are fluctuating year to year. The local government revenue 
sources should be relatively stable and predictable. Therefore, VAT sharing 
rates should be formalized by law, in order to provide less volatile and more 
predictable revenues for local jurisdictions.  
Centralized tax collection also does not create incentives to increase revenues, 
as any increase in local revenues is equalized by one to one reductions in 
either the tax sharing or transfer amounts. Due to the cost for the administra-
tion of  local taxes the provincial and local authorities have a greater interest 
to collect the central taxes. Therefore the system encourages local govern-
ments to find extra-budgetary sources of income and under-estimate their tax 
revenues.  
The most serious issue in intergovernmental fiscal relations in Mongolia is the 
lack of incentives to increase own revenue collections and rationalize the 
expenditures at the local level. During the early years of transition the revenue 
assignment, revenue sharing and transfers were allocated without any 
legalized rules and such decisions were under the discretion of the Ministry of 
Finance, the Parliament and Cabinet and changed from year to year. Thus the 
system failed to provide hard budget constraints, motivation to increase own 
revenues and to limit expenditures at the sub-national government level. The 
2003 reform took significant measures towards the imposition of hard budget 
constraints, result oriented and medium term budgeting. However, hard 
budget constraints were only achieved through very strict regulations 
implemented by the TSA system. 
The poor design of intergovernmental transfers reduced the incentives for 
sub-national governments to increase revenue collections, because the 
equalization transfers were also provided by a gap-filling approach, and any 
increase in local own revenues was balanced by reductions in either tax 
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sharing or transfers. Therefore, the current system creates unpredictability and 
perverse negative incentives for sub-national revenue collections. 
Before the reform of 2003, there was a constant change in tax sharing rates 
and formulas over time, which was regulated by the annual consolidated 
budget law. Since 2003 only VAT was shared among the central and local 
governments, however, the sharing rates were fluctuated year to year. By the 
amendments of 2006 in CBL tax sharing rates among the central and sub-
national governments were defined for the royalties and license fees from 
mining and prospecting mineral resources. The fluctuations in VAT revenue 
sharing create uncertainties and reduced predictability for sub-national 
budgeting and planning. Therefore, the crucial concern in revenue assignment 
is that sub-national government lack of adequate revenue autonomy, which is 
the important element of a well functioning system of intergovernmental 
relations. 
4.5.5 Reform Proposal 
First, the revenue sharing and transfers should be allocated according to a 
fixed formula and must be legitimized that it can provide predictability and 
create incentives to raise own-source revenues for sub-national government. 
The formula based financing would be more transparent so that the regions 
can understand the rationality of the transfer scheme and reduce political 
bargaining. It also will improve sub-national planning due to the stability 
within the revenue situation. As mentioned before, the formula should be 
based on per capita variables, hence, central government could assure well 
balanced financial conditions for the sub-national jurisdictions. For these 
reason the following measures are recommended: 
• VAT should be shared on a per capita base instead of the current arbitrary 
transfers to the sub-national governments, 
• formulas on per capita basis or other simple formulas for VAT sharing 
arrangement should be developed, 
• mid term planning as defined by the PSFML should be implemented or 
adequate amendments in the CBL should be made. 
Second, in order to enhance local accountability and responsibility the shares 
of sub-national revenues in GDP (currently being about 3%) should be 
increased so that at least the local authorities can finance a certain minimum 
standard of public services (excluding social services). Therefore, the 
following measures are recommended: 
• A new law on Self Governance and Local Budgeting should be passed to 
provide some authorities for Aimag Assemblies’ to ensure at least partial 
legal soveriegnty and revenue sovereignty at the lower level lurisdictions.  
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• The sales tax might be assigned to the sub-national governments if the 
costs for administration for local governments are too high, the alternative 
could be corporate income tax sharing by formula, thus businesses should 
pay taxes in the regions, where they operate instead of paying taxes in 
regions, where they are registered. 
• The property tax is a good local tax due to its stability and immovability, 
thus revenues from the property tax can be increased via passing land law. 
• Another option for improving local autonomy might be an increase of the 
livestock tax. 
The recommended measures for the revenue reassignment should be 
implemented on the basis of careful estimation with consideration of the 
expenditure assignments that provide sufficient resources for sub-national 
government to deliver effective and efficient service for their constituencies. 
4.6 Intergovernmental Transfers in Mongolia 
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers are the third pillar of intergovernmental 
fiscal relations and the main form of the sub-national government financing in 
developing and transition countries (UNDP, 2005). There are a number of 
different instruments under the general term of “transfers”, which include: 
intergovernmental grants, subsidies, subventions, donations and sharing of tax 
revenues. Transfers help to address imbalances that result from the mismatch 
between local expenditure responsibilities and revenue raising capacity. The 
important characteristics of any good system of intergovernmental grants are 
stability and flexibility (Bird and Smart, 2002).  
Therefore, this chapter examines the existing structure of intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers, identifies basic problems and makes some tentative proposals 
for reform of the intergovernmental transfer system in Mongolia. 
4.6.1 Overview of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers 
Central-provincial and provincial-local transfers are the important source of 
revenues for the provincial and local governments in Mongolia. Transfers are 
representing about 55 percent of consolidated sub-national revenues until 
2003, and the ratio dropped to 40 percent of consolidated sub-national 
revenues after the reform of 2003, which shifted major social service 
responsibilities to the central government. However, the intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers sharply increased and amounted to 71.1 percent of consolidat-
ed sub-national revenues in 2007 (see table 4.18). 
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Table 4.18: Share of Transfers in Total Sub-national Revenue,  
2000-2007 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Arkhangai 62,0 62,0 n/a 43,2 44,2 36,9 45,2 62,8
Bayan-Ulgii 71,0 69,0 n/a 56,8 49,5 45,3 56,3 67,0
Bayankhongo 70,0 65,0 n/a 68,3 57,2 50,9 57,1 71,0
Bulgan 62,0 57,0 n/a 32,7 41,2 11,7 12,4 29,6
Gobi-Altai 76,0 77,0 n/a 65,6 60,3 59,5 57,0 75,5
Dornogobi 55,0 53,0 n/a 18,8 15,6 16,7 19,9 37,7
Dornod 61,0 56,0 n/a 31,0 33,5 27,2 35,6 364,4
Dundgobi 66,0 61,0 n/a 49,4 50,6 48,6 58,0 72,1
Zavkhan 68,0 66,0 n/a 53,4 55,9 51,0 55,4 71,5
Uburkhangai 60,0 56,0 n/a 56,4 48,9 42,7 54,3 63,9
Umnugobi 67,0 61,0 n/a 54,4 62,6 49,9 48,3 45,9
Sukhbaatar 76,0 74,0 n/a 48,8 46,9 50,0 81,3 67,5
Selenge 22,0 30,0 n/a 26,9 35,5 23,6 30,9 60,4
Tuv 33,0 44,0 n/a 31,3 43,6 23,2 33,7 53,5
Uvs 69,0 65,0 n/a 49,9 50,2 51,4 63,6 75,2
Khovd 70,0 66,0 n/a 39,6 49,3 46,8 51,1 67,0
Khubsugul 67,0 63,0 n/a 43,2 39,4 36,5 41,7 62,4
Khentii 64,0 60,0 n/a 31,8 42,2 41,5 53,5 66,3
Darkhan-Uul 22,0 15,0 n/a 32,6 18,7 26,2 26,6 11,5
Ulaanbaatar 0,0 5,0 n/a 16,4 11,7 12,5 10,1 9,8
Orkhon 17,0 6,0 n/a 3,5 4,9 6,2 10,7 61,2
Gobi-Sumber 55,0 37,0 n/a 45,7 63,6 62,6 62,0 67,0
Average 55,1 52,2 n/a 40,9 42,1 37,3 43,9 71,1
 
Source: Updated table from Lkhagvadorj, 2007, p. 27. 
The Mongolian fiscal system is based on a layer cake model where a strict 
vertical hierarchical relationship among different levels of government does 
exist. Thus, the central government determines transfers to the provincial 
(Aimag) level governments and there are no direct central transfers to the 
county (Soum) level of governments. The county level receives the transfers 
from the provincial level of government, which is congruent with the structure 
and allocation criteria of central transfers.  
Beyond that the transfers in Mongolia can be classified into two categories 
such as unconditional and conditional transfers. The unconditional transfers 
consist of revenue-sharing transfers and equalization transfers. The condition-
al transfers are allocated to the local governments for financing centrally 
agreed delegated services such as education, health, culture, sports, social 
assistance, public order and safety. All central transfers being assigned to the 
sub-national levels pass through the provincial governments. The provinces 
manage the transfers to the counties in a similar ad hoc way as in case of the 
central to provincial transfers. 
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Unconditional grants 
The VAT, PIT, corporate income tax and excise tax were shared among 
central and sub-national governments until 2003. By the 2003 reform 
progressive PIT, corporate income tax and excise tax sharing were removed, 
but VAT sharing is remained so that a certain amount of the original revenues 
are returned to the respective provinces. 
The consolidated budget law (CBL) defines the level of VAT sharing to sub-
national governments for each budgetary year, and determines the tax sharing 
rates (since 2006) for royalties, license fees for prospecting and mining 
mineral resources for the central, provincial and local governments. 20 
percent of the revenue of the VAT, 30 percent of the royalties and 50 percent 
of the license fees for mineral resource usages are determined for the sub-
national governments. The central government determines tax bases and rates 
as well as administers all taxes, so the revenue sharing transfers can be 
classified as unconditional grants. The VAT sharing rates between central and 
sub-national governments are unstable and unclear, and the de facto sharing 
rates were 18.4 percent in 2006 and 16.6 percent in 2007 (see table 4.8 on 
page 114).  
The consolidated budget law determines the level of transfers allocated to 
sub-national governments which vary from year to year. Financial equaliza-
tion transfers are one of the most important components of sub-national 
finance in Mongolia. In order to get transfers, sub-national governments 
submit the revenue and expenditure estimates to the Ministry of Finance. The 
compilation of the budgets is largely based on the norms and expenditure 
benchmarks. Consolidated request from provinces are reviewed, analyzed and 
recommendations are made by the MoF. Based on these estimates the MoF 
calculates the amount of transfers for each province and the Parliament 
approves the transfers. Counties receive transfers from the province govern-
ment in a similar way. The assignment of transfers is based on expenditure 
and revenue projections, which are more or less ad hoc and no formula for the 
transfer allocation does exist. 
Conditional grants 
The second type of transfer are conditional transfers to sub-national govern-
ments for financing sub-national investments and centrally agreed services 
such as education, health, culture, sports, social assistance, public order and 
safety. At the province level these transfers cover all costs for the provision of 
the mentioned services and operation of the respected departments. At the 
county level those transfers are financing the schools, kindergartens, hospitals 
and cultural centers. The conditional grants are earmarked and transferred 
directly to the respective budget entities at the sub-national level. The 
investment expenditures on health, education, culture and sports are delegated 
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to sub-national governments and financed by conditional transfers from the 
respected line ministries budgets. The investment on transportation is 
financed by the conditional grants allocated from auto-road funds, which are 
financed by the vehicle taxes. In addition, the specific purpose conditional 
transfers are assigned to sub-national levels to finance programs and projects 
since 2008.  
The revenue sharing and equalization transfers are recorded separately as 
intergovernmental transfers in the budget documents, but conditional grants 
are included in the line ministries budget. In addition, sub-national govern-
ments have extra-budgetary funds, which mainly consist of international aids 
and local donations. These revenues are not always registered in the budget 
records and are often the only financial source for local capital expenses as 
well as local services assigned to sub-national governments by the PSFML. 
Table 4.19: Consolidated Intergovernmental Transfers 
Amount 
(billion 
Tugrugs)
Percenta
ge of 
total 
transfers
Amount 
(billion 
Tugrugs)
Percenta
ge of 
total 
transfers
Unconditional transfers
Revenue sharing transfers 58,2 72,5 84,2 79,2
Equalization transfers 22,1 27,5 22,1 20,8
Subtotal 80,3 100,0 106,3 100
Own-source revenue 114,89 162,8
Total local revenue 195,19 269,1
Share of transfers in total local revenue 41,1 39,5
2007 2008
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Ministry of Finance. 
As mentioned before central to sub-national transfers are the most important 
source of revenues for the sub-national governments and they have substan-
tially been increased from 2003 to 2008. The equalization grant has grown 
rapidly in size from 7.1 billion Tugrug in 2006 to 22 billion Tugrug in 2007. 
However, the revenue sharing transfers had a gradual increase in 2003 to 
2006, tripled in size at 58,2 billion Tugrug and accounted to 79.2 percent in 
total transfers to the sub-national governments in 2007 (see table 4.19). The 
revenue sharing transfers increased sharply23 due to the introduction of 
mineral tax sharing by the amendment of 2006 in the CBL. The relative role 
of equalization transfers in the sub-national budgets remained somewhat 
                                                 
23 Due to the mineral resources price increases in the world markets both budget revenue 
and expenditure have had substantial increases in 2007. 
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constant, while the role of revenue sharing transfers in the sub-national 
budgets increased from 2006 to 2008. 
Figure 4.21: Distribution of Per Capita Total Central Transfers by 
Province, 2003-2007
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Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Ministry of Finance.
Figure 4.21 illustrates the distribution of the per capita total transfers across 
the provinces, which are arranged by per capita tax revenue in ascending 
order for the period of 2003 to 2007. The Gobi-Sumber (60,860 Tugrug) has 
been the highest per capita total transfer receiving province followed by Gobi-
Altai, Dundgobi, Zavkhan and Uvs Aimags, while Orkhon (4,500 Tugrug), 
Ulaanbaatar, Darkhan-Uul and Dornogobi Aimags have received a relatively 
low level of per capita transfers.
Figure 4.22 illustrates the distribution of the revenue sharing transfers across 
the provinces according to the ascending order of the fiscal capacities from 
2003 to 2007. Orkhon has obtained the highest per capita revenue sharing 
transfers of 190,349 Tugrug, followed by Dornod, Umnugobi, Sukhbaatar and 
Gobi-Sumber Aimags, while Bayan-Ulgii, Khovd and Zavkhan Aimags have 
received a relatively low level of per capita revenue sharing transfers. The 
transfers allocated to the sub-national governments are characterized by high 
fluctuations, and the strongest increases in transfers took place in 2006 and 
2007.
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Figure 4.22: Distribution of Per Capita Revenue Sharing Transfers 
by Provinces, 2003-2007 
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Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Ministry of Finance. 
The analysis demonstrates that provinces with high per capita revenue 
obtained higher per capita revenue sharing transfers. These are the provinces 
either with better infrastructure or mineral resource rich areas. Thus, the 
origin based VAT sharing and mineral resource tax sharing is not effective in 
terms of equity because it contributes to the regional disparities in Mongolia. 
With regard to the ad hoc transfers, the provinces with a fiscal capacity lower 
than the average received relatively high transfers, than the provinces with 
very low fiscal capacities. Despite the shortcomings the ad hoc transfers have 
had some positive impacts on equity. 
According to the current expenditure and revenue assignments, some 
provinces are unable to provide the national average minimum service 
standard, which determined in the panel analysis (p. 125). Thus, fiscal 
equalization transfers can be an instrument for reducing vertical and 
horizontal imbalances.  
4.6.2 Problems with the Existing Systems 
Circumstances and objectives differ in countries around the world, however, 
there are some commonly accepted criteria for effective transfer systems, 
which are flexibility, stability, adequacy of resources and clear mandates for 
sub-national levels of government. The basic task of the transfer system is to 
assure that sub-national governments are accountable both to their citizens 
and to higher levels of government (Bird & Smart, 2002). In case of properly 
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designed transfers equalization can be achieved even if transfers finance 90 
percent of local expenditures, so the design of the transfer system matters.  
The intergovernmental fiscal transfers are a dominant source of sub-national 
revenues in Mongolia, hence, the design of these transfers are vital for the 
efficiency and equity of local service delivery. As Shah & Shen (2006) 
summarized, there are six broad objectives for national fiscal transfers, which 
are bridging fiscal gaps, reducing regional disparities, compensating for 
benefit spillovers, setting national standards, influencing local priorities in 
area of high national but low local priority, and stabilization. Each of these 
objectives can be applied to a varying degree in Mongolia, and each objective 
needs a specific design of transfers.  
According to the current legislature the revenue sharing transfers do not 
provide predictability for sub-national governments in Mongolia. In addition, 
origin based mineral resource tax sharing contributes to local disparities, 
which is not in accordance with the best practices. In order to enhance local 
incentives and achieve expenditure efficiency, the transfers should be 
designed to balance local fiscal effort and central allocation of funds, and 
local government should have some degree of revenue autonomy. The tax 
sharing with formula that considered both needs and capacity like in Germany 
can be contributed to sub-national autonomy for the setting of their priorities. 
As mentioned before intergovernmental fiscal transfers are determined on ad 
hoc basis by using a revenue pooling system, which disregards the local 
differences in needs, costs and own revenue raising capacity. In conclusion, 
Mongolian intergovernmental fiscal transfer system lacks of the basic 
ingredients of a good equalization system, namely to provide sufficient 
resources even to the poorest and smallest jurisdictions, to enable all local 
governments to deliver at least t a national minimum standard of public 
goods. 
The analysis of this section has identified a number of shortcomings of the 
intergovernmental fiscal transfer system in Mongolia. As mentioned, the 
current system of transfers including revenue sharing transfers is not adequate 
to meet revenue needs of sub-national governments in consideration of the 
expenditures assigned to them. The transfer program has been implemented 
largely to fill vertical gaps created by the existing assignments at the sub-
national level. Due to the bottom-up budgeting and consolidating budgeting 
process, the amount of transfers is unknown until the consolidated budget is 
approved by parliament. Thus, sub-national governments cannot reasonably 
estimate intergovernmental transfers until the budget execution starts. Annual 
changes on the amount of transfers and lack of clarity in the distribution of 
funds create highly unpredictable and unstable conditions for sub-national 
governments, which makes sub-national planning for budgetary resources 
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impossible. Therefore, the existing system lacks of transparency, predictabili-
ty and stability, which are the most important components of an effective 
transfer system. 
The amount of transfers to sub-national governments is determined largely by 
political decisions on ad hoc basis and disregards local differences in needs 
and fiscal capacities. Consequently, the system does not support efficient 
delivery of public services and local incentives. In addition, unconditional 
transfers focused on input controls do not provide accountability for sub-
national governments. Provincial-local transfers use the same allocation 
criteria as central to provincial transfers. These criteria do not differentiate 
among local governments by type, population size and urban/rural character. 
These “one size fits all” approach in provincial-local transfers creates 
resource inadequacy and inefficiency of the services delivery. 
4.6.3 Reform Proposal 
The analysis of this section identified the shortcomings of the existing 
intergovernmental fiscal relation system of Mongolia. The existing transfer 
system does not consider the fiscal needs and capacities of the sub-national 
jurisdictions and the allocation of funds is basically implemented in an ad hoc 
way. In order to cope with this problem and enhance the local incentives, a 
fiscal equalization based on the fiscal needs of the provinces should be 
implemented. 
Many federalist countries such as Canada, Australia and Germany provide 
equalization transfers for reducing revenue disparities between sub-federal 
governments of the same level. In these countries sub-federal governments 
with fiscal capacities below the national average receive some additional 
funds (Baretti, Huber & Lichtblau, 2000). The equalization will at least partly 
offset the regional disparities in revenues and enable sub-national govern-
ments to provide national minimum standards of local public goods.  
Following a proposal of Kirn and Petersen (2007) the Principality of 
Liechtenstein in 2007 has reformed its fiscal equalization law in the direction 
discussed above.24 The figure 4.23 demonstrates the derivation of the 
minimum standard for the supply of public goods from the panel of the per 
capita expenditures of the Mongolian Aimags in the period of 2003 to 2007, 
which has been described in detail on section 4.5.3. The national standard of 
local public goods supply is fixed at the per capita expenditure of 17,100 
Tugrug (the vertical line in figure 4.23). 
                                                 
24 The Liechtenstein Fiscal Equalization Law is attached as appendix 7 and also can be 
found on the website http://www.gesetze.li/Seite1.jsp?LGBlm=2007336. 
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Figure 4.23: The Allocation of Equalization Transfers 
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Source: Authors calculation based on data from the Ministry of Finance 
Then the standardized minimum per capita expenditures have to be guaran-
teed by transfers from the central government to assure a minimum supply of 
public goods and services for all jurisdictions, thus guaranteeing a certain 
equality of living standards within a national state. The minimum level of the 
expenditure can be estimated by the minimum standard of the average per 
capita expenditure multiplied by the number of the inhabitants, so from the 
regression analysis the following formula can be derived 
Ej = 17.100 × Nj  (1) 
where j indicates the Aimag, Nj the number of inhabitants and Ej the 
minimum standard of expenditures for the Aimag.  
The analysis of the public expenditures, which has done in the section 4.5.3 
revealed that the per capita expenditures are higher in smaller jurisdictions 
than in larger ones due to the lacking economies of scale. Thus the Aimags 
with per capita expenditure lower than the national minimum standard are 
eligible to get transfers and the per capita expenditure should be estimated for 
a four to five year period. The Aimags with higher per capita expenditure 
have to finance the difference above the standard by own revenue or should 
reduce their expenditures to that standard. According to the current assign-
ment, Aimags collect own revenues (Rj), hence the own revenue should be 
subtracted from the standard transfers to secure the interests of the Aimags to 
raise own revenue. The transfers (Trj) to be paid by the central government 
can be estimated by the following formula: 
Trj = (17.100 – Rj)×Nj  (2) 
Population, thousand 
Pe
r c
ap
ita
  r
ev
en
ue
, t
ho
us
an
d 
Tu
gr
ug
 
136 
As figure 4.23 demonstrates, the Aimags with a population of less than about 
81,500 inhabitants do have per capita expenditure, which are clearly above 
that minimum amount of 17,100 Tugrug. Obviously such small Aimags do 
much less profit from the economies of scale than the bigger ones. With other 
words small Aimags are confronted with diseconomies of scale because the 
necessary fixed costs of such jurisdiction are shared by a comparatively small 
population. Due to geographical restrictions but also cultural traditions, it is 
often not possible to form larger jurisdictional units. Then such “costs of 
smallness” have to be taken into consideration so that an additional transfer 
formula is needed to compensate for the costs of smallness. Such a transfer 
formula is also presented in figure 4.23, which might be linear and starts from 
the limit of smallness (which is 81,500 inhabitants).25  
On the left side of the observation points from the population figure of 81,500 
inhabitants, one can derive a linear transfer formula, which is decreasing with 
the number of inhabitants. For instance such formula can be estimated as 
following: 
TrjS = 0.1565(81.500 – Nj)×Nj (3) 
where j again indicates the (small) Aimag, Nj the population and Trjs the 
transfers for smallness. This can also be expressed in a perhaps more 
understandable way that the minimum per capita expenditure level is 
increased by about 0.1565 thousand Tugrug if the number of inhabitants 
declines by one person starting from the limit of 81,500 inhabitants as 
mentioned above. 
As a result two kinds of transfer from the central budget would exist: a) the 
transfer to guarantee the minimum per capita expenditure level for all 
Mongolian Aimags, and b) the transfer to compensate the smallness for the 
Aimags with population below the 81,500 inhabitants. As a consequence the 
disparities between the Aimags at least would be substantially limited and – 
an even larger advantage – all Aimags would fall under a fiscal equalization 
scheme, which is transparent and would provide predictability and stability 
for regional planning and budgeting. In order to implement such a formula-
steered fiscal equalization scheme, the government should pass a new law on 
fiscal equalization. A good example for such a draft law is the Liechtenstein 
Fiscal Equalization Law, which consists of just eight articles and is one of the 
simplest and most effective laws in the world. 
                                                 
25 Also a stepwise increase is possible with increasing smallness as in case of the 
Liechtenstein fiscal equalization law. 
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4.7 Sub-national Borrowing 
Public debt and borrowing traditionally has been as an important source to 
finance long-term infrastructure projects because it enhances intergenerational 
equity. Such type of intergenerational sharing enables local government to 
undertake the large-scale infrastructure investments (Shah, 1999). The sub-
national borrowing is the final pillar of fiscal decentralization, in addition to 
first three pillars. In case when local government’s expenditures are exceeded 
by their revenues, sub-national budget deficits and the incurrence of debt are 
the consequence.  
However, countries in transition and some developing countries have imposed 
strict restrictions on local borrowing because of insufficient revenue capacity 
of the local governments. More importantly rapidly growing local debt will 
endanger macroeconomic stability. This section explores the current situation 
of the sub-national borrowings in Mongolia. 
The borrowing activity of the government is regulated by PSFML, LTAU and 
CBL. By PSFML local governments must obtain approval for borrowing from 
the central government through the MoF, and only Aimag or Capital city 
governors have a right to borrow. Aimag and Capital city governors and 
general managers of the budgetary bodies are forbidden to spend above the 
appropriation and to overdraw the bank account as well as to borrow by 
PSFML. Aimag and Capital city governors can borrow from the central 
government. 
As defined by LTAU the province Assembly has the authority to approve 
bond issuing according to the governors proposal. However, sub-national 
borrowing is currently limited because of the underdevelopment of the capital 
markets especially at the province level in Mongolia. 
Table 4.20: Consolidated Budget Execution, 1995-2002, (percent 
of GDP) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Revenues 
including transfers 33.8 27.8 25.5 27.6 27.2 34.5 38.5 38.7 
Expenditures 40.4 36.0 34.5 41.9 39.4 41.5 43.9 44.2 
Net lending 0.9 1.1 7.9 10.5 8.7 5.5 5.7 5.4 
Balance including 
transfers -6.7 -8.2 -9.1 -14.3 -12.2 -7.0 -5.4 -6.0 
Source: World Bank, 2002.  
The balance of expenditures, revenues and transfers of the consolidated 
budget between 1995 and 2002 was relatively high and net lending as a 
percent of GDP sharply increased until 1998. During the transition period 
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from 1995 to 2002, the consolidated budget after transfers yielded in a deficit, 
which was declining after 1998 (table 4.20). 
Table 4.21: Consolidated Budget Execution, 2003-2008, (percent 
of GDP) 
Government 
level 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Central government 
Revenues 
after 
transfer 
35.82 35.16 35.01 34.98 38.74 31.44 
Expenditures 40.06 37.22 31.67 31.67 36.58 35.62 
Balance 
after 
transfers 
-4.24 -2.06 3.34 3.30 2.16 -4.18 
Balance 
before 
transfers 
-5.84 -3.25 2.10 2.52 1.48 -5.60 
Consolidated sub-national government 
Revenues 
after 
transfer 
3.20 3.16 3.26 2.45 2.59 3.08 
Expenditures 2.43 2.72 2.45 2.57 3.09 3.50 
Balance 
after 
transfers 
0.77 0.44 0.81 -0.12 -0.50 -0.42 
Balance 
before 
transfers 
0.56 0.00 0.55 -0.31 -0.98 -0.82 
Net lending 6.19 5.70 3.29 2.13 2.23 n/a 
GDP, 
millions of 
Tugrug 
1461169.2 1910880.9 2266505.5 3715000.0 4525900.0 5464300.0
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the Ministry of Finance. 
However, the reform of 2003 imposed the limits on state borrowing in general 
and sub-national borrowing in specific. As mentioned the sub-national 
governments are strictly prohibited to spend over the approved budget 
expenditures and make loan or budget arrears. As a result of these measures 
the sub-national budget after and before transfers are leveled off on about to 
zero percent of GDP from 2003 to 2005, and turned into a deficit of about  
one percent of GDP from 2006 to 2008 (table 4.21). The reform measures of 
2003 established the budget discipline with hard budget constraints at the sub-
national level.  
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Generally, short term borrowing is limited because of its impact on macroe-
conomic stabilization. Financing the current expenditure by debt leads to an 
increase of the public debt and has a crowding-out effect on the private 
investments. So, local governments are allowed to borrow only for financing 
the capital expenditure. Long and medium term borrowing is restricted to 
finance the infrastructure and central government has a strong control on the 
overall levels of borrowing in Mongolia.  
According to the current legislation the sub-national borrowing is under the 
direct control and administration of the central government in Mongolia. The 
sub-national borrowing can be used for financing the large scale infrastructure 
projects to support economic growth. Due to the weak capital market 
development the market based borrowing control is currently not possible in 
Mongolia. In a market system lenders charge higher borrowing costs to 
excessive or irresponsible borrowers. But this approach only works effective-
ly in well developed capital markets and institutions. Therefore, rule based 
debt control is appropriate for Mongolia.  
4.8 Concluding Remarks 
A sound local government structure is an important foundation for the 
effective and efficient system of intergovernmental fiscal relations. According 
to the current legislation, Mongolia has a large number of extremely small 
local governments and this fragmentation could be detrimental for the ability 
of local government to deliver public services effectively. However, 
communities (Bags) became large in size, which is also inappropriate for the 
service delivery in a vast territory with small population living in nomadic 
culture. The basic recommendation for the improvement of the size and 
structure of the sub-national jurisdictions is the amalgamation of the Aimags 
and Soums as well as the segregation of the rural Bags. It is worth to note that 
these activities should take the historical tradition into consideration, which 
means the regional and local characteristics, geography and size of the 
territory as well as the preferences of the population. 
The main criterion for an effective expenditure assignment is the efficient 
service provision that government satisfies needs and preferences of taxpayers 
as well as possible and this can be achieved at best by the subsidiarity 
principle. The analysis demonstrates that the current expenditure assignments 
in Mongolia do not violate the general principles of expenditure assignment. 
However, there exist overlapping in and duplications of responsibilities, 
which create unclear assignments and inefficient supply of public services. 
With regard to the capital expenditure, the maintenance and the operation of 
the facilities are assigned to the local level, which also have had a negative 
impact on the efficient service provision at the sub-national levels. To address 
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the mentioned deficiencies in the existing expenditure assignments, the LTAU 
should be amended or replaced by new law on Self Governance and Local 
Budgeting that defines clear distinctions and interactions of the competencies 
between different levels of self governing bodies and clarifies norms for the 
decision making process of the Assembly.  
The revenue assignments lack a very important element, for instance 
significant revenue autonomy given to sub-national governments, hence, sub-
national governments cannot control their revenues and have not enough own 
revenues. In addition, the intergovernmental fiscal relations in Mongolia lack 
of incentives to increase the own revenue collections and rationalize the 
expenditures at the local level. In order to address these issues the sub-
national governments should be provided with sufficient revenues, for 
instance the shares of sub-national revenues in GDP could be increased to 
about five percent, so that at least they can finance their minimum level of the 
local services. 
The analyses illustrates that there are significant vertical and horizontal 
imbalances in Mongolia. Due to regional disparities in per capita income, 
jurisdictions differ by their fiscal capacities. Hence, a well balanced design of 
revenue sharing and fiscal equalization system is an important part of the 
intergovernmental fiscal relations system. The average minimum per capita 
expenditure is 17,100 Tugrug, thus provinces with per capita expenditure 
below this level are poor jurisdictions and those above the level are the rich 
jurisdictions.   
The critical problem associated with intergovernmental transfers is that there 
is not a stable, predictable and transparent system of transfer allocation. The 
amounts of transfers to sub-national governments are determined largely by 
arbitrary political decisions on an ad hoc basis and disregarding local 
differences in fiscal needs and fiscal capacity. Thus, a fiscal equalization 
system based on the fiscal needs of the provinces should be implemented. The 
equalization transfers will at least partly offset the regional disparities in 
revenues and enable sub-national governments to provide a national minimum 
standard of local public goods. In total, local governments are still far away 
from having the political, administrative and fiscal autonomy to manage their 
own affairs. Current expenditure assignments and limited revenue raising 
possibilities became major obstacles for the development of local self-
government and the promotion of fiscal decentralization. Therefore the most 
important result of this analysis is the proposal for fiscal equalization scheme, 
which is formula based in determining the transfers.  
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Chapter 5 
Summary and Conclusion 
The definitions and implications of fiscal federalism are core elements of the 
policy debates in many countries around the world. At the beginning it was 
pointed out that more responsible government at the local level will ensure the 
efficient resource allocation in the public sector, which is possible in a 
decentralized governmental system. The multilevel systems of jurisdictions 
then raise the problem of fiscal federalism.  
Tiebout (1956), Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972) classic argument for 
decentralization is that government should correct market failure in the supply 
of public goods by decentralization because local communities have better 
opportunities to meet differences in tastes and preferences. The jurisdictional 
level with best information about the citizens’ preferences should supply the 
respective public goods, which will result in economic efficiency regarding 
the resource allocation. Then central government should be responsible on 
national public goods like in the fields of redistribution and stabilization. 
Hence, local government should provide the efficient level of local public 
goods for their constituencies. Under centralized government the decisions on 
the service delivery are made according to the median national voters’ 
preferences. National consensus will not fit in case of local public goods, 
because these goods benefit only the population of that jurisdiction. Thus, for 
local public goods decentralized decision making provides advantage of 
taking into account variations in preferences what centralized decision 
making cannot do. 
In a democratic setting citizens have the opportunity to vote on such issues. 
Decentralized elections will strengthen the citizen’s responsibility to 
participate in the political process and control the fiscal institutions for an 
efficient use of public funds and the decentralized jurisdictional power will 
improve citizen’s influence on the budgetary decisions and strengthen the 
politician’s responsibility. Therefore, to achieve efficient provision of public 
goods at the local level, the political and fiscal decentralization should be 
implemented hand in hand that allows citizens to vote for their interest and 
local government to provide services and tax their constituencies appropriate-
ly. 
Decentralization has many benefits, but it also has costs if it is implemented 
in a wrong way. Hence, the countries should find the appropriate balance of 
centralization and decentralization in order to achieve an efficient and 
effective structure of the public sector. In case of a decentralized provision of 
public goods, the multilevel system of government raises an interesting set of 
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fiscal problems, which are referred to as fiscal federalism or central/local 
government relations. The intergovernmental fiscal relations will be focused 
on the four main areas, which are expenditure and revenue assignment, 
transfers as well as sub-national borrowing.  
Expenditure assignment is a very important base line for the design of the 
revenue assignment and transfers. In order to achieve efficiency in service 
provision, the expenditures should be assigned by the subsidiarity principle. 
The duplication and overlapping of the functions should be avoided as much 
as possible because conflicting competencies will hurt accountability. There is 
no single best expenditure assignment at all, thus the optimal expenditure 
assignment is which could be changed following changes in costs and 
preferences. 
For the implementation of the assigned functions, sub-national governments 
should have sufficient own revenue sources. Conceptually, the taxes with 
stabilization and redistribution effects as well as taxes on mobile factors 
should be assigned to the central government. As a result of this assignment 
the local government does not have sufficient revenue to cover the costs for 
the assigned goods. The capability to increase tax rates by local governments 
depend on the tax competition and tax exportation. The tax competition and 
exporting have both positive as well as negative aspects. Thus central 
government should take the effects of tax competition and exporting into 
consideration in its policy decisions.  
As a result of the decentralized expenditure and revenue responsibilities the 
different regions have different fiscal capacities. Some regions would be 
unable to provide a certain standard of public goods with own tax revenue. 
Therefore, grants from the higher level of government can compensate the 
vertical and horizontal imbalances. The grants are designed to internalize 
externalities and to achieve vertical as well as horizontal equity. Fiscal 
equalization transfers are mainly designed to mitigate disparities within a 
decentralized system of government.  
Many countries around the world have reformed the fiscal relations between 
different levels of government to improve public sector efficiency, hence, 
promote economic growth. The problems that each country faces are at the 
same time very different and very similar. The differences arise from the 
diversity of the national economy, demography, geography and traditions. 
The government sector in developing countries appears to be more centralized 
than in developed ones. As stated in UNDP (2005) the similarities of fiscal 
decentralization in transition countries are mostly involved in the shortcom-
ings of the intergovernmental relations such as inadequacy of local govern-
ment structures, unclear expenditure assignments, lack of revenue autonomy 
and poorly administered intergovernmental transfers.  
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Following Bahl & Linn (1992) there is a threshold level of economic 
development below which decentralization is not effective. Prud’homme 
(1995) stated that in case of developing countries voters make decisions on 
the basis of tribal and political party loyalties, so that preferences are not 
expressed on their votes, hence, public goods provision consist on the 
satisfying the basic needs rather to meet variation in the preferences. In 
addition in countries with less economic diversification, more vulnerable 
external factors such as international commodity prices, natural disasters and 
chronic inflation as well as weak local administrative capacities, centraliza-
tion might be superior to extensive decentralization. Therefore, the centraliza-
tion and decentralization is a continuum rather than a dichotomy and 
effectiveness of decentralization would depend on the optimal distribution of 
the taxing and expenditure responsibilities taking into consideration the 
country specific factors such as economy, tradition and demography as well 
as geography.  
The empirical research was focused on the intergovernmental fiscal relations 
system of Mongolia. Within this perspective the analysis is made on the scope 
and structure of the governmental sector, expenditure assignment, revenue 
assignment and design of the intergovernmental transfer as well as sub-
national borrowing. On the basis of the theoretical and empirical research 
some policy recommendations for the development of the efficient and 
effective intergovernmental fiscal relations system have been developed.  
As former socialist country Mongolia has had a highly centralized govern-
mental sector. In the last decade Mongolia has introduced a number of 
decentralization measures, which followed a top down approach and were 
implemented without any integrated decentralization strategy. As a result 
Mongolia became de-concentrated state with fiscal centralization. According 
to the current legislation, Mongolia has a large number of extremely small 
local governments and this fragmentation could be detrimental for the ability 
of local government to deliver public services effectively. The historical 
research on the local government structure of Mongolia demonstrated that to 
improve the public service delivery the amalgamation of the Aimags and 
Soums as well as a segregation of the rural Bags should be implemented 
taking into consideration the tradition, geography and demography as well as 
culture.  
With regard to the expenditure assignment the analysis demonstrated that the 
current expenditure assignments in Mongolia do not violate the general 
principles of expenditure assignment. However, there exist overlapping in and 
duplications of responsibilities which create unclear assignments and 
inefficient supply of public services. To address the mentioned deficiencies in 
the existing expenditure assignment, the Law of Territorial and Administra-
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tive Units should be amended or replaced by new law on Self Governance and 
Local Budgeting that defines the clear distinction and interaction of the 
competencies between different levels of self governing bodies and clarifies 
norms for the decision making process of the Assembly.  
The revenue assignment is lacking a very important element, for instance 
significant revenue autonomy given to sub-national governments, which is 
vital for the efficient service delivery at the local level. The tax bases for 
custom duties, direct and indirect taxes are under the exclusive legislation and 
administration of the central government in Mongolia. The most local taxes 
are also under the central legislation with partial legislative sovereignty for 
the local government. Within the current system sub-national governments 
have no incentives to increase revenue collection. In fact, any increase in local 
revenues is equalized by reductions in either the tax sharing or transfers. 
Therefore the current system discourages local governments incentives to 
increase own revenue collections and rationalize the expenditures at the local 
level. In order to address these issues the sub-national governments should be 
provided with sufficient revenues, for instance the shares of sub-national 
revenues in GDP could be increased to about five percent by introducing the 
corporate income tax sharing and increasing the livestock tax, so that at least 
the regional and local authorities can finance minimum level of local services. 
The critical problem associated with intergovernmental transfers is that there 
is not a stable, predictable and transparent system of transfer allocation. The 
amount of transfers to sub-national governments is determined largely by 
political decisions on ad hoc basis and disregards local differences in needs 
and fiscal capacity. The current tax assignment contributed to regional fiscal 
disparities due to the origin based VAT and mineral tax sharing. Thus a fiscal 
equalization system based on the fiscal needs of the provinces should be 
implemented. The equalization transfers will at least partly offset the regional 
disparities in revenues and enable sub-national governments to provide 
national minimum standards of local public goods.  
Therefore, in order to achieve efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector 
Mongolian government have to design the integrated decentralization strategy 
considering the country specific characteristics, and implement reform with 
right sequeincing. The policy paper should have the components such as 
expenditure assignment, revenue assignment and intergovernmental transfers 
as well as sub-national borrowing. In addition, the budgeting and financial 
management aspects also should be included in the policy paper. The 
recommendations developed within this thesis with regard the four main 
pillars of intergovernmental fiscal relations system can be considered as 
starting point for the development of such policy paper on fiscal decentraliza-
tion in Mongolia. 
145 
The conduction of the comprehensive survey of the actual expenditure 
assignment of the different governmental levels by unbundling services is 
highly recommended to clarify expenditure responsibilities of the jurisdic-
tions. Finally, the implementation of formula-steered equalization transfer 
scheme based on fiscal needs of the jurisdictions is strongly recommended.   
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Appendix 1: Population of Mongolia by Aimags, 2001-2007 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
          
TOTAL 2 442.5 2 475.4 2 504.0 2 533.1 2 562.4 2 594.8 2 635.2
    West region     
Total 422.4 418.3 414.5 411.6 409.0 410.0 411.1 
  Bayan-Ulgii 96.9 98.9 100.8 101.2 100.0 100.1 100.8 
  Gobi-Altai 64.2 62.7 61.4 60.9 60.4 60.3 60.2 
  Zavkhan 86.8 84.6 82.9 80.7 80.1 80.6 81.1 
  Uvs 85.8 83.6 81.9 81.0 80.6 80.5 80.4 
  Khovd 88.7 88.5 87.5 87.8 87.9 88.5 88.6 
    Khangai region     
Total 558.7 558.5 551.9 552.5 551.8 553.8 555.7 
  Arkhangai 98.3 97.4 96.1 94.9 93.8 93.3 92.8 
  Bayankhon-
gor 85.7 84.4 83.2 83.8 83.6 83.8 84.2 
  Bulgan 63.3 63.5 62.8 60.8 59.9 60.3 60.5 
  Orkhon 76.5 77.4 75.1 78.4 79.0 79.4 80.1 
  Uvurkhangai 114 113.9 113.2 113.2 113.8 114.9 115.7 
  Khubsgul 120.9 121.9 121.5 121.4 121.7 122.1 122.4 
    Central region     
Total 446.5 449.3 442.3 439.0 436.1 436.5 437.9 
  Gobisumber 12.4 12.4 12.2 12.3 12.2 12.3 12.6 
  Darkhan-Uul 86 87.8 86.5 87.8 87.7 87.5 87.6 
  Dornogobi 51.5 52 52.1 52.5 53.3 54.5 55.6 
  Dundgobi 51.3 51.2 50.5 49.9 49.6 49.2 48.8 
  Umnugobi 47.3 47.2 46.7 46.8 46.1 46.5 46.9 
  Selenge 101.7 102.2 101.8 100.8 99.8 100.1 100.5 
  Tuv 96.3 96.5 92.5 88.9 87.4 86.4 85.9 
    East region     
Total 202.4 202.8 201.9 201.5 200.2 200.2 199.3 
  Dornod 74.5 74.7 74.4 73.7 73.4 73.6 72.9 
  Sukhbaatar 56 56.1 56.4 56.6 56.0 55.6 55.1 
  Khentii 71.9 72 71.1 71.2 70.8 71.0 71.3 
    Ulaanbaatar     
Ulaanbaatar 812.5 846.5 893.4 928.5 965.3 994.3 1031.2 
Source: Mongolian Statistical Year Book 2007. 
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Appendix 2: Population, Territory and Livestock Data 
by Soums for 2000 
 I. Arkhangai    
  Soums' name Population Territory (hectare) Livestock 
1 Erdenebulgan 17,932.0 53,607.0 78,703.0 
2 Ikhtamir 6,577.0 484,658.0 138,179.0 
3 Erdenemandal 6,395.0 336,330.0 167,325.0 
4 Ondor-ulaan 6,068.0 439,401.0 119,182.0 
5 Tariat 5,673.0 347,730.0 76,724.0 
6 Khotont 5,544.0 241,740.0 127,896.0 
7 Tsenkher 5,414.0 322,304.0 95,489.0 
8 Jargalant 4,531.0 283,278.0 89,985.0 
9 Tsetserleg 4,437.0 256,730.0 122,592.0 
10 Khashaat 4,347.0 258,524.0 142,528.0 
11 Batstengel 4,106.0 353,653.0 150,226.0 
12 Chuluut 3,965.0 392,754.0 66,628.0 
13 Khairkhan 3,783.0 254,430.0 98,321.0 
14 Tuvshruuleh 3,628.0 118,958.0 53,200.0 
15 Khangai 3,455.0 438,462.0 46,585.0 
16 Ugiinuur 3,401.0 168,648.0 95,225.0 
17 Olziit 3,386.0 172,037.0 93,263.0 
18 Bulgan 2,373.0 321,945.0 37,508.0 
19 Tsakhiur 2,218.0 339,800.0 36,560.0 
  Total 97,233.0 5,584,989.0 1,836,119.0 
     
 II. Bayan-Ulgii    
  Soums' name Population Territory (hectare) Livestock 
1 Olgii 27,145.0 15,000.0 22,341.0 
2 Ulaankhus 8,584.0 605,045.4 131,646.0 
3 Deluun 8,463.0 559,499.0 198,334.0 
4 Tsengel 8,277.0 645,939.0 162,900.0 
5 Nogoonnuur 7,268.0 522,194.0 110,457.0 
6 Bulgan 6,061.0 497,733.1 99,615.0 
7 Bayannuur 5,227.0 233,950.0 101,489.0 
8 Sagsai 5,027.0 313,999.0 96,792.0 
9 Tolbo 4,810.0 297,594.6 89,246.0 
10 Altai 4,149.0 316,356.0 77,929.0 
11 Bugat 3,563.0 215,002.0 68,000.0 
12 Buyant 3,298.0 184,567.0 71,188.0 
13 Altantsugts 3,259.0 178,609.9 67,890.0 
  Total 95,131.0 4,585,489.0 1,297,827.0 
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                              III. Bayankhongor 
  Soums' name Population Territory (hectare) Livestock 
1 Bayankhongor 22,698.0 6,400.0 52,324.0 
2 Galuut 5,271.0 504,745.0 95,320.0 
3 Erdenetsogt 4,890.0 410,023.0 51,553.0 
4 Baatsagaan 4,364.0 744,682.0 116,730.0 
5 Jargalant 4,224.0 417,453.0 73,557.0 
6 Buutsagaan 4,084.0 583,977.0 149,394.0 
7 Bayantsagaan 3,986.0 539,513.0 116,211.0 
8 Bayanlig 3,810.0 1,191,767.0 84,022.0 
9 Olziit 3,741.0 385,283.0 83,100.0 
10 Bogd 3,311.0 398,287.0 89,114.0 
11 Bayan-Ovoo 2,991.0 324,449.0 41,373.0 
12 Gurvanbulag 2,845.0 444,181.0 68,499.0 
13 Bayangovi 2,812.0 466,159.0 54,987.0 
14 Bumbugur 2,783.0 304,377.0 54,961.0 
15 Bayan-Undur 2,721.0 1,689,135.0 86,952.0 
16 Kureemaral 2,486.0 432,832.0 105,008.0 
17 Shinejinst 2,459.0 1,650,123.0 51,988.0 
18 Zag 2,396.0 256,100.0 70,968.0 
19 Jinst 2,381.0 531,264.0 71,840.0 
20 Bayanbulag 2,208.0 317,030.0 63,783.0 
  Total 86,461.0 11,597,780.0 1,581,684.0 
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IY. Bulgan 
  Soums' name Population Territory (hectare) Livestock 
1 Bulgan 12,623.0 9,995.0 44,367.0 
2 Khutag 4,495.0 560,547.0 101,588.0 
3 Khangal 4,373.0 165,564.0 40,922.0 
4 Saikhan 3,946.0 277,276.0 166,003.0 
5 Dashinchilen 3,772.0 231,896.0 128,244.0 
6 Orkhon 3,600.0 421,478.0 120,569.0 
7 Rashaant 3,543.0 101,212.0 37,374.0 
8 Gurvanbulag 3,537.0 268,611.0 150,676.0 
9 Selenge 3,403.0 482,952.0 33,153.0 
10 Khishig-Undur 3,395.0 245,505.0 94,863.0 
11 Teshig 3,374.0 771,992.0 52,227.0 
12 Mogod 2,815.0 282,047.0 140,828.0 
13 Bayan-Agt 2,764.0 307,970.0 120,308.0 
14 Buregkhangai 2,697.0 349,792.0 132,358.0 
15 Bugat 2,024.0 300,446.3 43,670.0 
16 Bayannuur 1,724.0 96,017.0 50,443.0 
  Total 62,085.0 4,873,300.3 1,457,593.0 
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 Y. Gobi-Altai    
  Soums' name Population Territory (hectare) Livestock 
1 Esonbulag-Altai 17,927.0 216,133.0 92,458.0 
2 Tsogt 4,544.0 1,661,804.0 147,929.0 
3 Delger 3,837.0 662,507.0 101,346.0 
4 Bayan-Uul 3,572.0 583,609.0 134,564.0 
5 Khaliun 3,173.0 521,354.0 121,503.0 
6 Tonkhil 2,928.0 732,244.2 121,250.0 
7 Butag 2,864.0 992,086.0 90,916.0 
8 Biger 2,849.0 382,623.0 75,385.0 
9 Jargalan 2,842.0 368,262.0 99,823.0 
10 Khukhmorit 2,814.0 631,451.0 61,721.0 
11 Tseel 2,780.0 563,091.0 106,635.0 
12 Chandmana 2,775.0 462,831.0 72,936.0 
13 Sharga 2,550.0 556,585.0 101,270.0 
14 Altai 2,516.0 2,025,612.0 75,019.0 
15 Erdene 2,471.0 2,506,626.0 84,078.0 
16 Tugrug 2,164.0 534,328.0 78,704.0 
17 Darvi 2,060.0 352,309.0 85,466.0 
18 Taishir 1,828.0 391,312.0 63,728.0 
  Total 66,494.0 14,144,767.2 1,714,731.0 
     
 YI. Dornogobi    
  Soums' name Population Territory (hectare) Livestock 
1 Sainshand 17,279.0 735,101.0 56,979.0 
2 Zamin-Uud 6,253.0 340,603.0 8,104.0 
3 Airag 3,295.0 250,200.0 62,760.0 
4 Khatanbulag 3,135.0 316,051.0 80,013.0 
5 Erdene 2,697.0 405,478.0 71,138.0 
6 Ikhhet 2,542.0 318,869.0 59,689.0 
7 Dalanjargalan 2,396.0 270,674.0 66,407.0 
8 Urgun 2,015.0 541,647.0 67,049.0 
9 Mandakh 1,896.0 485,238.0 64,483.0 
10 Delgerekh 1,881.0 342,781.0 67,137.0 
11 Ulaanbadrakh 1,761.0 607,025.0 68,015.0 
12 Khubsgul 1,658.0 620,889.0 48,025.0 
13 Altanshiree 1,596.0 362,402.0 52,419.0 
14 Saikhandulaan 1,310.0 1,542,114.0 66,043.0 
  Total 49,714.0 7,139,072.0 838,261.0 
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 YII. Dornod    
  Soums' name Population Territory (hectare) Livestock 
1 Kherlen 37,928.0 28,084.0 89,436.0 
2 Bayan-Uul 4,804.0 562,278.0 36,626.0 
3 Dashbalbar 3,578.0 871,315.0 90,594.0 
4 Tsagaan-Ovoo 3,576.0 650,200.0 102,540.0 
5 Khalkhgol 3,434.0 2,809,299.0 32,689.0 
6 Choibalsan 2,967.0 1,015,212.0 53,842.0 
7 Bayandun 2,873.0 623,705.0 66,513.0 
8 Sergelen 2,526.0 416,929.0 87,520.0 
9 Matad 2,350.0 2,283,133.0 54,041.0 
10 Bayantumen 2,067.0 832,080.0 43,462.0 
11 Bulgan 2,065.0 711,111.0 42,817.0 
12 Khulunboir 1,770.0 377,308.0 50,944.0 
13 Chuluunkhoroot 1,579.0 653,931.0 17,211.0 
14 Gurvanzagal 1,421.0 525,158.0 25,852.0 
  Total 72,938.0 12,359,743.0 794,087.0 
     
 YIII. Dundgobi    
  Soums' name Population Territory (hectare) Livestock 
1 Saintsagaan 13,909.0 340,603.0 145,807.0 
2 Erdenedalai 7,185.0 735,101.0 191,627.0 
3 Adaatsag 3,363.0 329,960.0 107,156.0 
4 Ulziit 2,891.0 1,542,114.0 115,496.0 
5 Delgerkhangai 2,771.0 620,889.0 66,626.0 
6 Saikhanovoo 2,720.0 405,478.0 70,079.0 
7 Delgertsogt 2,605.0 250,200.0 84,032.0 
8 Khuld 2,587.0 607,025.0 80,767.0 
9 Deren 2,512.0 362,402.0 103,284.0 
10 Gurvansaikhan 2,508.0 541,647.0 106,204.0 
11 Luus 2,237.0 316,051.0 91,401.0 
12 Gobi-Ugtaal 1,886.0 270,674.0 83,965.0 
13 Tsagaandelger 1,598.0 342,781.0 39,072.0 
14 Undurshil 1,580.0 485,238.0 55,307.0 
15 Bayanjargalan 1,405.0 318,869.0 56,542.0 
  Total 51,757.0 7,469,032.0 1,397,365.0 
162 
     
 IX. Zavkhan    
  Soums' name Population Territory (hectare) Livestock 
1 Uliastai 18,154.0 2,821.0 55,168.0 
2 Tosontsengel 9,776.0 530,233.0 52,402.0 
3 Ikh-Uul 6,691.0 377,598.0 67,790.0 
4 Aldarkhaan 4,298.0 715,829.0 106,878.0 
5 Otgon 3,523.0 600,867.0 97,653.0 
6 Ider 3,500.0 370,805.0 49,940.0 
7 Telmen 3,452.0 344,605.0 49,189.0 
8 Tes 3,301.0 87,229.0 57,361.0 
9 Yaruu 3,248.0 495,614.1 40,443.0 
10 Bayantes 2,683.0 433,898.1 60,802.0 
11 Shiluustei 2,606.0 268,990.0 70,431.0 
12 Durvuljin 2,648.0 726,022.0 115,866.0 
13 Tsetsenuul 2,659.0 237,286.0 56,235.0 
14 Numrug 2,635.0 327,740.0 28,242.0 
15 Bayankhairkhan 2,606.0 255,811.0 46,634.0 
16 Erdenekhairkhan 2,598.0 416,728.0 61,018.0 
17 Santmargats 2,283.0 239,183.8 84,620.0 
18 Tudevtei 2,472.0 267,182.0 29,062.0 
19 Songino 2,214.0 248,953.0 51,319.0 
20 Urgamal 2,057.0 349,199.0 89,138.0 
21 Tsagaankhairkhan 1,984.0 265,332.0 53,712.0 
22 Tsagaanchuluut 2,071.0 257,103.0 73,890.0 
23 Zavkhanmandal 1,498.0 361,137.0 73,423.0 
24 Asgat 1,042.0 65,400.0 15,581.0 
  Total 89,999.0 8,245,566.0 1,486,797.0 
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X. Uburkhangai 
  Soums' name Population Territory (hectare) Livestock 
1 Uyanga 7,686.0 313,936.0 97,948.0 
2 Arvaikheer 19,058.0 17,303.0 23,785.0 
3 Kharkhorin 13,964.0 224,116.0 86,760.0 
4 Khujirt 7,606.0 171,782.0 114,125.0 
5 Bogd 5,744.0 1,015,519.0 241,685.0 
6 Bat-Ulzii 5,643.0 242,820.0 72,289.0 
7 Bayan-Ulaan 5,765.0 270,098.0 75,010.0 
8 Bayan-Undur 4,691.0 324,832.0 123,771.0 
9 Bayangol 4,669.0 354,257.0 157,393.0 
10 Taragt 4,864.0 339,544.0 68,056.0 
11 Nariinteel 4,122.0 270,170.0 95,293.0 
12 Burd 3,987.0 258,138.0 84,592.0 
13 Sant 4,319.0 256,406.0 126,720.0 
14 Khairhandulaan 4,287.0 413,770.0 87,316.0 
15 Ulziit 3,135.0 179,705.0 78,938.0 
16 Bayan-Ulaan 2,852.0 394,111.0 76,674.0 
17 Tugrug 2,944.0 546,688.0 71,996.0 
18 Esunzuil 3,696.0 221,088.0 86,348.0 
19 Guchin-Us 2,388.0 475,250.0 100,395.0 
  Total 111,420.0 6,289,533.0 1,869,094.0 
     
 XI. Umnugobi    
  Soums' name Population Territory (hectare) Livestock 
1 Dalanzadgad 14,050.0 47,630.0 54,904.0 
2 Gurvantes 3,608.0 2,796,727.1 105,517.0 
3 Nomgon 3,013.0 1,946,837.0 123,509.0 
4 Khanhongor 2,470.0 993,129.9 116,451.0 
5 Sevrei 2,327.0 809,572.1 110,468.0 
6 Bulgan 2,395.0 749,815.1 100,446.0 
7 Bayandalai 2,431.0 1,075,073.0 102,977.0 
8 Manlai 2,323.0 1,241,789.0 74,308.0 
9 Khanbogd 2,373.0 1,515,156.0 47,468.0 
10 Mandal-ovoo 2,366.0 643,271.0 85,317.0 
11 Tsogttsetsii 2,185.0 724,643.0 65,491.0 
12 Khurmen 2,177.0 1,239,326.0 64,167.0 
13 Tsogtovoo 1,928.0 652,676.0 51,826.0 
14 Bayanovoo 1,643.0 1,047,370.0 46,425.0 
15 Noyon 1,569.0 1,055,032.0 59,992.0 
  Total 46,858.0 16,538,047.2 1,209,266.0 
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 XII. Sukhbaatar    
  Soums' name Population Territory (hectare) Livestock 
1 Asgat 1,891.0 718,595.0 80,285.0 
2 Bayandelger 4,681.0 785,049.0 187,581.0 
3 Dariganga 2,694.0 477,630.0 86,741.0 
4 Munkhhaan 4,691.0 738,495.0 130,766.0 
5 Naran 1,804.0 350,979.0 75,734.0 
6 Ongon 3,959.0 644,616.0 153,853.0 
7 Sukhbaatar 3,170.0 1,270,873.0 114,314.0 
8 Tuvshinshiree 3,375.0 428,442.0 95,770.0 
9 Tunebtsogt 2,850.0 212,224.0 52,024.0 
10 Ulaanbayan 3,888.0 492,086.0 122,802.0 
11 Khalzan 1,883.0 377,409.0 72,115.0 
12 Erdenetsagaan 6,147.0 1,692,581.0 137,638.0 
13 Baruun-Urt 15,133.0 1,500.0 119,515.0 
  Total 56,166.0 8,190,479.0 1,429,138.0 
     
 XIII. Selenge    
  Soums' name Population Territory (hectare) Livestock 
1 Mandal 23,964.0 484,373.0 70,590.0 
2 Sukhbaatar 22,374.0 4,535.0 22,786.0 
3 Saikhan 8,737.0 131,186.9 45,345.0 
4 Eruu 6,077.0 820,351.0 31,566.0 
5 Bayangol 5,391.0 197,628.2 48,718.0 
6 Shaamar 4,809.0 67,191.0 21,448.0 
7 Tsagaannuur 4,153.0 381,472.1 60,844.0 
8 Orkhontuul 3,760.0 294,083.0 77,434.0 
9 Altanbulag 3,489.0 210,030.0 22,085.0 
10 Baruunburen 2,939.0 281,454.0 72,809.0 
11 Zuunburen 2,507.0 120,494.0 32,646.0 
12 Orkhon 2,817.0 130,626.9 30,489.0 
13 Sant 2,062.0 138,705.9 26,444.0 
14 Khuder 1,799.0 183,865.0 8,591.0 
15 Tushig 1,899.0 249,282.0 17,133.0 
16 Jabkhlant 1,767.0 118,970.0 35,328.0 
17 Khushaat 1,406.0 201,015.0 21,185.0 
  Total 99,950.0 4,015,263.0 645,441.0 
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 XIY. Tuv    
  Soums' name Population Territory (hectare) Livestock 
1 Buren 3,473.0 375,728.0 115,749.0 
2 Batsumber 6,537.0 243,112.0 52,390.0 
3 Bayan 3,193.0 290,531.0 28,776.0 
4 Bayanchandmana 3,458.0 63,220.0 26,077.0 
5 Bayanjargalan 1,789.0 237,651.0 58,818.0 
6 Bayan-Unjuul 2,503.0 479,099.0 102,863.0 
7 Bayandelger 2,058.0 214,656.0 56,666.0 
8 Bayantsagaan 2,724.0 663,048.0 66,067.0 
9 Bayankhangai 1,710.0 100,733.0 43,772.0 
10 Bayantsogt 2,430.0 132,173.0 48,369.0 
11 Argalant 1,988.0 112,637.0 39,062.0 
12 Arkhust 2,008.0 82,912.0 36,298.0 
13 Jargalant 5,513.0 189,581.0 60,768.0 
14 Altanbulag 3,702.0 565,295.0 94,335.0 
15 Undurshireet 2,265.0 268,420.0 82,051.0 
16 Bornuur 4,206.0 112,183.0 50,081.0 
17 Delgerkhaan 2,470.0 221,625.0 46,622.0 
18 Zaamar 6,342.0 277,845.0 100,221.0 
19 Zuunmod 14,837.0 1,893.0 22,918.0 
20 Lun 3,697.0 251,269.0 116,022.0 
21 Mungunmorit 2,569.0 672,756.0 33,328.0 
22 Sumber 1,982.0 50,838.0 18,880.0 
23 Sergelen 2,005.0 387,612.0 47,982.0 
24 Ugtaal 3,534.0 137,428.0 53,702.0 
25 Tseel 3,671.0 165,686.0 56,201.0 
26 Erdene 3,110.0 801,647.0 72,050.0 
27 Erdenesant 5,494.0 304,659.0 137,967.0 
  Total 99,268.0 7,404,237.0 1,668,035.0 
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  Soums' name Population Territory (hectare) Livestock 
1 Kharhiraa 25,369.0 260,433.0 89,230.0 
2 Tes 6,505.0 308,506.0 160,455.0 
3 Tarialan 5,053.0 247,799.0 96,464.0 
4 Umnugobi 4,734.0 314,580.0 95,583.0 
5 Naranbulag 4,626.0 525,781.9 122,989.0 
6 Undurkhangai 3,849.0 465,205.0 92,062.0 
7 Baruunturuun 3,621.0 329,232.0 18,683.0 
8 Tsagaankhairhan 3,087.0 399,374.0 79,675.0 
9 Zuungobi 3,011.0 401,314.0 75,734.0 
10 Ulgii 2,949.0 234,053.0 88,855.0 
11 Malchin 2,919.0 402,778.0 88,062.0 
12 Zuunkhangai 2,908.0 265,823.0 75,438.0 
13 Khovd 2,812.0 297,175.1 69,224.0 
14 Khyargas 2,707.0 341,598.1 87,606.0 
15 Zavkhan 2,484.0 682,364.0 76,563.0 
16 Sagil 2,466.0 379,482.0 78,099.0 
17 Bukhmurun 2,403.0 373,475.0 65,892.0 
18 Tyrgen 2,108.0 225,342.0 69,178.0 
19 Davst 1,943.0 504,224.0 45,861.0 
  Total 85,554.0 6,958,539.1 1,575,653.0 
 XYI. Khovd    
  Soums' name Population Territory (hectare) Livestock 
1 Jargalant 26,887.0 7,253.0 24,759.0 
2 Bulgan 9,056.0 810,478.0 124,227.0 
3 Khovd 5,137.0 282,057.0 97,378.0 
4 Mankhan 5,083.0 433,035.0 143,175.0 
5 Uench 4,760.0 747,673.0 91,606.0 
6 Must 4,076.0 392,729.0 88,931.0 
7 Myangad 3,979.0 325,850.0 100,565.0 
8 Chandmana 3,542.0 601,679.0 137,022.0 
9 Zereg 3,535.0 252,383.0 75,867.0 
10 Byant 3,526.0 368,697.0 81,318.0 
11 Erdeneburen 3,402.0 277,222.0 104,773.0 
12 Altai 3,128.0 1,314,426.1 80,611.0 
13 Durgun 3,058.0 412,812.0 67,062.0 
14 Darvi 3,055.0 560,460.0 77,918.0 
15 Tsetseg 2,833.0 349,199.0 84,342.0 
16 Munkhhairkhan 2,603.0 255,413.0 72,489.0 
17 Duut 2,247.0 214,671.0 60,279.0 
  Total 89,907.0 7,606,037.1 1,512,322.0 
XY. Uvs 
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 XYII. Khubsgul    
  Soums' name Population Territory (hectare) Livestock 
1 Murun 28,416.0 10,290.0 73,289.0 
2 Tarialan 6,030.0 343,067.0 97,671.0 
3 Tsagaan-Uul 5,705.0 586,631.0 105,552.0 
4 Tsetserleg 5,639.0 745,162.0 69,632.0 
5 Galt 5,364.0 359,683.0 144,702.0 
6 Jargalant 5,160.0 254,928.0 54,821.0 
7 Burentogtokh 4,861.0 376,860.0 92,396.0 
8 Arbulag 4,515.0 352,921.0 95,472.0 
9 Renchinlkhumbe 4,405.0 844,834.0 89,096.0 
10 Shine-Ider 4,370.0 205,356.0 88,869.0 
11 Tumurbulag 4,343.0 252,172.0 106,074.0 
12 Bayanzurkh 4,187.0 429,914.0 82,697.0 
13 Tosontsengel 4,145.0 204,223.0 116,628.0 
14 Ikh-Uul 4,059.0 202,382.0 113,487.0 
15 Ulaanuul 3,731.0 1,005,752.0 62,257.0 
16 Tynel 3,649.0 357,733.0 70,373.0 
17 Rashaant 3,466.0 198,252.0 105,290.0 
18 Chandmana-Undur 2,942.0 448,754.0 37,732.0 
19 Edenebulgan 2,853.0 469,438.0 39,550.0 
20 Alag-Erdene 5,446.0 450,296.0 71,314.0 
21 Tsagaan-Uur 2,379.0 873,533.0 21,021.0 
22 Khanh 2,286.0 549,871.0 23,282.0 
23 Tsagaannurr 1,356.0 540,830.0 8,838.0 
  Total 119,307.0 10,062,882.0 1,770,043.0 
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 XYIII. Khentii    
  Soums' name Population Territory (hectare) Livestock 
1 Kherlen 18,003.0 392,792.4 105,075.0 
2 Umnudelger 5,732.0 1,101,333.0 136,371.0 
3 Binder 3,862.0 527,450.0 69,029.0 
4 Batnorov 6,580.0 502,029.1 121,476.0 
5 Galshir 2,697.0 667,608.0 128,411.0 
6 Delgerkhaan 2,967.0 398,581.0 108,915.0 
7 Norovlin 2,851.0 515,110.9 67,071.0 
8 Dadal 2,631.0 488,247.0 18,864.0 
9 Bayanadargana 2,389.0 318,119.0 38,400.0 
10 Bayankhutag 2,034.0 602,943.0 97,413.0 
11 Murun 2,500.0 215,085.0 77,385.0 
12 Batshireet 2,267.0 722,823.0 25,034.0 
13 Jargaltkhaan 2,068.0 275,154.0 82,802.0 
14 Darkhan 8,878.0 445,361.4 92,051.0 
15 Tsenkhermandal 2,147.0 316,885.0 71,480.0 
16 Bayanmunkh 1,687.0 255,385.0 58,470.0 
17 Bayanovoo 1,653.0 327,845.0 58,463.0 
  Total 70,946.0 8,072,751.8 1,356,710.0 
     
 
XIX. Darkhan-
Uul    
  Soums' name Population Territory (hectare) Livestock 
1 Darkhan 68,285.0 10,315.0 63,660.0 
2 Sharin gol 8,458.0 16,060.0 33,887.0 
3 Khongor 5,543.0 253,338.0 49,328.0 
4 Orkhon soum 3,374.0 47,787.0 32,819.0 
  Total 85,660.0 327,500.0 179,694.0 
     
 XX. Orkhon    
  Soums' name Population Territory (hectare) Livestock 
1 Orkhon 71,618.0 24,902.0 125,870.0 
2 Jargalant 3,621.0 59,498.0 42,975.0 
  Total 75,239.0 84,400.0 168,845.0 
     
 
 
 
 
    
169 
XXI. Gobisumber 
  Soums' name Population Territory (hectare) Livestock 
1 Gobisumber 8,650.0 376,819.8 47,967.0 
2 Shiveegobi 2,549.0 85,754.8 12,936.0 
3 Bayantal 987.0 91,605.4 4,070.0 
  Total 12,186.0 554,180.0 64,973.0 
Source: Chimid (2004), pp. 66-76. 
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Appendix 3:  Distribution of Taxes and Fees among the 
Government Levels 
Specific tax 
Tax 
imposed 
by 
Tax base 
determined 
by 
tax rate 
determined 
by 
Revenue 
distribution 
Principle used for 
revenue split 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Central 
government 
taxes and fees 
          
Personal income 
tax C C C 
C (94.1%) 
L (5.9%) 
C - payroll tax 
L- livestock tax, 
unidentified 
income tax, small 
business tax,  
Corporate 
income tax C C C C (100%)   
Windfall tax C C C C (100%)   
Social insurance 
payment C C C 
social security 
fund (100%)    
VAT  C C C C (80%) P (20%) 
S since 2002, but 
sharing rates are 
unstable 
Excise taxes on 
certain alcohol C C C C (100%)   
Excise taxes on 
cigarettes C C C C (100%)   
Excise taxes on 
cars C C C C (100%)   
Excise taxes on 
gasoline and 
diesel 
C C C C (100%)   
Export duty  C C C C (100%)   
Import tariffs C C C C (100%)   
Stamp duty C C C     
License fees for 
mining and 
exploring 
mineral 
resources 
C C C 
C (50%) 
P (25%) 
L (25%) 
S 
Tax on gasoline 
and diesel C C C C (100%)   
Payment for the 
use of hunting 
resources, and 
license fees for 
hunting 
C C C 
C - hunting re-
sources (100%) 
L - hunting li-
cense fee 
(100%) 
  
Royalty C C C 
C (70%) 
P (20%) 
L (10%) 
S 
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1 2  3  4  5 6  
Province taxes 
and fees           
City tax         not yet introduced 
Immobile 
property tax C C C P (100%) 
Since 2005 local 
tax 
Vehicle tax C C C P (100%)   
Land payment C C C P (100%)   
Local taxes and 
fees           
Unidentified 
income tax C C C L (100%)   
Self-employ-
ment tax C C C L (100%)   
Livestock tax C C C L (100%)   
Gun tax C C C L (100%)   
stamp duty C C C C ( 89%) L (11%)   
Forest tax C C C, P L (100%)   
Tax on 
extraction of 
common natural 
resources 
P P P L (100%)   
Fees for springs 
use C C 
P (within 
limits set 
by C)  
L (100%)   
Fees for water 
use C C C L (100%)   
Herb fees L C 
P (within 
limits set 
by C)  
    
Fees for use of 
natural 
resources other 
than minerals 
P P P L (100%)   
Note: C, P, and L denoted the central, provincial and local respectively, and S denoted the 
shared responsibilities. 
Source: Authors’ own evaluation based on budget data from the Ministry of Finance
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Appendix 5:  Aggregate Sub-national Expenditures 
 by Aimags, 2001-2008, millions of Tu-
grug 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008* 
Arkhangai 5,409 5,687 984 1,243 1,356 1,672 3,239 4,232 
Bayan-Ulgii 5,238.6 5,596.0 929.1 1,120.3 1,237.9 1,382.2 2,706.7 3,754.7 
Bayankhongor 5,187.0 5,376.1 939.1 1,350.8 1,449.5 1,616.8 3,358.6 4,570.8 
Bulgan 4,904.6 4,819.7 971.3 1,332.5 1,583.6 1,985.7 3,280.9 3,906.9 
Gobi-Altai 4,951.4 5,337.5 964.8 1,447.2 1,583.0 2,007.4 3,487.8 4,302.4 
Dornogobi 4,209.5 4,965.6 1,399.6 1,690.7 1,912.1 1,381.2 3,475.3 3,484.2 
Dornod 4,780.8 4,932.3 869.9 1,173.7 1,077.8 1,113.4 2,686.8 3,474.2 
Dundgobi 3,263.4 3,573.6 900.2 1,110.0 1,151.1 992.6 2,653.1 3,099.6 
Zavkhan 5,562.5 5,965.8 1,128.4 1,331.0 1,619.1 1,836.6 3,546.5 4,400.9 
Uburkhangai 5,649.3 6,202.6 1,304.8 1,727.5 1,676.1 937.4 3,782.4 4,646.2 
Umnugobi 3,662.7 3,969.5 883.7 1,538.0 1,826.5 2,841.5 5,274.4 3,485.0 
Sukhbaatar 4,239.7 4,328.2 970.5 1,060.6 1,266.3 1,514.2 3,529.5 3,355.0 
Selenge 7,580.3 8,550.2 1,454.8 2,063.8 2,136.0 2,087.3 3,577.2 4,477.5 
Tuv 6,919.7 7,571.5 1,519.5 2,436.0 2,670.2 3,365.9 5,412.0 5,996.1 
Uvs 5,800.3 5,794.6 1,277.6 1,542.1 1,554.8 1,741.2 3,336.8 4,455.1 
Khovd 5,433.5 5,613.2 1,040.0 1,473.0 1,574.2 1,662.0 3,446.0 4,271.2 
Khubsugul 6,374.7 6,808.6 1,261.1 1,479.8 1,638.3 1,919.3 4,199.3 5,063.3 
Khentii 5,399.7 5,329.5 1,002.6 1,296.0 1,378.2 1,587.9 3,577.3 4,065.7 
Darkhan-Uul 6,619.4 7,655.5 1,065.3 1,379.0 1,507.9 1,600.2 2,924.0 3,535.6 
Ulaanbaatar 50,893.8 53,683.8 12,476.9 21,618.5 21,967.3 15,530.3 47,170.4 45,521.6
Orkhon 5,663.0 5,622.0 1,588.4 2,043.4 2,719.0 2,220.0 5,750.0 3,189.0 
Gobi-Sumber 1,590.8 1,521.5 553.5 569.0 601.0 470.7 1,212.7 1,447.1 
Total 159,333 168,905 35,485 52,025 55,486 51,466 121,627 128,734 
Note: *expected budget execution. 
Source: Data from the Ministry of Finance. 
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Appendix 6:                Aimags’ Own Revenues, 2003-2007, 
millions of Tugrug. 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Arkhangai 546.5 529 702.4 893.7 1856 
Bayan-Ulgii 384.3 471.8 453.8 498.7 1285.5 
Bayankhongor 310.9 379.8 521.1 678.5 2,193.1 
Bulgan 590.3 662.5 2038.5 2217.1 3,369 
Gobi-Altai 348.9 421.8 438.9 852.3 1,223.2 
Dornogobi 1,280.5 1,649.2 1826.8 2318 4,158.9 
Dornod 622.8 711.1 795.4 993 2,408.1 
Dundgobi 460.8 455.4 487.2 525.8 1,245.6 
Zavkhan 454.3 441.0 525.3 817.7 1,281.0 
Uburkhangai 564.3 595.4 704.6 783.1 2,997.4 
Umnugobi 572.2 988.2 1756 3898.1 7,911.0 
Sukhbaatar 475.9 474.3 637.3 3224 2,897.4 
Selenge 926.2 1,143.1 1603.7 1794.6 5,324.0 
Tuv 974.6 1,302.9 2128.4 2095.5 4,595.7 
Uvs 641.7 641.6 553.6 566.1 1,187.1 
Khovd 587.2 587.8 655 748.7 1,445.3 
Khubsugul 731.6 721.1 827.3 993.1 2,258.9 
Khentii 686.6 642.6 720.6 826.7 2,232.8 
Darkhan-Uul 1,088.6 1,277.9 1434 2150.4 3,608.7 
Ulaanbaatar 22,790.5 28,943.7 33943 35918 50,185.8 
Orkhon 4,707.5 9,278.6 8,762.6 9580.4 24,438.5 
Gobi-Sumber 412.5 354.6 428.2 506.4 502.1 
Source: Data from the Ministry of Finance. 
175 
Appendix 7: The Liechtenstein Fiscal Equalization Law 
Liechtensteinisches Landesgesetzblatt 
Jahrgang 2007 Nr. 336 ausgegeben am 19. Dezember 2007 
 
Finanzausgleichsgesetz (FinAG) vom 24. Oktober 2007 
Dem nachstehenden vom Landtag gefassten Beschluss erteile Ich Meine 
Zustimmung: 
I. ALLGEMEINE BESTIMMUNGEN 
Art. 1 Gegenstand 
Dieses Gesetz regelt die nicht zweckgebundenen Finanzausgleichszu-
weisungen (Ausgleichsbeiträge) des Landes an die Gemeinden. 
Art. 2 Zweck der Ausgleichsbeiträge 
Zweck der Ausgleichsbeiträge ist es, die Finanzierung der den Gemein-
den obliegenden öffentlichen Aufgaben sicherzustellen. 
Art. 3 Anspruchsberechtigung 
Anspruch auf Ausgleichsbeiträge haben Gemeinden, deren Steuerkraft 
zur Finanzierung der ihnen obliegenden öffentlichen Aufgaben nicht 
ausreicht. 
II. GRUNDLAGEN FÜR DIE BERECHNUNG DER AUSGLEICHSBEITRÄGE 
Art. 4 Grundsatz 
Die Höhe der Ausgleichsbeiträge ist abhängig:  
a) vom Finanzbedarf einer Gemeinde (Art. 5); 
b) von der Steuerkraft einer Gemeinde (Art. 6). 
Art. 5 Finanzbedarf 
1) Der Finanzbedarf der Gemeinden errechnet sich aus den durchschnitt-
lichen Pro-Kopf-Ausgaben aller Gemeinden der vorangegangenen 
letzten vier Jahre vor Antragstellung durch die Regierung gemäss Abs. 3. 
2) Die Pro-Kopf-Ausgaben nach Abs. 1 setzen sich zusammen aus:  
a) den laufenden Aufwendungen (Personal- und Sachaufwand sowie 
Beitrags-leistungen) mit Ausnahme der Abschreibungen auf das 
Verwaltungs- und Finanzvermögen; und 
b) den Nettoinvestitionen. 
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3) Der Mindestfinanzbedarf errechnet sich aus der Multiplikation des 
Finanzbedarfs nach Abs. 1 mit einem vom Landtag auf Vorschlag der 
Regierung festzulegenden Faktor (k), der zwischen 0 und 1 liegt. Der 
Vorschlag der Regierung orientiert sich dabei in der Regel an der 
Gemeinde mit den tiefsten Durchschnittsausgaben. Der so berechnete 
Mindestfinanzbedarf gilt für eine Dauer von vier Jahren und bleibt 
während dieser Zeit unverändert. Die Regierung unterbreitet ihren 
Vorschlag dem Landtag im zweiten Jahr vor Beginn einer neuen 
Vierjahresperiode. 
Art. 6 Steuerkraft 
1) Bei der Steuerkraft wird zwischen standardisierter und originärer 
Steuerkraft unterschieden; sie wird pro Einwohner einer Gemeinde 
berechnet. 
2) Die standardisierte Steuerkraft setzt sich aus den Einnahmen aus der 
Vermögens- und Erwerbssteuer (berechnet auf der Grundlage eines 
Gemeindesteuerzuschlags von 200 %), den Gemeindeanteilen an der 
Grundstückgewinnsteuer und 70 % der Gemeindeanteile an der Kapital- 
und Ertragssteuer zusammen, dividiert durch die Einwohnerzahl der 
Gemeinde per Ende des Vorjahres. 
3) Die originäre Steuerkraft setzt sich aus den Einnahmen aus der 
Vermögens- und Erwerbssteuer (berechnet auf der Grundlage des von 
der Gemeinde für das entsprechende Steuerjahr angewendeten Gemein-
desteuerzuschlags), den Gemeindeanteilen an der Grundstückgewinn-
steuer und 70 % der Gemeindeanteile an der Kapital- und Ertragssteuer 
zusammen, dividiert durch die Einwohnerzahl der Gemeinde per Ende 
des Vorjahres. 
III. AUSRICHTUNG DER AUSGLEICHSBEITRÄGE 
Art. 7 Stufenweise Ausrichtung 
1) Die Ausgleichsbeiträge werden jährlich in zwei Stufen wie folgt 
ausgerichtet:  
a) Stufe 1: anspruchsberechtigt sind alle Gemeinden, deren standardi-
sierte Steuerkraft nach Art. 6 Abs. 2 unter dem Mindestfinanzbedarf 
nach Art. 5 Abs. 3 liegt; 
b) Stufe 2: anspruchsberechtigt sind alle Gemeinden, deren Einwoh-
nerzahl per Ende des Vorjahres unter 3 300 liegt und deren originäre 
Steuerkraft nach Art. 6 Abs. 3 unter dem Finanzbedarf nach Art. 5 
Abs. 1 liegt. 
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2) Die Höhe der Ausgleichsbeiträge der Stufe 1 berechnet sich aus der 
Differenz zwischen dem Mindestfinanzbedarf und der standardisierten 
Steuerkraft multipliziert mit der Anzahl Einwohner einer Gemeinde per 
Ende des Vorjahres. 
3) Die Höhe der Ausgleichsbeiträge der Stufe 2 berechnet sich aus der 
Differenz zwischen der Zahl 3 300 und der Anzahl Einwohner einer 
Gemeinde per Ende des Vorjahres multipliziert mit:  
a) einem Zuschlag von:  
1. 2 Franken pro Einwohner für Gemeinden mit einer Einwohnerzahl 
unter 500; 
2. 1.4 Franken pro Einwohner für Gemeinden mit einer Einwohnerzahl 
zwischen 501 und 2 000; 
3. 1.1 Franken pro Einwohner für Gemeinden mit einer Einwohnerzahl 
zwischen 2 001 und 3 300; und 
b) der Anzahl Einwohner einer Gemeinde. 
4) Für die Deckung der Kosten des Naherholungsgebietes Steg-Malbun 
erhält die Gemeinde Triesenberg einen Sonderzuschlag, der sich nach 
Abs. 3 mit einer theoretischen Einwohnerzahl von 1 200 multipliziert mit 
einem Zuschlag von 1.1 Franken pro Einwohner berechnet. 
Art. 8 Zeitpunkt der Berechnung und Ausrichtung der Ausgleichsbeiträ-
ge 
1) Die Berechnung und Ausrichtung der Ausgleichsbeiträge erfolgt bei 
Vorliegen der notwendigen Steuerdaten im Zuge des Rechnungsab-
schlusses des Landes. 
2) Die Regierung kann während des Jahres Akontozahlungen an die 
Gemeinden leisten. 
IV. ÜBERGANGS- UND SCHLUSSBESTIMMUNGEN 
Art. 9 Durchführungsverordnungen 
Die Regierung erlässt die zur Durchführung des Gesetzes notwendigen 
Verordnungen. 
Art. 10 Übergangsbestimmungen 
1) Für das Rechnungsjahr 2007 findet das bisherige Recht Anwendung. 
2) Für die Rechnungsjahre 2008 bis 2012 werden der Berechung des 
Finanzbedarfs (Art. 5 Abs. 1) die durchschnittlichen Pro-Kopf-Ausgaben 
aller Gemeinden der Jahre 2001 bis 2004 zu Grunde gelegt. Der Faktor 
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(k) zur Berechnung des Mindestfinanzbedarfs (Art. 5 Abs. 3) wird für 
diesen Zeitraum mit 0.87 festgelegt. 
Art. 11 Aufhebung bisherigen Rechts 
Es werden aufgehoben:  
a) Gesetz vom 30. Oktober 1996 über die nicht zweckgebundenen 
Finanzzuweisungen an die Gemeinden (Finanzausgleichsgesetz), LGBl. 
1997 Nr. 25; 
b) Gesetz vom 17. Dezember 1997 betreffend die Abänderung des 
Gesetzes über die nicht zweckgebundenen Finanzzuweisungen an die 
Gemeinden (Finanzausgleichsgesetz), LGBl. 1998 Nr. 24; 
c) Gesetz vom 16. Dezember 1999 betreffend die Abänderung des 
Gesetzes über die nicht zweckgebundenen Finanzzuweisungen an die 
Gemeinden (Finanzausgleichsgesetz), LGBl. 2000 Nr. 38; 
d) Gesetz vom 13. März 2002 betreffend die Abänderung des Gesetzes 
über die nicht zweckgebundenen Finanzzuweisungen an die Gemeinden 
(Finanzausgleichsgesetz), LGBl. 2002 Nr. 54. 
Art. 12 Inkrafttreten 
Dieses Gesetz tritt unter Vorbehalt des ungenutzten Ablaufs der 
Referendumsfrist am 1. Januar 2008 in Kraft, andernfalls am Tage der 
Kundmachung.  
 
In Stellvertretung des Landesfürsten: 
gez. Alois  
Erbprinz 
 
gez. Otmar Hasler  
Fürstlicher Regierungschef  
 
ISBN 978-3-86956-053-3
Fiscal federalism has been an important topic among public ﬁnance theo-
rists in the last four decades. Developing and transition countries have 
developed a variety of forms of ﬁscal decentralization as a possible strategy 
to achieve effective and efﬁcient governmental structures. A generalized 
principle of decentralization due to the country speciﬁc circumstances 
does not exist. Therefore, decentralization has taken place in different 
forms in various countries at different times. 
As a former socialist country Mongolia has had a highly centralized gov-
ernmental sector. Mongolia has introduced a number of decentralization 
measures, which followed a top down approach and were slowly imple-
mented without any integrated decentralization strategy in the last decade. 
The revenue assignment is lacking a very important element, for instance 
signiﬁcant revenue autonomy given to sub-national governments, which 
is vital for the efﬁcient service delivery at the local level. According to 
the current assignments of the expenditure and revenue responsibilities 
most of the provinces are unable to provide a certain national standard of 
public goods supply. Hence, intergovernmental transfers from the central 
jurisdiction to the sub-national jurisdictions play an important role for 
the equalization of the vertical and horizontal imbalances in Mongolia. 
The critical problem associated with intergovernmental transfers is that 
there is not a stable, predictable and transparent system of transfer al-
location. Thus a ﬁscal equalization system based on the ﬁscal needs of 
the provinces should be implemented. 
